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Demonstratives

Kaplan, D. (1989). In Themes from Kaplan (pp. 481–563). Oxford University Press

A sentence is valid in Kaplan's logic of demonstratives when it is true at every context, and necessary when what it says at every context is true at every world. Necessity implies validity (Kaplan.Character.IsNecessary.isAPriori), but necessitation fails as soon as there are two worlds, and for sentences whose content does not vary with the context it holds only if every world is the world of a context. α = dthat[α] is valid, and necessary exactly when α is directly referential; I exist and I am here now are valid but contingent.

Implementation notes

  • Validity of I exist and I am here now quantifies over the proper contexts alone (ProperContext): over every tuple, I exist would be true at every context only if every agent existed at every world, and so would be necessary.
  • An index is a world; Kaplan's circumstances also fix a time, which the necessity of these sentences does not need.

References

The failure of necessitation

Proper contexts

L94–97

A one-agent, two-world model

I exist and I am here now are valid but not necessary: the actual world is the world of the only proper context, and what both say there is false at the alternative, where no one exists.

theorem model_isAPriori_not_isNecessaryL126–135

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