Putting oughts together #
@cite{boylan-2023}
Semantics and Pragmatics 16, Article 5: 1–53.
Core Proposal #
Consistent Agglomeration — when φ and ψ are consistent, ⌜ought φ⌝ and ⌜ought ψ⌝ entail ⌜ought (φ ∧ ψ)⌝ — is valid for deontic but not epistemic ought. Boylan gives a unified semantics that derives this asymmetry from three independently motivated components:
Existential semantics: ought is an existential quantifier over the propositionally best partial answers to a relevance question (PBEST), not a universal quantifier over best worlds.
Question-sensitivity: The ordering only ranks partial answers to a contextually supplied relevance question Q, following @cite{karttunen-1977}'s partition semantics.
Pairwise consistency definedness: ought is defined only when all pairs in PBEST are consistent with the background information.
The deontic/epistemic split arises from a structural difference in orderings: deontic orderings satisfy an averaging constraint (a disjunction cannot be worse than ALL its disjuncts), while epistemic orderings can violate it (a disjunction can be more probable than any disjunct).
Structure #
The file is organized top-down: abstract framework first, concrete applications second.
§§1–6 establish the formal machinery — proposition-level orderings, partitions (partial/complete answers), PBEST, pairwise consistency, ought, and ordering assumptions (Assumptions 1–6 from the appendix).
§7 derives the general structural properties from those assumptions:
- Fact 1 (
fact1_partial_complete): Partition disjunction — a partial answer and complete answer are either nested or disjoint. - Fact 2 (
fact2_unique_deontic_complete): Under deontic orderings, PBEST contains exactly one complete answer. - Fact 3 (
fact3_deontic_boxy): Singleton PBEST reduces Boylan's ought to Kratzer necessity. - Fact 4 (
fact4_no_agglomeration): Singleton PBEST validates Agglomeration. - Inheritance (
inheritance): φ ⊨ ψ → ⌜ought φ⌝ ⊨ ⌜ought ψ⌝. - No dilemma (
no_dilemma): Pairwise consistency prevents ⌜ought φ⌝ ∧ ⌜ought ¬φ⌝.
§§8–14 instantiate the framework for concrete scenarios (The Office, Dessert) and comparisons (conflict account, Kratzer bridge).
Connection to Existing Infrastructure #
- Builds on
Kratzer.Ordering(bestWorlds,atLeastAsGoodAs,accessibleWorlds,ModalBase,OrderingSource). - Bridges to
Kratzer.Background(isConsistent↔pairConsistent). - Connects to
Kratzer.Flavor(EpistemicFlavor,DeonticFlavor). - Contrasts with the universal-quantifier accounts in
Directive.lean(@cite{von-fintel-iatridou-2008}) andRubinstein2014.lean(@cite{rubinstein-2014}), which model weak necessity as ∀ over refined best-world sets. Boylan's operator is existential over propositions.
Computable list of accessible worlds for use in the Boylan framework.
accessibleWorlds is now Set-valued (noncomputable); for the decide-
driven machinery here we ignore the (always empty) modal base and return
allWorlds. The Office and Dessert scenarios both use empty bases.
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Lifting world ordering to propositions #
Kratzer's ordering ranks worlds. Boylan needs ordering over propositions (subsets of the modal base). We lift the world ordering: a proposition p is at least as good as q iff every world satisfying q is at-least-as-good-as some world satisfying p. In practice, Boylan's ordering over partial answers is supplied by context (probability for epistemics, value for deontics), so we parameterize directly over a proposition-level ordering.
A proposition-level ordering: ranks propositions relative to an evaluation world. This abstracts over the source of the ordering (probability, normality, deontic value, etc.).
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- Boylan2023.PropOrdering = (Boylan2023.World → (Boylan2023.World → Bool) → (Boylan2023.World → Bool) → Bool)
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Questions as partitions #
The relevance question Q restricted to the modal base f(w) partitions the accessible worlds into cells. Complete answers are individual cells; partial answers are unions of cells. This is the mathematical foundation for Boylan's semantics — ought quantifies over the best partial answers.
The partition framework corresponds to Assumptions 4 (question-sensitivity), 5 (partition invariance), and 6 (comparability) from the appendix.
A partition of accessible worlds into non-empty pairwise-disjoint cells. Models Q|f(w) — the relevance question restricted to the modal base.
- cells : List (World → Bool)
Every accessible world belongs to some cell.
