[PB25] — Some-Things-Considered Desire #
Question-based semantics for desire ascriptions: ⟦S wants p⟧^c is true relative to a contextual question Q_c iff every undominated answer in Q_c-Bel_S entails p. The proposal handles conflicting-desire cases — "S wants p" + "S wants ¬p" — by varying Q_c.
This study file replicates the Nap, Lobster, Lu/Happy/Rain
(deck-stacking), and William-III/nuclear-war scenarios of
[PB25], plus a §11 cross-paper bridge to
[CL16] (an effective-preferential alternative
that refuses simultaneous want(p) and want(¬p)).
The substrate is Semantics/Attitudes/Desire/. All theorems
here either compute by decide over an 8-world model (3 binary
dimensions: nap × rested × pass = lobster × gustatory × ¬die) or
delegate to the substrate's general theorems
(BestWorlds.Want.not_compl,
toPartialProp_strawsonEntails, …).
§-by-§ map #
| Paper | Study file |
|---|---|
| §2.1 vF no-go | §5 (vf_cannot_predict_both, delegates to general) |
| §3.3 Q-relative belief | §3, §4 |
| §3.4 finest=vF | §8 |
| §3.5 best-answer semantics | §3, §4 |
| §3.6 Considering | §3, §4 |
| §3.7 Diversity, Anti-deckstacking | §3, §7 |
| §4.1 doxastic-closure blocking | §6 |
| §4.2 Belief-sensitivity | §10 |
| §5 cross-framework | §11 (CondoravdiLauer bridge) |
Parallel discovery: Cariani 2013 isVisible #
PB's IsConsidered (§3.6) is the same predicate as [Car13]'s
isVisible (§4 p.545–546): both require every cell of the
partition/option-set to settle the prejacent. PB doesn't cite Cariani;
Cariani doesn't anticipate PB. The identification is exposed in
Studies/Cariani2013.lean, where Cariani's
isVisible is defined as abbrev isVisible rc p := IsConsidered rc.options p and the bridge theorem isVisible_iff_IsConsidered
reduces to Iff.rfl. The agreement is independent reinvention across
the desire/deontic-modality boundary, surfaced by the substrate sharing
a common predicate.
§1. Eight-world model #
3 binary dimensions: d₁ × d₂ × d₃. For Nap: d₁ = nap, d₂ = rested,
d₃ = pass. For Lobster (paper §2.2): d₁ = lobster, d₂ = gustatory,
d₃ = ¬die. The Lobster scenario reuses the Nap dimensions via
abbrev — see lobster := nap, gustatory := rested, die := fail
below; the structural isomorphism is documented and not coincidental
(lobster_true := nap_true is the same theorem under renaming).
Equations
- PhillipsBrown2025.instDecidableEqW x✝ y✝ = if h : x✝.ctorIdx = y✝.ctorIdx then isTrue ⋯ else isFalse ⋯
Equations
- PhillipsBrown2025.instFintypeW = { elems := { val := ↑PhillipsBrown2025.W.enumList, nodup := PhillipsBrown2025.W.enumList_nodup }, complete := PhillipsBrown2025.instFintypeW._proof_1 }
Equations
- PhillipsBrown2025.instReprW.repr PhillipsBrown2025.W.w0 prec✝ = Repr.addAppParen (Std.Format.nest (if prec✝ ≥ 1024 then 1 else 2) (Std.Format.text "PhillipsBrown2025.W.w0")).group prec✝
- PhillipsBrown2025.instReprW.repr PhillipsBrown2025.W.w1 prec✝ = Repr.addAppParen (Std.Format.nest (if prec✝ ≥ 1024 then 1 else 2) (Std.Format.text "PhillipsBrown2025.W.w1")).group prec✝
- PhillipsBrown2025.instReprW.repr PhillipsBrown2025.W.w2 prec✝ = Repr.addAppParen (Std.Format.nest (if prec✝ ≥ 1024 then 1 else 2) (Std.Format.text "PhillipsBrown2025.W.w2")).group prec✝
- PhillipsBrown2025.instReprW.repr PhillipsBrown2025.W.w3 prec✝ = Repr.addAppParen (Std.Format.nest (if prec✝ ≥ 1024 then 1 else 2) (Std.Format.text "PhillipsBrown2025.W.w3")).group prec✝
- PhillipsBrown2025.instReprW.repr PhillipsBrown2025.W.w4 prec✝ = Repr.addAppParen (Std.Format.nest (if prec✝ ≥ 1024 then 1 else 2) (Std.Format.text "PhillipsBrown2025.W.w4")).group prec✝
- PhillipsBrown2025.instReprW.repr PhillipsBrown2025.W.w5 prec✝ = Repr.addAppParen (Std.Format.nest (if prec✝ ≥ 1024 then 1 else 2) (Std.Format.text "PhillipsBrown2025.W.w5")).group prec✝
- PhillipsBrown2025.instReprW.repr PhillipsBrown2025.W.w6 prec✝ = Repr.addAppParen (Std.Format.nest (if prec✝ ≥ 1024 then 1 else 2) (Std.Format.text "PhillipsBrown2025.W.w6")).group prec✝
- PhillipsBrown2025.instReprW.repr PhillipsBrown2025.W.w7 prec✝ = Repr.addAppParen (Std.Format.nest (if prec✝ ≥ 1024 then 1 else 2) (Std.Format.text "PhillipsBrown2025.W.w7")).group prec✝
Instances For
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- PhillipsBrown2025.instReprW = { reprPrec := PhillipsBrown2025.instReprW.repr }
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- PhillipsBrown2025.instInhabitedW = { default := PhillipsBrown2025.instInhabitedW.default }
§2. Propositions #
| World | nap | rested | pass |
|---|---|---|---|
| w0 | T | T | T |
| w1 | T | T | F |
| w2 | T | F | T |
| w3 | T | F | F |
| w4 | F | T | T |
| w5 | F | T | F |
| w6 | F | F | T |
| w7 | F | F | F |
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The natural propositions of the model (basic dimensions), used to
feed IsAntiDeckstacking. AD's quantifier is restricted to this
test set — see IsAntiDeckstacking.
