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An Argument for a Strong Force Semantics of Believe

Koev, T. (2026). Linguistic Inquiry, 57(4), 869–880

Koev renders the weak semantics of Hawthorne, Rothschild and Spectre as a relation between the holder's credence in the complement and a degree (4), and argues that its scale gives believe strong force. Believe takes maximizers and no minimizers, so its scale is upper closed, and Interpretive Economy gives it the maximum standard, the force of Hintikka's semantics (1). Three tentative pieces of further evidence, comparison classes, the antonym doubt and percentage modifiers, pattern it with maximum-standard adjectives. This file checks the paper's judgments against the fragment's believe and doubt.

Implementation notes

Rows name predicates by form, looked up as a Degree.Gradability among the fragment's adjectives and its believe and doubt. Credences are degrees of a linear order with a top, and probability measures over a countable discrete space for the comparison with Hintikka.

TODO

  • (21): the objective reading of sure, measuring commitment, which (2) needs; the fragment's sure shares the scale of believe, so (2) does not yet come out consistent.
  • The percentage judgments (19)–(20) and the ratings of fn. 9, the second condition of Hawthorne et al. 2016 that fn. 1 sets aside, and fn. 8's exhaustification of doubt.

References

The fragment's predicates

The scale of believe (§2)

Further evidence (§3)

L192–194

Hintikka's semantics (§4)

L215–219

Believe at the maximum standard of the credence scale is Hintikka's believe over the credence's support, the universal force of (1).

theorem holdsAt_hintikka_iffL221–229
{E : Type u_1} {W : Type u_2} [MeasurableSpace W] (Cr : E → W → MeasureTheory.Measure W) [DiscreteMeasurableSpace W] [Countable W] [∀ (x : E) (w : W), MeasureTheory.IsProbabilityMeasure (Cr x w)] (x : E) (p : Set W) (w : W) :
(hintikka Cr).HoldsAt x (fun (x : W) => x ∈ p) w ↔ p ∈ Lassiter2017.likelihood (Cr x w) ⁻¹' Set.Ici ⊤

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