- disjoint (c₁ : World → Bool) : c₁ ∈ self.cells → ∀ c₂ ∈ self.cells, c₁ ≠ c₂ → ∀ w ∈ accessible, ¬(c₁ w = true ∧ c₂ w = true)
Distinct cells share no accessible world.
Every cell contains at least one accessible world.
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A partial answer is a union of cells: if p intersects a cell on the accessible worlds, it contains the entire cell.
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- Q.isPartialAnswer p = ∀ c ∈ Q.cells, (∃ w ∈ acc, c w = true ∧ p w = true) → ∀ w ∈ acc, c w = true → p w = true
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A complete answer is a single cell of the partition.
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- Q.isCompleteAnswer q = (q ∈ Q.cells)
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Every non-empty partial answer contains at least one complete cell. Since p is a union of cells and is non-empty, some cell's accessible worlds are entirely within p.
PBEST #
PBEST(w, f, g, Q) = {p ⊆ f(w) : p ≠ ∅ and ¬∃q ⊆ f(w) : q ≺ p}
The set of undominated (best) propositions among the partial answers to Q that are subsets of the modal base information f(w). We take a list of candidate propositions (the partial answers to Q restricted to f(w)) and filter to those that are undominated under the ordering.
Strict betterness between propositions: p is strictly better than q.
Equations
- Boylan2023.StrictlyBetter ord w p q = (ord w p q = true ∧ ¬ord w q p = true)
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PBEST: the propositionally best partial answers.
Given a list of candidate propositions (partial answers to Q restricted to f(w)), returns those that are non-empty on the accessible worlds and undominated under the ordering.
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- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
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PBEST bridge lemmas #
Consistency definedness condition #
⟦ought φ⟧ is defined only if for all p and q in PBEST(w,f,g,Q), (p ∩ q) ∩ f(w) ≠ ∅. This is pairwise, not global, consistency.
The key insight: {Alice is in, Bob is in, ..., Not everyone is in} is pairwise consistent (any two people can both be in) but globally inconsistent (not everyone can be in while someone is absent).
Two propositions are consistent with respect to background information: there exists a world satisfying both p, q, and the modal base.
Equations
- Boylan2023.pairConsistent p q accessible = accessible.any fun (w : Boylan2023.World) => p w && q w
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All pairs in a list of propositions are consistent.
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- Boylan2023.pairwiseConsistent props accessible = props.all fun (p : Boylan2023.World → Bool) => props.all fun (q : Boylan2023.World → Bool) => Boylan2023.pairConsistent p q accessible
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Definedness condition for ought: PBEST is pairwise consistent.
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- Boylan2023.oughtDefined ord w candidates accessible = Boylan2023.pairwiseConsistent (Boylan2023.PBEST ord w candidates accessible) accessible
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Boylan's ought #
(a) ⟦ought φ⟧^{w,f,g,Q} is defined only if for all p and q in PBEST(w,f,g,Q), p ∩ q is consistent with f(w).
(b) If defined, ⟦ought φ⟧^{w,f,g,Q} iff ∃p ∈ PBEST(w,f,g,Q): ∀w' ∈ p: ⟦φ⟧^{w'} = 1
Boylan's ought: existential quantifier over PBEST.
Returns none when the definedness condition fails.
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- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
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Ordering constraints #
The deontic/epistemic asymmetry arises from structural differences in orderings. Deontic orderings satisfy an averaging constraint: a disjunction's value lies between its best and worst disjuncts. Epistemic orderings violate this: P(A ∨ B) can exceed max(P(A), P(B)).
These correspond to Assumptions 1 (Limit) and 2 (Deontic orderings) from the appendix.
The deontic constraint on a proposition-level ordering (Assumption 2).
For every proposition p that contains a complete answer (cell) q ⊆ p on the accessible worlds, some complete answer q' ⊆ p is at least as good as p. This ensures a complete answer makes it into PBEST under deontic orderings.
Epistemics violate this: a disjunction can be more probable than any disjunct (P(A∨B) > max(P(A), P(B)) when A,B overlap).
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- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
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Transitivity of the ordering (implicit in Kratzer's framework).
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- Boylan2023.orderingTransitive ord w = ∀ (a b c : Boylan2023.World → Bool), ord w a b = true → ord w b c = true → ord w a c = true
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Structural properties of Boylan's ought #
The general properties derived from the framework above. These hold for all orderings, modal bases, and candidate sets — they are not finite data checks but structured proofs from the assumptions.