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§3. Nap scenario #
Q' = partition by nap × rested (4 cells).
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Q'' = partition by nap × pass (4 cells).
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Beliefs for Nap: nap ↔ rested. Bel = {w0, w1, w6, w7}.
Equations
- PhillipsBrown2025.belNapRest = {w : PhillipsBrown2025.W | if w ∈ PhillipsBrown2025.nap then w ∈ PhillipsBrown2025.rested else w ∉ PhillipsBrown2025.rested}
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Beliefs for Not-nap: pass ↔ ¬nap. Bel = {w1, w3, w4, w6}.
Equations
- PhillipsBrown2025.belNapPass = {w : PhillipsBrown2025.W | if w ∈ PhillipsBrown2025.nap then w ∉ PhillipsBrown2025.pass else w ∈ PhillipsBrown2025.pass}
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- PhillipsBrown2025.desRest = [{x : PhillipsBrown2025.W | x ∈ PhillipsBrown2025.rested}]
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- PhillipsBrown2025.desPass = [{x : PhillipsBrown2025.W | x ∈ PhillipsBrown2025.pass}]
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Nap is true relative to Q' with beliefs nap↔rested, desires [rested].
Not-nap is true relative to Q'' with beliefs pass↔¬nap, desires [pass].
Fail is NOT considered relative to Q'.
Fail is also not predicted true.
Q' is diverse w.r.t. nap.
§4. Lobster scenario (paper §2.2) #
The Lobster scenario reuses the Nap dimensions via abbrev:
lobster := nap, gustatory := rested, die := fail. The two paper
arguments use different questions over these dimensions — Q_{c''}
(qLobGus) ignores death, Q_{c'''} (qLobDie) ignores taste.
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Q_{c'''} = partition by lobster × die.
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- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
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Beliefs: die ↔ eat lobster. Bel = {w1, w3, w4, w6}.
Equations
- PhillipsBrown2025.belLobDie = {w : PhillipsBrown2025.W | if w ∈ PhillipsBrown2025.nap then w ∈ PhillipsBrown2025.fail else w ∉ PhillipsBrown2025.fail}
Instances For
Equations
- PhillipsBrown2025.desNotDie = [{x : PhillipsBrown2025.W | x ∉ PhillipsBrown2025.fail}]
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Lobster is true in c'' (considering taste, ignoring death).
Die is undefined in the Lobster context c'' (paper §2.2): in
qLobGus = qNapRest, no cell settles die, so the Considering
presupposition fails.
Not-lobster is true in c''' (considering death, ignoring taste).
Not-die is also true in c''' (best answer entails both ¬lobster and ¬die).
§5. Von Fintel comparison and the no-go theorem #
The paper's central argument against belief-based semantics: vF cannot
predict both want p and want ¬p simultaneously. Specialised here
for the Nap example, then derived from the substrate's general
BestWorlds.Want.not_compl.
vF cannot predict both Nap and Not-nap with the same parameter set (specific instance).
vF cannot predict both Nap and Not-nap (general no-go, delegates to the substrate). The witness is any belS-world that is Pareto-undominated under the desire ordering.
§6. Doxastic closure blocking (paper §4.1) #
[Vil08] identified the doxastic-closure problem for belief-based semantics: any proposition true at all best belief-worlds is predicted wanted, over-generating for coincidental propositions.
