Barwise and Cooper 1981: generalized quantifiers and natural language #
A noun phrase denotes a quantifier — a family of subsets of the domain — and a determiner
assigns to each set A a quantifier that lives on A (the paper's determiner universal, the
one condition the logic imposes on non-logical determiners). The classifications of §4 are
conditions on such families. A determiner is positive (negative) strong when A always
(never) lies in D(A) and weak otherwise; definite when D(A) is a principal filter with a
nonempty generator; a quantifier is monotone when closed under supersets or subsets, and
outer negation, inner negation and the dual exchange the two directions. Appendix C's
propositions are general: a quantifier living on A contains A iff it contains the domain,
so a strong determiner's there-sentence is trivial (C1); definite determiners are positive
strong (C2, C3); the intersection condition is symmetry, and no proper strong determiner has
it (C4–C6); persistent symmetric determiners are increasing (C7); positive strong increasing
determiners validate D N that VP, VP (C8); negation reverses monotonicity (C9); an
increasing quantifier and its dual overlap (C10); a monotone quantifier is decided by its
witness sets (C11). C12 and C13 prove that more than half is definable neither in
first-order logic nor from the unrelativized majority quantifier, so most is a determiner,
not a quantifier. The fragment's quantity words instantiate Table II, and the paper's own
artificial determiners witness that the universals U6–U8 are not logical truths. Under the
substrate's proportional reading of few (fewer than half), few N are N is contradictory,
so few comes out negative strong — B&C's Table II lists few as weak, a classification
their own §4.8 discussion of many and few already marks as unstable. Partial determiners
(the n, both, neither) fall outside the total type GQ α and are not treated.
Main results #
livesOn_apply_iff,there_of_positiveStrong,Definite.positiveStrong: C1–C3.strong_trivial_of_intersective,scopeUp_of_restrictorUp_symmetric: C6 and C7.exists_and_of_scopeUp_dual: C10, withmost_selfDual_of_odd_count.more_than_half_not_definable,more_than_half_not_Q_definable: C12 and C13, withno_tree_means_most, no tree of first-order constants means most.
References #
Quantifiers and witness sets #
A proper quantifier, or sieve, is one that some set passes and some set fails (§4.5).
Equations
- BarwiseCooper1981.Sieve Q = ((∃ (X : α → Prop), Q X) ∧ ∃ (X : α → Prop), ¬Q X)
Instances For
The principal filter generated by B consists of the sets containing B (§4.6).
Equations
- BarwiseCooper1981.principalFilter B X = ∀ (x : α), B x → X x
Instances For
A quantifier living on A contains A iff it contains the domain (C1).
The principal filter generated by B lives on A iff B ⊆ A (C2).
A principal filter with a nonempty generator is a sieve.
A mixed conjunction of an increasing and a decreasing quantifier, John and no woman, is neither increasing nor decreasing (§4.10).
Determiners: strength, definiteness, and the intersection condition #
A determiner is strong when it is positive or negative strong (§4.6).
Equations
- BarwiseCooper1981.Strong D = (D.PositiveStrong ∨ D.NegativeStrong)
Instances For
A determiner is weak when it is neither positive nor negative strong (§4.6).
Equations
Instances For
A determiner is definite when every D(A) is the principal filter of a nonempty generator
(§4.6).
Equations
- BarwiseCooper1981.Definite D = ∀ (A : α → Prop), ∃ (B : α → Prop), (∃ (x : α), B x) ∧ ∀ (X : α → Prop), D A X ↔ ∀ (x : α), B x → X x
Instances For
The there-sentence of a positive strong determiner is a tautology (§4.6), since there are
D N says the domain lies in D(N), which C1 reduces to N ∈ D(N).
The there-sentence of a negative strong determiner is a contradiction (§4.6).
Definite determiners are positive strong (C3).
Under the intersection condition, B ∈ D(A) iff the domain lies in D(A ∩ B), the there
is/are paraphrase of weak determiners (C4).