From the appendix: Facts 1–4 establish that deontic ought reduces to Kratzer necessity (Facts 2–3) and validates Agglomeration (Fact 4), while epistemic ought can fail Agglomeration (Fact 5, §8 below).
From §10–11: Inheritance and No-dilemma hold for all flavors.
Fact 1: For any partial answer p and complete answer q (cell), either q ⊆ p or p ∩ q = ∅ on the accessible worlds.
Proof: q is a cell. If q and p share an accessible world v, then
since p is a union of cells, all of q's accessible worlds must be in p
(by isPartialAnswer applied to cell q). Otherwise disjoint.
Distinct cells of a partition are pairwise inconsistent — they share no accessible world. This is the key to uniqueness in Fact 2.
Key lemma: If p is undominated among candidates and q ≽ p (at least as good), then q is also undominated — given transitivity.
Proof: Suppose r ≻ q (r strictly better). By transitivity r ≽ p (from r ≽ q ≽ p). If also p ≽ r, then by transitivity q ≽ r (from q ≽ p ≽ r), contradicting r ≻ q. So ¬(p ≽ r), hence r ≻ p, contradicting p's undominatedness.
Fact 2 — Unique Deontic Complete Answer #
Proof sketch (Boylan, p. 46):
Existence. PBEST is non-empty (Assumption 1); take p ∈ PBEST. Since p is
a partial answer, some cell q ⊆ p (partial_contains_cell). By the deontic
constraint (Assumption 2 / isDeontic), some cell q' ⊆ p is at least as good
as p (q' ≽ p). By undominated_of_geq, q' is also undominated. Since q' is
non-empty (a cell) and in the candidates, q' ∈ PBEST.
Uniqueness. Suppose q₁ ≠ q₂ are both cells in PBEST. By
cells_pairInconsistent, pairConsistent q₁ q₂ acc = false. But
pairwiseConsistent requires all PBEST pairs to be consistent — contradiction.
Fact 2: Under a deontic, transitive ordering with pairwise consistency, PBEST contains exactly one complete answer.
Fact 3 — Deontic Ought Is Boxy (General) #
When PBEST = [q] (a singleton containing one complete answer), Boylan's existential ought reduces to universal quantification over q — exactly Kratzer necessity relativized to the unique best complete answer.
Fact 3: When PBEST is a singleton {q}, ⌜ought φ⌝ = true iff all accessible q-worlds satisfy φ.
Fact 4: Under the hypotheses of Fact 3 (PBEST = [q]), Agglomeration holds: ⌜ought φ⌝ ∧ ⌜ought ψ⌝ → ⌜ought (φ ∧ ψ)⌝.
Inheritance and No-Dilemma #
Inheritance: If φ entails ψ, then ⌜ought φ⌝ entails ⌜ought ψ⌝. This is a general result — not a finite data check — that holds for all orderings, modal bases, and candidate sets. Contrastivist accounts generally invalidate this (§10).
No dilemma when defined: Boylan's ought never simultaneously yields ⌜ought φ⌝ = true and ⌜ought ¬φ⌝ = true. If p₁ ∈ PBEST witnesses φ and p₂ ∈ PBEST witnesses ¬φ, pairwise consistency gives a world in p₁ ∩ p₂ that would satisfy both φ and ¬φ. This is the key structural advantage over the conflict account, which predicts dilemmas in The Office.
The Office #
26 workers (Alice, Bob, ..., Zadie) work on separate floors. On average they each take a sick day once a month, so statistically it is rare that all 26 are present on any given day.
For each worker x: "x should be in the office today" is true. But "Everyone should be in the office today" is false.
We model this with 4 worlds (the minimum needed to demonstrate the structure): 3 workers, where exactly one is absent in each non-ideal world.
- w0: all present (low probability)
- w1: Alice absent
- w2: Bob absent
- w3: Carol absent
Everyone is in the office.
Equations
- Boylan2023.everyoneIn w = (Boylan2023.aliceIn w && Boylan2023.bobIn w && Boylan2023.carolIn w)
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Epistemic modal base: all worlds epistemically accessible.
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- Boylan2023.officeBase x✝ = []
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Epistemic ordering for The Office: probability-based. Propositions true in more worlds are ranked higher. w1, w2, w3 are each roughly equally likely; w0 (all present) is rare.
Here we model this with a simple ordering: p is at least as good as q iff p is true in at least as many worlds as q.
