Docs / Studies / Studies.Lewis1973b

Counterfactuals

Lewis, D. (1973). Blackwell

Lewis analyses the counterfactual as a variably strict conditional over comparative similarity: if p, q holds when, as the accessible p-worlds come closer, the consequent eventually holds at all of them, and if p, might q when it holds at some of them however close one comes. This file takes as primitive the theory layer's conditional over an accessibility assignment and a family of similarity preorders (Conditional.variablyStrictImp), which is membership in the filter of necessities over the accessible antecedent-worlds, and derives the book's apparatus from it. Lewis's systems of spheres are the sets of accessible worlds each closer than every accessible world outside, and his truth condition by spheres is the primitive on a total preorder. Comparative possibility by spheres is Lewis's lifting of the similarity order to the accessible propositions, and the counterfactual is definable from it. No strict conditional makes two adjacent stages of a Sobel sequence true, and a variably strict one does. Under the Limit Assumption the conditional is truth at the closest accessible antecedent-worlds; without it, as for a line longer than an inch, the closest-world conditional is vacuously true of every consequent while the variably strict one is not, and conditional excluded middle fails although the ordering has no ties. Stalnaker's theory is the special case of a linear, well-founded ordering, and conditional excluded middle at an antecedent is the filter being an ultrafilter, which ties between closest worlds rule out. Lewis's axiomatization of the V-logics with the counterfactual primitive is sound, its axioms being the laws of the filter, and every theorem of Stalnaker's C2 holds under centering and Stalnaker's Assumption, while conditional excluded middle is not a theorem of VC.

Implementation notes

Propositions are all sets of worlds, so Lewis's assumptions for every antecedent of the language are assumptions for every set. The conditions of §2.3 placing inaccessible worlds above the accessible ones enter by restricting antecedents to the accessible worlds.

The V-logics are stated over Stalnaker's formulas (Stalnaker1968.Formula), the corner read as the counterfactual. The other operators are Lean definitions, so the axiom schema of definitions holds by definition, and Deduction within Conditionals takes the conjunction of its premises as a List.foldr. Centering is Conditional.IsCentered, stated over all worlds.

TODO

  • The completeness of the V-logics (§6.1), and that every theorem of VCS is a theorem of Stalnaker's C2.
  • The representation of set-selection functions (§2.7).
  • Stalnaker's Assumption as a well-ordering of the accessible worlds (§3.4).

References

Eventual and frequent truth

Systems of spheres

L77–80
L84–86
L88–93
L95–98
L100–106
L108–113

On a total preorder the accessible worlds at least as close as a given world form a sphere.

theorem setOf_le_mem_spheresL115–122
{I : Type u_1} {W : Type u_2} {access : I → Set W} {ord : I → Preorder W} {i : I} (htot : Std.Total LE.le) (j : W) :
{x : W | x ∈ access i ∧ x ≤ j} ∈ spheres access ord i

Built from

On a total preorder, if p, q holds when no sphere contains a p-world, or some sphere contains one and q holds at every p-world in it (§1.3).

theorem mem_variablyStrictImp_iff_spheresL124–144
{I : Type u_1} {W : Type u_2} {access : I → Set W} {ord : I → Preorder W} {i : I} {p q : Set W} (htot : Std.Total LE.le) :
i ∈ Conditional.variablyStrictImp access ord p q ↔ (∀ S ∈ spheres access ord i, Disjoint S p) ∨ ∃ S ∈ spheres access ord i, (S ∩ p).Nonempty ∧ S ∩ p ⊆ q

Built from

Comparative possibility (§2.5)

On a total preorder Lewis's truth condition for comparative possibility, that every sphere containing a q-world contains a p-world, says that the accessible p-worlds are at least as possible as the accessible q-worlds under the similarity order (§2.5, p. 53).

theorem forall_spheres_iff_lewisL148–159
{I : Type u_1} {W : Type u_2} {access : I → Set W} {ord : I → Preorder W} {i : I} {p q : Set W} (htot : Std.Total LE.le) :
(∀ S ∈ spheres access ord i, (S ∩ q).Nonempty → (S ∩ p).Nonempty) ↔ ComparativePossibility.Lewis LE.le (access i ∩ p) (access i ∩ q)

Built from

On a total preorder if p, q holds when no accessible world is a p-world or the p ∧ q worlds are more possible than the p ∧ ¬q worlds, Lewis's definition of the counterfactual from comparative possibility (§2.5, p. 53).

theorem mem_variablyStrictImp_iff_asymmRel_lewisL161–167
{I : Type u_1} {W : Type u_2} {access : I → Set W} {ord : I → Preorder W} {i : I} {p q : Set W} (htot : Std.Total LE.le) :
i ∈ Conditional.variablyStrictImp access ord p q ↔ access i ∩ p = ∅ ∨ AsymmRel (ComparativePossibility.Lewis LE.le) (access i ∩ p ∩ q) ((access i ∩ p) \ q)

Sobel sequences

If Otto had come it would have been lively; but if both Otto and Anna had come it would have been dreary (§1.2).

