Premise Sets and Logical Relations #
@cite{kratzer-1977} @cite{kratzer-1981} @cite{kratzer-2012}
Generic, modality-agnostic primitives over premise sets — finite collections
of propositions over an arbitrary index type. These are the logical primitives
on which Kratzer's modal semantics, ordering sources, conditional restriction,
and lumping all rest, but they have no built-in commitment to "worlds" vs.
"situations" vs. "times": they make sense for any Index : Type* of points
at which propositions are evaluated.
Why this lives in Core/Logic/Intensional/ #
A premise set is a List (Index → Prop). The notions of consistency,
following from, and compatibility are purely set-theoretic facts about
extensions in Index — they are about logical relations on propositions, not
about modality. Modal operators (necessity, possibility) are then defined in
terms of these primitives, but the primitives themselves should be available
to any module that wants to talk about premises (counterfactual analysis,
discourse update, situation lumping, …).
Mathlib-style discipline #
Propositions are Index → Prop (mathlib-native), extensions are Set Index
(also mathlib-native). All predicates return Prop; we reason classically and
do not register Decidable instances. Callers who need decidability can
supply it locally via [DecidablePred p] in their own theorems; the core
intensional algebra is purely classical.
Key definitions #
propExtension— extension of a proposition ({i | p i}as aSet Index)propIntersection— intersection of a list of propositions (Set Index)followsFrom—pfollows fromAiff⋂ A ⊆ {i | p i}(Kratzer p. 31)isConsistent—Ais consistent iff⋂ Ais non-emptyisCompatibleWith—pis compatible withAiffA ∪ {p}is consistent
Kratzer 1977 Definitions 5–8 #
mustInView(Def 5) —must p in view of fatiiffpfollows fromf icanInView(Def 6) —can p in view of fatiiffpis compatible withf i
When f i may be inconsistent, Kratzer revises these in terms of maximally
consistent subsets:
consistentSublists—X_{f(i)}in Kratzer's notationmustInView'(Def 7) — every consistent subset has a consistent extension from whichpfollowscanInView'(Def 8) — some consistent subset has a consistent extension that remains consistent withp
The revised definitions reduce to the original ones when the premise set is
itself consistent (mustInView_iff_mustInView'_of_consistent).
Primitives on premise sets #
The extension of a proposition: the set of indices at which it holds.
Equations
- Core.Logic.Intensional.Premise.propExtension p = {i : Index | p i}
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The intersection of a list of propositions: indices satisfying all of them.
Equations
- Core.Logic.Intensional.Premise.propIntersection props = {i : Index | ∀ p ∈ props, p i}
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A proposition p follows from a premise set A iff ⋂ A ⊆ {i | p i}
(@cite{kratzer-1977} p. 31).
Equations
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A premise set is consistent iff ⋂ A is non-empty (@cite{kratzer-1977} p. 31).
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A proposition p is compatible with A iff A ∪ {p} is consistent.
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Kratzer 1977 Definitions 5–6: must/can in view of #
Def 5 (@cite{kratzer-1977}): must p in view of f at index i
iff p follows from the premise set f i.
ν(p, f) = {i : ⋂(f i) ⊆ p}
Equations
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Def 6 (@cite{kratzer-1977}): can p in view of f at index i
iff p is compatible with the premise set f i.
μ(p, f) = {i : ⋂((f i) ∪ {p}) ≠ ∅}
Equations
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Kratzer 1977 Definitions 7–8: revised must/can for inconsistent premise sets #
The set of consistent sublists of a premise set: X_A = {B ⊆ A : consistent B}.
Kratzer's revised definitions quantify over these to handle inconsistent A.
Concretely: a sublist B of A such that B is consistent.
Equations
- Core.Logic.Intensional.Premise.consistentSublists A = {B : List (Index → Prop) | B ∈ A.sublists ∧ Core.Logic.Intensional.Premise.isConsistent B}
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Def 7 (@cite{kratzer-1977}): the revised necessity operator that handles possibly inconsistent premise sets.
must p in view of f at i iff for every consistent subset B of f i,
there exists a consistent subset C ⊇ B such that p follows from C.
Original notation:
ν(p, f) = {i : ∀B[B ∈ X_{f(i)} → ∃C[C ∈ X_{f(i)} ∧ B ⊆ C ∧ ⋂C ⊆ p]]}
Equations
- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
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Def 8 (@cite{kratzer-1977}): the revised possibility operator that handles possibly inconsistent premise sets.
can p in view of f at i iff there exists a consistent subset B of f i
such that for every consistent subset C ⊇ B, the set C ∪ {p} is consistent.
Original notation:
μ(p, f) = {i : ∃B[B ∈ X_{f(i)} ∧ ∀C[(C ∈ X_{f(i)} ∧ B ⊆ C) → consistent(C ∪ {p})]]}
Equations
- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
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Monotonicity helpers #
The reduction theorems below need three monotonicity facts about the premise algebra. They are proved here once and reused.
propIntersection is anti-monotone in the premise list: more premises
can only shrink the set of indices satisfying all of them.
followsFrom is monotone in the premise list: more premises only add
consequences.
isCompatibleWith is anti-monotone in the premise list: removing
premises can only make a proposition easier to be compatible with.
A consistent premise list is itself a member of its own consistent sublist powerset.
Every element of consistentSublists A is a ⊆-subset of A.
Reduction to the unrevised definitions #
When the premise set f i is itself consistent, Kratzer's revised definitions
collapse to the original Defs 5–6: there is no "inconsistency to repair." The
witness for both directions is f i itself — it is a sublist of itself, it
is consistent by hypothesis, and B ⊆ f i for every B ∈ consistentSublists (f i).
When f i is consistent, the revised necessity operator coincides with
the original.
When f i is consistent, the revised possibility operator coincides with
the original.