[Las17a] (apparatus) / [Las11] (want application) — Expected-value desire #
[Las17a] ch.7 ("Scalar goodness", not a desire chapter) develops an expected-value semantics for evaluative gradable predicates; [Las11] (NYU dissertation, ch.6) applies the apparatus to want. The book extends the good analysis to want in a single sentence at §8.13 (p.249) — want is gradable like like, matter, care, need.
This study file:
- §1 builds the bare-threshold conflict-witness model (4 worlds,
uniform prior 1/4, V = (10, 4, 4, 0), θ = 3/2,
p = {w₀, w₁}). - §2 replicates the conflict predictions:
want_p ∧ want_negp. - §3 cross-paper bridge to [CL16]: C&L's consistency-driven belief-compatibility forbids the witness; the Lassiter bare apparatus exhibits it. Different mechanisms.
- §4 cross-paper bridge to [Hei92]: same configuration is
Conditional.Defined-OK, butConditional.Want.not_complrules out joint truth. Heim's (40) amendment is the structural analog of Lassiter's Sloman. - §5 Sloman's Principle blocks the witness for Lassiter's full account. The bare-threshold conflict witness is exactly Cariani's Weakening counter-model (Lassiter's Table 8.4 reconstruction of the [Car16] actualist Weakening attack, applied to EV; Cariani's own counter-model uses actualist closeness, not EV) p.239); Lassiter's response is Sloman's Principle, which excludes it. The witness is a falsifier of the bare form, not of Lassiter's actual position.
The chronological-dependency rule applies: this file references
[PB25] only in docstring prose (PB is later);
PhillipsBrown2025.lean already cross-references Lassiter via its
BeliefBasedDesireSemantics typology (the paper's own §2 packaging,
formalized in that study file).
§1. The 4-world conflict-witness model #
Following [Las17a] §7.6 eq. 7.22 (apparatus) and
[Las11] ch.6 (want application). Uniform prior over
Fin 4; value function asymmetric on {w₀, w₁} vs {w₂, w₃}.
Value function: V(w₀) = 10, V(w₁) = 4, V(w₂) = 4, V(w₃) = 0.
Equations
- Lassiter2017Desire.value 0 = 10
- Lassiter2017Desire.value 1 = 4
- Lassiter2017Desire.value 2 = 4
- Lassiter2017Desire.value 3 = 0
Instances For
Threshold for "significantly above neutral" — Lassiter 2017 §7.9 treats this as contextually supplied.
Equations
- Lassiter2017Desire.threshold = 3 / 2
Instances For
The agent's belief state: total uncertainty (all worlds compatible).
Matches Lassiter's D = epistemically possible worlds convention
(§7.6 p.187).
Equations
- Lassiter2017Desire.belTotal = Set.univ
Instances For
Equations
- Lassiter2017Desire.instDecidablePredWMemSetBelTotal x✝ = isTrue trivial
§2. The conflict predictions #
E_V(p | belS) = (1/4 · 10 + 1/4 · 4) / (1/4 + 1/4) = (14/4) / (1/2) = 7
E_V(¬p | belS) = (1/4 · 4 + 1/4 · 0) / (1/4 + 1/4) = 1 / (1/2) = 2
With θ = 3/2, both are above threshold → both are wanted.
§3. Cross-paper bridge: [CL16] #
C&L's PreferenceStructure.maxElts_pair_belief_compatible says that
for any preferential background P pointwise consistent with the
belief state, Preferential.Want P a φ w ∧ Preferential.Want P a ψ w
implies (φ ∩ ψ) ∩ B(a, w) ≠ ∅.
Specialized to ψ = φᶜ: the intersection is empty, so simultaneous
truth is impossible.
Lassiter's bare-threshold apparatus exhibits exactly such a configuration. The two frameworks make orthogonal predictions on the 4-world model.
C&L blocks any pair Want φ ∧ Want ¬φ over a
consistent background — C&L cannot reproduce Lassiter's witness.
§4. Cross-paper bridge: [Hei92] #
Heim's (40) amendment + comparative-belief semantics block simultaneous
want p ∧ want ¬p (substrate's Conditional.Want.not_compl). The 4-world
conflict witness configuration is Conditional.Defined-OK on targetProp (both p-worlds
and ¬p-worlds are in belTotal), so Heim's no-go applies — and Heim's
prediction differs from Lassiter's.
This is the analog: Heim's (40) plays the role for comparative-belief that Sloman plays for Lassiter — both block single-V/single-context conflict.
On the witness configuration, Heim's no-go theorem applies — for any frame with
antisymmetric desirability, want cannot make both targetProp and its negation
true.
§5. Sloman's Principle blocks the witness for Lassiter's full account #
Per [Las17a] §8.11 (p.245): "we should not weaken the semantics to make room for the simultaneous truth of ought(φ) and ought(¬φ). Instead, we should allow that there are various, possibly conflicting sources of value..." Sloman's Principle (eq. 8.16, p.216) is the constraint that excludes single-V conflict.
On the witness model with alts = [targetProp, ¬targetProp]:
- E_V(targetProp) = 7, E_V(¬targetProp) = 2.
- Sloman for
targetProp: requires7 > 2✓. - Sloman for
¬targetProp: requires2 > 7✗.
So WantWithSloman blocks the conflict on this configuration —
matching Lassiter's actual stated position. The bare-threshold witness
is exhibited by conflict_concrete only because it ignores Sloman;
Lassiter himself would say this is the wrong way to formalize his
account.
The two-element alternative set for the witness model.
Equations
Instances For
Lassiter's full account blocks the witness via Sloman's Principle
(WantWithSloman.not_compl).