The value of information of an experiment #
An experiment is a Markov kernel κ : Kernel Θ 𝓧 that draws an observation from a parameter.
An agent with prior π who values a belief μ at V μ expects, before observing, the value
of the posterior κ†π; the value of information valueOfInformation V κ π is that expectation
less the value of the prior. DeGroot calls it the information in the experiment when V is the
negative of an uncertainty function, and Lindley's measure of information is the case of
Shannon entropy.
The decision value decisionValue U μ of a belief is the best expected utility of an action.
For it, the value of information is the risk increase of mathlib's decision theory at the
regret loss C − U, so information never has negative value, and garbling an experiment never
raises its value, the forward direction of Blackwell's comparison of experiments. For an
experiment that observes a classifier f, the value of information is the probability-weighted
value of the prior conditioned on each fibre of f; a fixed statistic gains nothing, which is the
law of total expectation over the fibres, and the converse of Blackwell's theorem says that a
classifier never worth more than f factors through f. Observing the parameter itself leaves a
point-mass belief, so its value is the expected value of perfect information, and no experiment
is worth more.
Main definitions #
valueOfInformation V κ π: the expected value of the posterior less the value of the prior.decisionValue U μ: the best expected utility of an action under the beliefμ.
Main statements #
hasArgminEstimator_of_finite: with countably many observations and finitely many actions, a pointwise minimizer of the posterior expected loss is an argmin estimator.riskIncrease_ofReal_sub: at the regret loss, the risk increase is the value of information of the decision value.valueOfInformation_decisionValue_nonneg: information has nonnegative value.valueOfInformation_decisionValue_comp_le: a garbled experiment is worth no more.valueOfInformation_const: an experiment whose law does not depend on the parameter is worth nothing.valueOfInformation_deterministic,sum_measureReal_mul_integral_cond: the value of observing a classifier sums over its fibres, and the law of total expectation over them.exists_eq_comp_of_forall_valueOfInformation_le: a classifier never worth more thanffactors throughf.valueOfInformation_id,valueOfInformation_decisionValue_le_id: observing the parameter is worth the expected value of its point-mass beliefs, and no experiment is worth more.
Implementation notes #
The decision value is a supremum over the action type, 0 when there is no action. The
theorems about it assume finitely many parameters, observations and actions, and the regret
bound C stays inside the proofs of the inequalities.
References #
With countably many observations and finitely many estimates, choosing a minimizer of the posterior expected loss at each observation gives an argmin estimator.
Integrating against the composition of a kernel with a measure integrates twice.
The value of information of the experiment κ to an agent with prior π who values a
belief by V is the expected value of the posterior less the value of the prior.
Equations
- ProbabilityTheory.valueOfInformation V κ π = ∫ (x : 𝓧), V ((ProbabilityTheory.posterior κ π) x) ∂π.bind ⇑κ - V π
Instances For
The decision value of a belief μ is the best expected utility of an action under μ.
Equations
- ProbabilityTheory.decisionValue U μ = ⨆ (a : 𝓨), ∫ (θ : Θ), U θ a ∂μ
Instances For
An experiment whose law does not depend on the parameter is worth nothing.
Observing the parameter itself leaves a point-mass belief at each value.
A fixed statistic gains nothing from an experiment, since the posteriors average back to the prior.
The decision value and the risk increase #
At a bound C on the utilities, the least expected regret C − U of an action is C less
the decision value.
At the regret loss C − U, the Bayes risk of an experiment is C less the expected
decision value of the posterior.
At the regret loss C − U, the risk increase of an experiment is the value of information
of the decision value.
Information has nonnegative value to an expected-utility maximizer.
Garbling an experiment cannot raise its value to an expected-utility maximizer.
No experiment is worth more than observing the parameter itself, the expected value of perfect information.
Deterministic experiments #
The value of information of observing f is the decision value of the prior conditioned on
each fibre of f, weighted by the fibre's probability, less the decision value of the prior.
Observing a function of f is worth no more to an expected-utility maximizer than observing
f.
Averaging the expectations conditional on the fibres of f recovers the expectation, the law
of total expectation.
If observing g is never worth more than observing f to an expected-utility maximizer
with actions 𝓧' and a uniform prior, then g factors through f.