A strong determiner satisfying the intersection condition is trivial, since positive strong
makes every D(A) everything and negative strong makes it empty; so no proper strong
determiner is symmetric (C6).
A persistent symmetric determiner is increasing (C7).
A positive strong increasing determiner validates D N that VP, VP, since the scope lies
in D of the intersected restrictor (C8).
The dual of an increasing quantifier is increasing (C9 for the dual).
An increasing quantifier and its dual overlap, since D(R)(A) and Ď(R)(B) force a
common member of A and B (C10).
§4.8's artificial strong-but-not-increasing determiner shows U7 (positive strong determiners are increasing) is not a logical truth.
X ∈ D(A) iff X ∖ A is even — positive strong, but not increasing (§4.8).
Equations
- BarwiseCooper1981.evenOutside A X = Even {x : α | X x ∧ ¬A x}.ncard
Instances For
§4.9's some but not all is persistent but neither increasing nor symmetric, so U8 (persistent determiners are increasing and weak) is not a logical truth either.
X ∈ D(A) iff some but not all of A is in X (Appendix C, after C6).
Equations
- BarwiseCooper1981.someNotAll A X = ((∃ (x : α), A x ∧ X x) ∧ ∃ (x : α), A x ∧ ¬X x)
Instances For
The English quantity words (Table II and §4.7) #
Under the proportional reading (fewer than half), few N are N is contradictory, so
few is negative strong, where B&C's Table II lists few as weak.
Some is weak (Table II), since some N is a N is contingent.
No is weak (Table II), since no N is a N is contingent.
Exactly half, the non-monotone determiner of §4.7, is weak, since half the N are N is
contingent, witnessed over Fin 3.
The lower half of exactly half puts at least half the restrictor in the scope.
Equations
- BarwiseCooper1981.atLeastHalf = (Quantifier.NumberTree.ofSizes fun (x p : ℕ) => p ≤ 2 * x).toGQ
Instances For
The upper half of exactly half puts at most half the restrictor in the scope.
Equations
- BarwiseCooper1981.atMostHalf = (Quantifier.NumberTree.ofSizes fun (x p : ℕ) => 2 * x ≤ p).toGQ
Instances For
U6 for exactly half, the non-monotone example of §4.8, says that the non-monotone
determiner is the conjunction of an increasing and a decreasing one, as the monotonicity
constraint requires of simple NPs; exactly n decomposes likewise
(Quantifier.GQ.exactly_eq_atLeast_inf_atMost). On the tree the halves are a ≤ b and b ≤ a,
and their meet is a = b.
Every available reading of all is positive strong (Table II).
Most is positive strong on nonempty restrictors (Table II; Appendix B's SP1), since most
N are N whenever there are Ns. On the empty restrictor the proportional reading fails, as
in Barwise and Cooper's Table I column, so most N can denote the empty quantifier.
On a restrictor of odd size, more than half is self-dual (§4.11).
Appendix C: more than half is not first-order definable #
[BC81] Appendix C (C12, p. 213): over a first-order language
with equality and two unary predicate symbols U, V, no sentence is
true in exactly the finite models where more than half the V's are U's
(2·|U∩V| > |V|). B&C treat most via more than half "to avoid problems
of vagueness"; the theorem is the formal core of their claim that most
must be a determiner, not a quantifier.
The proof is the paper's "Fraïssé method" (pp. 213–214): for each m, two models on Fin k —
V = [0, 2m), U₁ = [0, m), U₂ = [0, m+1) — disagree on more than half but agree on every
sentence with fewer than m quantifiers, their (5). B&C prove (5) by extending a one-one
correspondence that respects U and V one step at each quantifier, their (6), since "there is
always enough room": below m, every Venn region of the two models is either the same set or
large in both. That argument is the Ehrenfeucht–Fraïssé game on monadic models, so (5) is
elementarilyEquivalentUpTo_monadicStructure_iff applied to the two models
(elementarilyEquivalentUpTo_struc), for quantifier rank, which is at most the number of
quantifiers. The language is Language.monadic (Fin 2), with U as pred 0 and V as
pred 1.