The question-based approach makes fail UNDEFINED rather than merely
false: fail is not settled by Q' (the nap × rested partition), so the
Considering presupposition blocks ⟦want(fail)⟧^{Q'} at definedness.
With Q'' (the nap × pass partition), fail is settled — and the
contrast is exactly the paper's point.
§7. Anti-deckstacking (paper §3.7) #
Lu is unsure if it will rain, but is sure he'll feel happy no matter
what. Q'''' (deck-stacked) = {r, ¬r∧h, ¬r∧¬h} asymmetrically
cross-cuts rain with happiness; the r cell ignores h while the
others distinguish it. Cell ¬r∧h predetermines h (entails it), but
h is not considered by the question. AD fails on qDeckstacked with
test set [r, h].
Q''''' (level playing field) = partition by rain × happy (4 cells).
AD passes for the same [r, h] test set.
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Test set of natural propositions for the Lu scenario.
Equations
- PhillipsBrown2025.naturalPropsLu = [{x : PhillipsBrown2025.W | x ∈ PhillipsBrown2025.rain}, {x : PhillipsBrown2025.W | x ∈ PhillipsBrown2025.happy}]
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Q'''' (deck-stacked): {r, ¬r∧h, ¬r∧¬h}.
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- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
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Lu's beliefs: happy unconditionally.
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- PhillipsBrown2025.desHappy = [{x : PhillipsBrown2025.W | x ∈ PhillipsBrown2025.happy}]
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happy is not considered in the deck-stacked Q'''' (the rain
cell contains both happy and unhappy worlds).
Without the constraint, the question-based semantics wrongly predicts Not-rain.
Q''''' (level playing field): partition by rain × happy.
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With the fair question, Not-rain is correctly predicted false.
The deck-stacked question fails Anti-deckstacking on test set
[r, h] (h is predetermined by the ¬r∧h cell but not
considered by Q'''').
The fair (cross-product) question satisfies Anti-deckstacking — every basic proposition is settled by every cell.
§8. Finest-question simulation (paper §3.4) #
When Q_c is the finest partition (singleton cells = individual worlds),
the question-based semantics reduces to vF. The substrate provides
finest : List W → List (Finset W); here we instantiate it
on the explicit world list of the model.
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- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
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The 8-world list allWorldsW covers W. Hypothesis required by the
substrate's general want_finest_iff.
With the finest question, question-based want = standard vF want
for nap. Derived from the substrate's general
want_finest_iff, not by decide.
With the finest question, question-based want = standard vF want
for ¬nap.
With the finest question, question-based want = standard vF want
for ¬lobster in the Lobster context.
§9. Definedness via PartialProp (paper §3.6) #
§10. Belief-sensitivity: William III / nuclear war (paper §4.2) #
William III wanted to avoid war. Avoiding war entails avoiding nuclear war. But we cannot conclude William III wanted to avoid nuclear war — he lacked the conceptual resources to grasp nuclear war.
Mechanism: William's beliefs are NOT sensitive to Q_nuc that
distinguishes nuclear from conventional war. All Q_nuc answers are
compatible with his beliefs (total uncertainty), so IsBelSensitive
returns false and Defined blocks the inference. A modern person
whose beliefs rule out nuclear war DOES have belief-sensitive context,
so the inference goes through.
Strawson upward monotonicity is the closure principle at issue;
[PB25] §4.2 argues that question-based semantics
must be Strawson-but-not-naively upward monotonic, with definedness
gating the inference. The substrate's
toPartialProp_strawsonEntails captures the licit
direction.
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Natural-prop test set for the nuclear-war scenario. The Nap-vs-war
distinction (nap) and the war-of-any-kind distinction
(avoidNuclearWar) are the salient dimensions; rested and
pass are not part of this scenario's vocabulary.
Equations
- PhillipsBrown2025.naturalPropsNuclear = [{x : PhillipsBrown2025.W | x ∈ PhillipsBrown2025.nap}, {x : PhillipsBrown2025.W | x ∈ PhillipsBrown2025.avoidNuclearWar}]
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William III: total uncertainty (all worlds compatible).
Equations
- PhillipsBrown2025.belWilliam = Set.univ
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- PhillipsBrown2025.instDecidablePredWMemSetBelWilliam x✝ = isTrue trivial
Modern person: beliefs rule out nuclear war (peace ∨ conventional).
Instances For
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- PhillipsBrown2025.desAvoidWar = [{x : PhillipsBrown2025.W | x ∈ PhillipsBrown2025.nap}]
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§11. Cross-paper bridge: [CL16] #
[CL16]'s exact-match want over an effective —
pointwise consistent — preferential background is jointly
belief-consistent (PreferenceStructure.maxElts_pair_belief_compatible):
if both Preferential.Want P a φ w and Preferential.Want P a ψ w hold, then
(φ ∩ ψ) ∩ B(a, w) ≠ ∅. Specialized to ψ = φᶜ, the conclusion
becomes ∅ ∩ B(a, w) ≠ ∅, which is contradictory. So C&L forbids
simultaneous want(p) and want(¬p) against a single belief state and
preference structure.
