Sumers, Ho, Griffiths, and Hawkins (2024): Reconciling Truthfulness and Relevance as Epistemic and Decision-Theoretic Utility #
On the speaker model of Sumers, Ho, Griffiths and Hawkins, Grice's maxims of quality and
relation are two independent objectives a speaker trades off. Truthfulness is an epistemic
utility, 1 for a true utterance and -1 for a false one (5), truthfulness; relevance is a
decision-theoretic utility after van Rooy and Benz, the reward the listener earns by acting on
the utterance in a decision problem (6)–(8), RSA.actionUtility of RSA.policy; and the speaker
of a Rational Speech Act model, after Frank and Goodman, soft-maximizes their convex combination
at a weight λ plus a cost term (9), combinedUtility, speaker. The endpoints are the purely
truthful speaker, who is insensitive to the decision problem and uniform over the true utterances,
speaker_zero_eq_of_mem, and the purely relevant speaker, who exaggerates whenever
exaggeration earns the listener more, speaker_one_real_lt_iff.
Signaling bandits decouple the two objectives. A world assigns a value to each feature, an
action carries a set of features, and its reward is the sum of their values (10)–(11),
reward; an utterance names a feature and its value, true at a world regardless of the
decision context, sem; the listener conditions a uniform prior on the utterance and acts on
the expected rewards of the actions in the context. Under the uniform prior the posterior
mean of the named feature is the named value and every other feature keeps its prior mean,
expectedReward_listener_filter, which is how the paper reads Figure 6C: in the
context of a red spotted, a red solid, and a blue striped mushroom, naming the value of green
or the zero value of red is true but leaves the listener's policy where the prior had it,
green_two_true_irrelevant, red_zero_true_irrelevant; naming a positive value of spots is
relevant, and the more so the higher the value, so the exaggeration is false but more relevant
than the truth, spots_relevant_iff, exaggeration_relevant; and the combined speaker prefers
the true utterance exactly when the relevance gained by exaggerating is worth less than the
truthfulness lost, prefers_truth_iff. Relevance is context-dependent where truth is not: in
a context of three spotted mushrooms naming the value of spots is irrelevant and naming the
value of green is relevant (footnote 12), spots_irrelevant_allSpotted,
green_relevant_allSpotted.
Appendix A relates decision problems to Roberts's questions under discussion. For the
two-action decision problem in which one action earns r in a cell of the partition
containing the true world and s outside it, and the other the reverse, relevance is a
logistic function of the listener's posterior mass on the cell, actionUtility_cellReward,
so for s < r it ranks utterances exactly as the question's epistemic utility, the log of
that mass, does, actionUtility_lt_iff_qudUtility_lt; the identity decision problem of
Theorem 1 is the case of the singleton cell, actionUtility_lt_iff_log_lt.
The paper's two experiments put participants in the speaker's role in the mushroom domain. In the free-choice experiment participants instructed to be truthful, given no instruction, or instructed to make the tourist pick well were fit by increasing weights on relevance, the uninstructed participants strictly between the endpoints; in the endorsement experiment the separation widened and the uninstructed participants still balanced the two; and the combined model was favored over either objective alone. The worked examples, on which a pragmatic listener embedding the combined speaker infers that a mentioned garage is open, loosens a stated start time, and rounds the time when asked casually, after Van der Henst and colleagues, are simulations at chosen parameters and are not formalized.
Implementation notes #
The listener's decision context is the action type, so a context of the bandit is a type of actions with their feature sets, and an utterance's relevance in two contexts is its utility against two action types. The cost term enters with the sign of (9). Lewis signaling games, where the world state is the correct action and the objectives coincide, are described and not formalized.
TODO #
- Theorem 1's exact identity: the reward
sat which relevance under the identity decision problem equals the log of the posterior mass, defined through the Lambert W function.
References #
The speaker objectives #
Truthfulness as epistemic utility (5) is 1 for a true utterance and -1 for a false one.
Equations
- SumersEtAl2024.truthfulness sem u w = if w ∈ sem u then 1 else -1
Instances For
The combined utility (9) mixes relevance and truthfulness at weight lam on relevance and
adds the cost term.
Equations
- SumersEtAl2024.combinedUtility lam cost sem π R u w = lam * RSA.actionUtility π R u w + (1 - lam) * SumersEtAl2024.truthfulness sem u w + cost u
Instances For
The speaker (1) is the softmax of combined utility at rationality βS.
Equations
- SumersEtAl2024.speaker βS lam cost sem π R = ProbabilityTheory.Kernel.softmax fun (w : W) (u : U) => ↑(βS * SumersEtAl2024.combinedUtility lam cost sem π R u w)
Instances For
Row preference of the speaker is comparison of combined utility.
The purely truthful speaker is insensitive to the decision problem, since at equal costs it puts the same mass on any two true utterances.
The purely relevant speaker prefers the utterance that earns the listener more, true or not.