The structure M₁, in which U is [0, m) and V is [0, 2m), so that exactly half the
V's are U's.
Equations
- BarwiseCooper1981.struc₁ m k = FirstOrder.Language.monadicStructure (Fin k) ![fun (x : Fin k) => ↑x < m, fun (x : Fin k) => ↑x < 2 * m]
Instances For
The structure M₂, in which U is [0, m+1) and V is [0, 2m), so that more than
half the V's are U's.
Equations
- BarwiseCooper1981.struc₂ m k = FirstOrder.Language.monadicStructure (Fin k) ![fun (x : Fin k) => ↑x < m + 1, fun (x : Fin k) => ↑x < 2 * m]
Instances For
B&C's (5) says that the two models agree on every sentence with fewer than m quantifiers;
for quantifier rank this is (m - 1)-equivalence, since each Venn region of U and V is either
the same set in both models or has at least m - 1 elements in both. The region outside V is
the same set, so 2m ≤ k suffices where B&C take k ≥ 3m.
The theorem #
"More than half the V's are U's" over bare predicates
(Card(U ∩ V) > ½ Card(V), B&C p. 213).
Equations
- BarwiseCooper1981.MostUV U V = (2 * {x : M | U x ∧ V x}.ncard > {x : M | V x}.ncard)
Instances For
The more than half truth condition over a structure.
Equations
- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
Instances For
C12 of [BC81] (Appendix C p. 213) says that no first-order sentence over two
unary predicates is true in exactly the finite models where more than half the V's are U's,
the formal core of the claim that most is a determiner, not a quantifier.
Appendix C: C13 — most is a determiner, not a quantifier #
[BC81] C13 (pp. 214–215): extend the monadic language with a
quantifier symbol Q, where Qx[φ(x)] means "more than half of all things
satisfy φ". Even in this language, no sentence is true in exactly the finite
models where more than half the V's are U's: the relativized quantifier is
not definable from the unrelativized one. So most cannot be a unary
sentence operator over the domain — it must be a determiner (a footnote
credits a related unpublished 1965 theorem to David Kaplan).
The proof is B&C's: a translation star from L(Q) into the first-order language of C12 (Qx θ
becomes "every x outside V and the free variables satisfies θ*"), correct on models where
the domain swamps V (property (P), via "a trivial automorphism argument"); the C12 models then
agree on φ* by (5), "since φ* is a first-order sentence with c(φ*) < m".
The formulas of Barwise and Cooper's L(Q), the monadic language of C12 with the atoms
U, V and equality plus the unrelativized majority quantifier Qx[·], in de Bruijn
indices; atoms apply directly to variables, since the language has no function symbols.
- falsum {n : ℕ} : QFormula n
- equal {n : ℕ} (i j : Fin n) : QFormula n
- isU {n : ℕ} (i : Fin n) : QFormula n
- isV {n : ℕ} (i : Fin n) : QFormula n
- imp {n : ℕ} (f₁ f₂ : QFormula n) : QFormula n
- all {n : ℕ} (f : QFormula (n + 1)) : QFormula n
- qx {n : ℕ} (f : QFormula (n + 1)) : QFormula n
Instances For
ψ.Realize U V xs is realization over the finite monadic model ⟨E, U, V⟩, where Qx θ
holds when more than half of all things satisfy θ.