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- Boylan2023.officeOrdering x✝ p q = decide ((List.filter p Boylan2023.allWorlds).length ≥ (List.filter q Boylan2023.allWorlds).length)
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The partial answers to the relevance question include each individual-in proposition and the not-everyone-in proposition. These are the propositions whose truth depends only on which workers are present.
In the full 26-worker model, the best propositions are {Alice is in, Bob is in, ..., Zadie is in, Not everyone is in}. In our 4-world model:
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PBEST contains exactly 4 propositions (the 3 individual-in props and not-everyone-in; everyoneIn is dominated).
The best propositions are pairwise consistent: any two workers can both be in (pairwise but not globally).
ought is defined in The Office (pairwise consistency holds).
"Alice should be in the office" is true: there is a best proposition (namely aliceIn) such that Alice is in at every world in it.
"Bob should be in the office" is true.
"Everyone should be in the office" is FALSE: no best proposition entails that everyone is in. This is Agglomeration failure.
Fact 5 (Epistemic Agglomeration Failure): There exist parameters such that ⟦ought φ⟧ = 1 and ⟦ought ψ⟧ = 1 but ⟦ought (φ ∧ ψ)⟧ = 0, witnessed by The Office.
Dessert #
Three dessert options: cannoli, cheesecake, and apple pie. Pie and cannoli are tastiest. One can order as many as one likes, but having more than one causes illness.
The relevance question how good will the action I perform be? lumps equally-good options together. With this question, "I ought to have pie or cannoli" is true, but "I ought to have pie" and "I ought to have cannoli" are each false — Boylan's Indifference prediction.
We model this with 4 worlds:
- w0: just pie
- w1: just cannoli
- w2: just cheesecake (less tasty)
- w3: nothing / more than one (illness)
Equations
- Boylan2023.justCannoli w = (w == 1)
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"I have pie or cannoli" — the disjunctive ought.
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Deontic ordering: tracks preferences. pie ≈ cannoli > cheesecake > nothing.
A proposition is at least as good as another iff its worst outcome is at least as good as the other's worst. We implement this as: value = minimum world index among satisfying worlds (lower = better).
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- Boylan2023.dessertValue 0 = 3
- Boylan2023.dessertValue 1 = 3
- Boylan2023.dessertValue 2 = 2
- Boylan2023.dessertValue 3 = 0
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Worst value among worlds satisfying a proposition.
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- Boylan2023.worstValue p = List.foldl min 100 (List.map Boylan2023.dessertValue (List.filter p Boylan2023.allWorlds))
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Deontic ordering based on worst-case value (conservative).
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- Boylan2023.dessertOrdering x✝ p q = decide (Boylan2023.worstValue p ≥ Boylan2023.worstValue q)
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Candidates for the how good? relevance question: actions of equal quality are lumped together.
- {pie or cannoli} (best tier)
- {cheesecake} (second tier)
- {nothing/illness} (worst tier)
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"I ought to have pie or cannoli" is true under how good?.
"I ought to have (just) pie" is FALSE: no single best proposition in the how good? partition entails just pie.
"I ought to have (just) cannoli" is FALSE.
Indifference: When multiple incompatible options are equally best, the strongest true ought-claim is disjunctive.
Deontic ought reduces to Kratzer necessity #
When the ordering is deontic and PBEST is pairwise consistent, there is a unique best complete answer to the relevance question. Ought φ is then true iff φ holds throughout that unique best complete answer — exactly the truth conditions of classical Kratzer necessity.
We demonstrate this for the Dessert scenario: with the fine-grained
what will I do? question, the deontic ordering yields a single best
proposition, and ought agrees with Kratzer necessity.
Candidates for the what will I do? question: each action is its own complete answer.
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Under what will I do? with deontic ordering, PBEST contains two equally-best options (pie and cannoli are tied).
But these are inconsistent (no world has both just-pie and just-cannoli), so ought is UNDEFINED with the what will I do? question. This is why the deontic case forces the coarser how good? question.
Modified dessert values where pie is uniquely best. Used to show Boylan's ought agrees with Kratzer necessity when there is a unique best option (§7, Fact 3).
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Equations
- Boylan2023.worstValueStrict p = List.foldl min 100 (List.map Boylan2023.dessertValueStrict (List.filter p Boylan2023.allWorlds))
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- Boylan2023.dessertStrictOrd x✝ p q = decide (Boylan2023.worstValueStrict p ≥ Boylan2023.worstValueStrict q)
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With a unique best option, PBEST is a singleton.