Appendix A: decision problems and questions under discussion #
In the decision problem of a cell the first action earns r in the cell and s outside it,
and the second the reverse.
Equations
- SumersEtAl2024.cellReward r s c a w = if w ∈ c ↔ a = 0 then r else s
Instances For
The listener's posterior mass on the cell (A3).
Equations
- SumersEtAl2024.cellMass L c u = ∑ w ∈ c, (L u).real {w}
Instances For
The epistemic utility of an utterance relative to a question (A2) is the log of the posterior mass on the cell of the true world.
Equations
- SumersEtAl2024.qudUtility L c u = Real.log (SumersEtAl2024.cellMass L c u)
Instances For
Relevance under the cell decision problem is a logistic function of the posterior mass on the cell, the calculation of Appendix A.
The cell decision problem ranks utterances as the question's epistemic utility does,
whenever the cell of the true world is favored, s < r (Theorem 2).
The identity decision problem, the cell of the true world alone, ranks utterances as the log of the listener's posterior probability of the true world does (Theorem 1).
Signaling bandits #
The reward of an action carrying the features feat a at a world is the sum of their
values (10)–(11).
Equations
- SumersEtAl2024.reward val feat a w = ∑ k ∈ feat a, val (w k)
Instances For
Among the worlds satisfying a condition on one feature's value, the mean of a function of a feature's value is the conditional mean for the conditioned feature and the prior mean for every other feature.
The utterance naming a feature and a value is true at the worlds where the feature has that value.
Equations
- SumersEtAl2024.sem u = {w : K → V | w u.1 = u.2}
Instances For
Truth does not depend on the decision context, since the meaning mentions no actions.
After an utterance whose meaning is a condition on one feature's value, the listener at the uniform prior expects from an action the conditional mean of the named feature and the prior mean of every other feature it carries.
The mushroom domain of Figure 6 #
Equations
- SumersEtAl2024.instDecidableEqFeature x✝ y✝ = if h : x✝.ctorIdx = y✝.ctorIdx then isTrue ⋯ else isFalse ⋯
Equations
- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
Equations
- SumersEtAl2024.instReprFeature = { reprPrec := SumersEtAl2024.instReprFeature.repr }
Equations
- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
Instances For
Equations
Feature values -2 to +2, as 0 to 4.
Equations
- SumersEtAl2024.Value = Fin 5
Instances For
The world of Figure 6A has green +2, red 0, blue -2, spots +1, solid 0 and stripes
-1.
Equations
- SumersEtAl2024.world SumersEtAl2024.Feature.green = 4
- SumersEtAl2024.world SumersEtAl2024.Feature.red = 2
- SumersEtAl2024.world SumersEtAl2024.Feature.blue = 0
- SumersEtAl2024.world SumersEtAl2024.Feature.spots = 3
- SumersEtAl2024.world SumersEtAl2024.Feature.solid = 2
- SumersEtAl2024.world SumersEtAl2024.Feature.stripes = 1
Instances For
The context of Figure 6B has a red spotted, a red solid, and a blue striped mushroom.
Equations
Instances For
The context of footnote 12 has a green, a red, and a blue spotted mushroom.
Equations
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The literal listener (3) at the uniform prior over worlds.
Equations
- SumersEtAl2024.listener = RSA.listener (ProbabilityTheory.uniformOn Set.univ) (RSA.truthful fun (u : SumersEtAl2024.Feature × SumersEtAl2024.Value) => ↑(SumersEtAl2024.sem u))
Instances For
The prior as a listener who has heard nothing.
Equations
- SumersEtAl2024.prior = RSA.listener (ProbabilityTheory.uniformOn Set.univ) (RSA.truthful fun (x : SumersEtAl2024.Feature × SumersEtAl2024.Value) => ↑Finset.univ)
Instances For
Two utterances after which every action's expected reward agrees up to a shift are equally useful in the context.
The prior policy is uniform over the context, and the utility of acting on the prior alone is the mean reward.
Naming the value of green, absent from the context, is true and irrelevant.
Naming the zero value of red, present in the context, is true and irrelevant, since a zero value is the prior mean.
Naming a value of spots makes the listener expect that value from the spotted mushroom and nothing from the others.
When a value of spots is named, the listener's softmax share of the spotted mushroom earns
1 and the rest is spent on the blue striped one.
Naming a value of spots is relevant exactly when the value is positive, when it raises the listener's expected earnings above acting on the prior.
The exaggeration ⟨spots, +2⟩ is false where ⟨spots, +1⟩ is true, and is the more relevant of the two.
The combined speaker prefers the truth to the exaggeration exactly when the relevance
gained by exaggerating, weighted by lam, is worth less than the truthfulness lost.
In the context of three spotted mushrooms naming any value of spots is irrelevant, since it shifts every action's expected reward alike.
In the same context naming the value of green is relevant, since green is now the deciding feature.