Equations
- BarwiseCooper1981.QFormula.Realize U V BarwiseCooper1981.QFormula.falsum x✝ = False
- BarwiseCooper1981.QFormula.Realize U V (BarwiseCooper1981.QFormula.equal i j) x✝ = (x✝ i = x✝ j)
- BarwiseCooper1981.QFormula.Realize U V (BarwiseCooper1981.QFormula.isU i) x✝ = U (x✝ i)
- BarwiseCooper1981.QFormula.Realize U V (BarwiseCooper1981.QFormula.isV i) x✝ = V (x✝ i)
- BarwiseCooper1981.QFormula.Realize U V (f₁.imp f₂) x✝ = (BarwiseCooper1981.QFormula.Realize U V f₁ x✝ → BarwiseCooper1981.QFormula.Realize U V f₂ x✝)
- BarwiseCooper1981.QFormula.Realize U V f.all x✝ = ∀ (x : E), BarwiseCooper1981.QFormula.Realize U V f (Fin.snoc x✝ x)
- BarwiseCooper1981.QFormula.Realize U V f.qx x✝ = (2 * {a : E | BarwiseCooper1981.QFormula.Realize U V f (Fin.snoc x✝ a)}.ncard > Fintype.card E)
Instances For
Quantifier count (all and qx both count).
Equations
- BarwiseCooper1981.QFormula.falsum.numQ = 0
- (BarwiseCooper1981.QFormula.equal i j).numQ = 0
- (BarwiseCooper1981.QFormula.isU i).numQ = 0
- (BarwiseCooper1981.QFormula.isV i).numQ = 0
- (f₁.imp f₂).numQ = f₁.numQ + f₂.numQ
- f.all.numQ = f.numQ + 1
- f.qx.numQ = f.numQ + 1
Instances For
B&C's Q-elimination ψ* (p. 215) translates L(Q) into the first-order language of C12,
sending Qx θ to "every x is in V, equal to a free variable, or satisfies θ*".
Equations
- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
- BarwiseCooper1981.QFormula.falsum.star = ⊥
- (BarwiseCooper1981.QFormula.equal i j).star = ((FirstOrder.Language.var ∘ Sum.inr) i).bdEqual ((FirstOrder.Language.var ∘ Sum.inr) j)
- (BarwiseCooper1981.QFormula.isU i).star = FirstOrder.Language.Relations.boundedFormula₁ (FirstOrder.Language.monadicRel.pred 0) ((FirstOrder.Language.var ∘ Sum.inr) i)
- (BarwiseCooper1981.QFormula.isV i).star = FirstOrder.Language.Relations.boundedFormula₁ (FirstOrder.Language.monadicRel.pred 1) ((FirstOrder.Language.var ∘ Sum.inr) i)
- (f₁.imp f₂).star = f₁.star.imp f₂.star
- f.all.star = f.star.all
Instances For
L(Q)-realization is invariant under automorphisms of the monadic model
(B&C's "trivial automorphism argument", p. 215).
Barwise and Cooper's property (P) (p. 215) says that on models with U ⊆ V whose domain is
at least twice |V| plus the complexity of ψ, the Q-elimination star is correct, since
the domain "swamps out" U and V.
C13 of [BC81] (Appendix C pp. 214–215) says that even with the unrelativized
majority quantifier Qx[·], "more than half of all things", no sentence of L(Q) is true in
exactly the finite models where more than half the V's are U's; the relativized quantifier
is not definable from the unrelativized one, so most must be treated as a determiner, not a
quantifier. Barwise and Cooper credit a related unpublished 1965 theorem to David Kaplan.
The truth condition is the codebase's (most : GQ α) #
The C12/C13 truth condition is most with V as restrictor — the
theorems are about the denotation the rest of the codebase attributes to
most, not a local re-implementation.
C12 restated through most says that no first-order sentence expresses most over finite
models.
The engine-level corollary: no tree means most #
No tree means most. Under any translation of words into the first-order constants of the
language of C12, no tree has, across all nonempty finite models and under every assignment, the
truth conditions of most. A tree whose logical form has type t reads back to a first-order
formula whose universal closure would define most, against C12; any other tree is true in no
model, while most is true in the one-element model where both predicates hold.