[PB25] resolves the conflict by varying the
contextual question Q_c (and the contextually-relevant belS) per
ascription. C&L resolves it by varying the preference structure (per
reading: Preferential.Want / WantSufficient / WantNecessary). The two
resolutions are orthogonal — both can coexist in a unified theory of
desire, but they make non-overlapping claims.
C&L's joint-belief-consistency, specialized to ψ = φᶜ: no single
exact-match want over a consistent background can hold of both φ
and ¬φ simultaneously, since their intersection is empty.
This is a paper-level contrast with PB §3: PB makes both
nap_true and not_nap_true work by varying Q_c and belS; the
C&L analysis would need a different background per ascription to
reproduce the contrast.
The belief-based class and its no-go (paper §2) #
The paper's §2 thesis is class-level: conflicting desire ascriptions
falsify every semantics on the orthodox belief-based approach —
[Hei92], [vF99a], Levinson 2003, and their descendants.
BeliefBasedDesireSemantics formalizes the class: a desire-semantic
device over (Bel_S, parameters, evaluation world, proposition) with no
contextual question parameter outside that shape. Both von Fintel and
Heim are instances (vonFintelSemantics, heimSemantics), each proved
conflict-blocking by delegation to the substrate's per-account no-go
theorems (BestWorlds.Want.not_compl, Conditional.Want.not_compl).
PB's QuestionBased.Want evades the no-go by selecting from
Q-Bel_S rather than directly from Bel_S — it is not an
instance of BeliefBasedDesireSemantics (the question parameter
answers plays a non-trivial role outside the shape).
A belief-based desire semantics on world type W: defined is the
presuppositional definedness condition, want the truth condition.
Decidability inside instances is supplied classically — the
structure is for Prop-level reasoning, not for decide.
- Param : Type u_2
Type of additional parameters (desire list for von Fintel, similarity + pref for Heim, etc.).
Definedness condition: the presupposition that ⟦S wants p⟧^c is defined at the configuration.
Truth condition: when defined, the prediction of ⟦S wants p⟧^c.
Instances For
A semantics is conflict-blocking if no parameters/world make
want(p) and want(¬p) both true when both are defined — the
paper's §2 no-go in slogan form.
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- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
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von Fintel as a BeliefBasedDesireSemantics instance. defined
requires both p- and ¬p-witnesses in belS — strong enough that some
belS-world is necessarily undominated, which the no-go needs.
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- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
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Heim as a BeliefBasedDesireSemantics instance: definedness is her
(40) amendment.
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- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
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von Fintel is conflict-blocking (BestWorlds.Want.not_compl).
Heim is conflict-blocking at any frame and evaluation world with
antisymmetric desirability (Conditional.Want.not_compl).
[Las17a] also evades the no-go but via numerical
threshold + graded value rather than question-sensitivity. The
Lassiter substrate's exists_want_and_want_compl exhibits a
concrete configuration where both want(p) and want(¬p) fire on
a single (belS, pr, V, θ) — falsifying IsConflictBlocking.
Lassiter and PB are now formalized as two distinct non-instances
of BeliefBasedDesireSemantics. PB's escape route: question
parameter outside the BBS shape. Lassiter's: numerical threshold
on graded expected value. The cross-paper picture: the typology
correctly excludes both, and they evade via genuinely different
mechanisms.
Summary #
The 8-world model verifies all of the paper's quantitative predictions
that fit the 3-binary-dimension encoding (Nap, Lobster-via-isomorphism,
Lu/deck-stacking, William-III). The substrate carries the general
arguments (no-go for vF, no-go for Heim, Strawson upward monotonicity,
and the universal finest-question identity
want_finest_iff); the
belief-based-class typology — the paper's own §2 packaging — is
formalized above. The §11 bridge makes the disagreement with C&L explicit;
heimSemantics_IsConflictBlocking shows the no-go covers Heim as well.
What's deferred:
The Lobster scenario reuses Nap's dimensions via
abbrev— a 4-dimension model would letqLobGusandqLobDiebe genuinely distinct in their underlying worlds. The current encoding is honest (qLobGus := qNapRest) and adequate for the structural argument.[Crn14] is the acknowledged precursor of the question-based semantics; a Crnič-2011 study file is the natural next paper.
The CPR overgeneration argument (paper §2.2) is handled here via
die_not_considered_in_qLobGus. A separate CPR formalization (paper §2.4) is not yet in linglib.