L180–181

At 0, with Otto coming at 1 and 2, Anna at 2, and the party lively only at 1, if Otto had come it would have been lively and not dreary, and if Otto and Anna had come it would have been dreary and not lively.

theorem sobelL183–197
:
have otto := {v : Fin 3 | v ≠ 0}; have anna := {v : Fin 3 | v = 2}; have lively := {v : Fin 3 | v = 1}; (0 ∈ Conditional.variablyStrictImp (fun (x : Fin 3) => Set.univ) ahead otto lively ∧ 0 ∉ Conditional.variablyStrictImp (fun (x : Fin 3) => Set.univ) ahead otto livelyᶜ) ∧ 0 ∈ Conditional.variablyStrictImp (fun (x : Fin 3) => Set.univ) ahead (otto ∩ anna) livelyᶜ ∧ 0 ∉ Conditional.variablyStrictImp (fun (x : Fin 3) => Set.univ) ahead (otto ∩ anna) lively

Built from

The Limit Assumption

Lengths of a line, the actual one at most an inch, similar to the actual one as their lengths are close to it (§1.4).

L209–210

Conditional excluded middle at an antecedent is the filter of necessities over its accessible worlds being trivial or an ultrafilter.

theorem forall_mem_variablyStrictImp_or_compl_iffL254–261
{I : Type u_1} {W : Type u_2} {access : I → Set W} {ord : I → Preorder W} {i : I} {p : Set W} :
(∀ (q : Set W), i ∈ Conditional.variablyStrictImp access ord p q ∨ i ∈ Conditional.variablyStrictImp access ord p qᶜ) ↔ OrderingSemantics.necessityFilter (ord i) (access i ∩ p) = ⊥ ∨ IsAtom (OrderingSemantics.necessityFilter (ord i) (access i ∩ p))

Conditional excluded middle fails for the line although lengths over an inch are never tied: whether the length would be rational is settled by no closeness to the actual length.

theorem not_cem_lineL263–284
{a : ℝ} (ha : a ≤ 1) :
(∀ x ∈ Set.Ioi 1, ∀ y ∈ Set.Ioi 1, x ≤ y → y ≤ x → x = y) ∧ a ∉ Conditional.variablyStrictImp (fun (x : ℝ) => Set.univ) lineSim (Set.Ioi 1) (Set.range Rat.cast) ∧ a ∉ Conditional.variablyStrictImp (fun (x : ℝ) => Set.univ) lineSim (Set.Ioi 1) (Set.range Rat.cast)ᶜ

Built from

Stalnaker's theory

Stalnaker's selection is Lewis's similarity with two further assumptions: the Limit Assumption, and that closest antecedent-worlds are never tied (§3.4).

Stalnaker's theory is a special case: on a centered similarity ordering that is linear and well-founded, the closest accessible antecedent-world is a selection function satisfying Stalnaker's conditions, and the variably strict conditional is truth at the world it selects.

theorem variablyStrictImp_eq_ofDomain_selectionL291–302
{W : Type u_2} {p q : Set W} {access : W → Set W} {ord : W → Preorder W} (hR : ∀ (w : W), w ∈ access w) (hc : Conditional.IsCentered ord) (htot : ∀ (w : W), Std.Total LE.le) (hanti : ∀ (w : W), Std.Antisymm LE.le) (hwf : ∀ (w : W), WellFounded LT.lt) :
(Stalnaker1968.IsSelectionFunction access fun (w : W) (A : Set W) => (ord w).minimals (access w ∩ A)) ∧ Conditional.variablyStrictImp access ord p q = Conditional.ofDomain (fun (w : W) (A : Set W) => (ord w).minimals (access w ∩ A)) p q

The V-logics with the counterfactual primitive

Lewis axiomatizes VC with the counterfactual primitive by Modus Ponens, Deduction within Conditionals and Interchange of Logical Equivalents, the tautologies, the definitions of the other operators, and axioms (3)–(7). VW drops (7), and VCS adds conditional excluded middle as (8) (§6.1). Axioms (3)–(5) and the rules hold on every total preorder. (3) and Deduction within Conditionals hold because the necessities over the antecedent-worlds form a filter containing them, (4) because an antecedent whose negation would imply it holds at every accessible world, and (5) because restricting an antecedent to a proposition possible over it restricts its filter to that proposition. (6) holds under weak centering, (7) under centering and (8) under Stalnaker's Assumption.

L331–337
L342–344
L355–357
L359–367
L396–398
L400–402
L408–425
L517–542
L550–551