Dong et al. (2026): Value of Information: A Framework for Human–Agent Communication #
This file formalizes the clarify-or-commit policy of [DHH+26]. An agent holds a belief
b over a user's latent intent θ, may commit to an action a of utility U(θ, a), or may
ask a closed-ended question q whose answer y it predicts by an answer model p(y ∣ q, θ)
and which costs the user c. The expected utility of committing, (1), is an integral against
the belief, and the value of acting now, (2), is its best value, decisionValue. The value of a
question, (3), is the answer-marginal expectation of the value of the posterior belief, so the
value of information, (4), VoI(q) = Vpost(b, q) − V(b), is the value of information of the
question as an experiment under the decision value, the notion the paper takes from
[RS61], and the net value, (5), subtracts the cost. The agent clarifies with a
question of positive net value and commits when none has one. Information cannot have negative
value, voi_nonneg, so an uninformative question is never asked, not_clarifies_of_const;
scaling the stakes scales the value of information, voi_smul, so a question worth asking at
low stakes is worth asking at higher stakes, clarifies_smul, and a costlier question is asked
less, clarifies_of_le. Appendix A shows this risk awareness on its 20 Questions task, where a
correct animal guess is worth 1 and a correct diagnosis 10; appendixA reproduces the
contrast on a two-candidate task with a yes/no question of reliability r, whose value of
information is r − 1/2 by voi_reliability.
Implementation notes #
The belief is a probability measure on intents and each question an answer kernel, so (1) to (4)
are integrals, posteriors and values of information of the library, and the clarify-or-commit
decision is the only new object. The policy's choice among the questions of positive net value,
the sequential loop of Algorithm 1 with its clarification budget and linear cost T · c, and the
language-model estimates of belief and answer distributions of §4.2 are not represented: the
theorems concern the decision at one turn, at a fixed belief. Stakes are a scalar on the utility.
The two-candidate task and the reliability 27/50 are this file's illustration, not the paper's.
References #
The value of information and the clarify-or-commit decision, (3) to (5) #
The value of asking question q, (3), is the expected value of the posterior belief.
Equations
- DongEtAl2026.postValue U b P q = ∫ (y : Y), ProbabilityTheory.decisionValue U ((ProbabilityTheory.posterior (P q) b) y) ∂b.bind ⇑(P q)
Instances For
The value of information of question q, (4), is the value of information of the question
as an experiment under the decision value.
Equations
- DongEtAl2026.voi U b P q = ProbabilityTheory.valueOfInformation (ProbabilityTheory.decisionValue U) (P q) b
Instances For
The net value of information of question q at cost c, (5), is its value of information
less the cost.
Equations
- DongEtAl2026.netVoi U b P c q = DongEtAl2026.voi U b P q - c
Instances For
The agent clarifies when some question of questions has positive net value, and commits
otherwise.
Equations
- DongEtAl2026.Clarifies U b P c questions = ∃ q ∈ questions, 0 < DongEtAl2026.netVoi U b P c q
Instances For
By the paper's commit rule, the agent commits exactly when the best net value is at most 0.
Clarifying with a question of positive net value raises the expected utility net of its cost above the value of committing now.
A costlier question is asked less: the clarifying region shrinks as the cost rises.
Scaling the stakes scales the value of information.
Uninformative questions are never asked, at any nonnegative cost.
Information cannot have negative value.
A question worth asking at stakes s is worth asking at any higher stakes s': the
commit-without-asking region shrinks as the stakes rise.
A two-candidate task with a yes/no question #
A correct guess is worth 1 and an incorrect one 0.
Equations
- DongEtAl2026.correct θ a = if a = θ then 1 else 0
Instances For
answer r θ y is the probability that a yes/no question of reliability r answers y at
θ.
Equations
- DongEtAl2026.answer r θ y = if y = θ then r else 1 - r
Instances For
A yes/no question of reliability r answers correctly with probability r.
Equations
- DongEtAl2026.question r = ProbabilityTheory.Kernel.ofFunOfCountable fun (θ : Bool) => ∑ y : Bool, ENNReal.ofReal (DongEtAl2026.answer r θ y) • MeasureTheory.Measure.dirac y
Instances For
Each answer has marginal probability 1/2 under the uniform belief.
After answer y, the posterior puts the reliability r on the answered candidate.
The value of information of a yes/no question of reliability r ≥ 1/2 on a two-candidate
task is r − 1/2.
As in Appendix A, at cost 1/20 a question of reliability 27/50 is skipped when a correct
guess is worth 1 and asked when it is worth 10.