Fact 3 (concrete): When PBEST is a singleton {p}, ought φ = true iff ∀w' ∈ p. φ(w') — matching Kratzer necessity relativized to the unique best proposition.
Deontic Agglomeration holds #
When PBEST is a singleton (the deontic case with a unique best complete answer), Agglomeration holds trivially: if the unique best proposition entails both φ and ψ, it entails φ ∧ ψ.
We verify this for the strict dessert scenario.
"I ought to have pie" and "I ought not to have cannoli" — both true.
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Fact 4 (concrete): The conjunction of two true deontic ought-claims is also true.
Connecting Boylan to Kratzer #
When Boylan's ought is defined and the ordering is deontic (unique best
complete answer), it agrees with Kratzer's necessity operator for the
same modal base and ordering source. This is the structural connection
that justifies calling deontic ought "a box after all" (§7).
The classic Kratzer semantics: ought is a universal quantifier over best worlds. Boylan argues this is correct for deontics but not epistemics.
Equations
- Boylan2023.classicOught f g φ w = Semantics.Modality.Kratzer.necessity f g (fun (w' : Boylan2023.World) => φ w' = true) w
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The classic semantics cannot distinguish the epistemic pattern.
Kratzer necessity is Agglomeration-valid by construction: if □φ and □ψ then □(φ∧ψ). So any ordering that makes "Alice should be in" true also makes "Everyone should be in" true. The classic semantics cannot get {Alice-true, Bob-true, Carol-true, Everyone-false} for ANY choice of modal base and ordering.
Boylan gets the right pattern: all three individual oughts true, conjunction false.
The conflict account wrongly predicts dilemmas #
The conflict account (@cite{von-fintel-2012}, @cite{horty-2012}) says ⟦ought φ⟧ = 1 iff some maximally consistent subset of the best propositions entails φ. In The Office, this predicts epistemic dilemmas: for each worker, there is an MCS entailing their absence. Boylan argues this is wrong — The Office does not involve dilemmas.
We formalize the conflict account's prediction and show it diverges from Boylan's.
A subset of propositions: represented as a Boolean mask on the list.
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- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
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Whether a mask selects a consistent subset (non-empty intersection).
Equations
- Boylan2023.maskConsistent props mask accessible = !(Boylan2023.subsetWorlds props mask accessible).isEmpty
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Whether a consistent subset is maximal: no strictly larger consistent subset exists (adding any excluded proposition breaks consistency).
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- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
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Generate all Boolean masks of a given length.
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- Boylan2023.allMasks 0 = [[]]
- Boylan2023.allMasks n.succ = List.flatMap (fun (m : List Bool) => [true :: m, false :: m]) (Boylan2023.allMasks n)
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The conflict account (eq. 61): ⟦ought φ⟧ = 1 iff for some maximally consistent subset S of g(w), ∀w' ∈ ∩S ∩ f(w): φ(w').
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- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
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In The Office, the conflict account yields epistemic dilemmas. The best propositions are {Alice in, Bob in, Carol in, ¬everyone in}. MCS {Bob in, Carol in, ¬everyone in} entails Alice is absent — so the conflict account predicts "Alice should NOT be in" is true.
Boylan's semantics avoids this: ought never produces dilemmas when PBEST is pairwise consistent.
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The conflict account also predicts a full dilemma: both "Alice should
be in" AND "Alice should not be in" come out true simultaneously.
Boylan's semantics avoids this entirely (see no_dilemma above).
Connecting to Kratzer's framework #
Boylan's apparatus extends Kratzer with proposition-level ordering and pairwise consistency. We bridge back by showing:
pairConsistentagrees with Kratzer'sisConsistent(Background.lean)- The Office and Dessert scenarios can be typed via
EpistemicFlavorandDeonticFlavor(Flavor.lean)
Boylan's pairwise consistency agrees with Kratzer's proposition consistency when all worlds are accessible (Background.lean, p. 31).
The Office as an epistemic scenario via Kratzer.Flavor.
Equations
- Boylan2023.officeEpistemic = { evidence := Boylan2023.officeBase }
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Dessert as a deontic scenario via Kratzer.Flavor.
Equations
- Boylan2023.dessertDeontic = { circumstances := Boylan2023.dessertBase, norms := fun (x : Boylan2023.World) => [] }
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The epistemic flavor's modal base matches The Office.
The deontic flavor's modal base matches Dessert.