Documentation

Studies.ReesReksnesRohde2026

Rees, Reksnes, and Rohde (2026): Why are you telling me this? The availability and timing of relevance inferences #

Rees, Reksnes and Rohde ask why an addressee takes a trivial remark such as the library walls are blue to mean that the walls used to be a different colour. A speaker makes a remark only when it is worth enough to her, and a quiet speaker's bar is higher. Here the addressee conditions a prior over whether the situation changed on the pasts in which the speaker would have spoken; a change can make a trivial remark worth making only to a speaker who knows the situation over time. Across four experiments the inference is drawn more often for a knowledgeable speaker and, in the second, for a quiet one. Two verification experiments with opposite question polarity locate a cost when the inference is endorsed, which the paper attributes to considering the alternative situation.

Main statements #

Implementation notes #

Conditioning on the decision to speak is Rohde, Hoek, Keshev and Franke's account of the listener's expectation, which the paper cites. The speaker speaks exactly when the remark's worth to her meets her bar, so the model says which inferences are available, not how often participants draw them. Every item describes a situation that may plausibly have changed. The emphasis cue and the paper's post hoc account of the interaction in its second experiment are not modelled.

References #

The decision to speak #

A past of the described situation says whether, a few months ago, it was the same as now or different.

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    The addressee models the speaker making a remark by what the remark is worth to her in each past of the situation and by the bar a remark must clear for her to make it.

    • worth : Past → ℝ
    • bar : ℝ
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      The speaker knows the situation over time when the worth of her remark depends on its past.

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        The remark is trivial when, with nothing changed, it falls short of the speaker's bar.

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          noncomputable def ReesReksnesRohde2026.Speaker.spoke (s : Speaker) :
          ProbabilityTheory.Kernel Past Bool

          The speaker makes the remark exactly in the pasts in which it is worth it to her.

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            instance ReesReksnesRohde2026.Speaker.instIsMarkovKernelPastBoolSpoke (s : Speaker) :
            ProbabilityTheory.IsMarkovKernel s.spoke
            theorem ReesReksnesRohde2026.Speaker.spoke_real_true (s : Speaker) (p : Past) :
            (s.spoke p).real {true} = if s.bar ≤ s.worth p then 1 else 0
            theorem ReesReksnesRohde2026.Speaker.spoke_comp_apply_true {s : Speaker} (μ : MeasureTheory.Measure Past) :
            (μ.bind ⇑s.spoke) {true} = μ {p : Past | s.bar ≤ s.worth p}

            The prior probability that the speaker speaks is that of the pasts in which the remark is worth it to her.

            theorem ReesReksnesRohde2026.Speaker.Trivial.mono {s t : Speaker} (h : s.Trivial) (hw : s.worth = t.worth) (hb : s.bar ≤ t.bar) :

            A quieter speaker with the same view of the situation finds trivial whatever a more talkative one does.

            theorem ReesReksnesRohde2026.Speaker.spoke_comp_apply_true_eq_zero {s : Speaker} (μ : MeasureTheory.Measure Past) (hk : ¬s.Knowledgeable) (ht : s.Trivial) :
            (μ.bind ⇑s.spoke) {true} = 0

            A speaker who does not know the situation over time would stay silent about a trivial remark whatever its past, so no past explains her making it.

            theorem ReesReksnesRohde2026.Speaker.posterior_spoke {s : Speaker} (μ : MeasureTheory.Measure Past) [MeasureTheory.IsProbabilityMeasure μ] (hx : (μ.bind ⇑s.spoke) {true} ≠ 0) :
            (ProbabilityTheory.posterior s.spoke μ) true = μ[|{p : Past | s.bar ≤ s.worth p}]

            Hearing the remark conditions the prior on the pasts in which the speaker would make it.

            theorem ReesReksnesRohde2026.Speaker.prior_lt_posterior_iff {s : Speaker} (μ : MeasureTheory.Measure Past) [MeasureTheory.IsProbabilityMeasure μ] (hx : (μ.bind ⇑s.spoke) {true} ≠ 0) (hs : μ {Past.same} ≠ 0) (hd : μ {Past.different} ≠ 0) :
            μ.real {Past.different} < ((ProbabilityTheory.posterior s.spoke μ) true).real {Past.different} ↔ s.Trivial ∧ s.bar ≤ s.worth Past.different

            Speaking raises the probability that the situation used to be different exactly when the remark is trivial with nothing changed and worth making had the situation changed.

            theorem ReesReksnesRohde2026.Speaker.posterior_eq_prior_of_not_knowledgeable {s : Speaker} (μ : MeasureTheory.Measure Past) [MeasureTheory.IsProbabilityMeasure μ] (hk : ¬s.Knowledgeable) (hx : (μ.bind ⇑s.spoke) {true} ≠ 0) :
            (ProbabilityTheory.posterior s.spoke μ) true = μ

            A speaker who does not know the situation over time makes the remark in every past or in none, so hearing it leaves the prior unchanged.

            theorem ReesReksnesRohde2026.Speaker.not_prior_lt_posterior_of_not_knowledgeable {s : Speaker} (μ : MeasureTheory.Measure Past) [MeasureTheory.IsProbabilityMeasure μ] (hk : ¬s.Knowledgeable) (hx : (μ.bind ⇑s.spoke) {true} ≠ 0) :
            ¬μ.real {Past.different} < ((ProbabilityTheory.posterior s.spoke μ) true).real {Past.different}

            In particular such a speaker never licenses the inference that the situation changed, as Suzy cannot at the Prime Minister's office.

            theorem ReesReksnesRohde2026.Speaker.prior_lt_posterior_of_bar_le {s t : Speaker} (μ : MeasureTheory.Measure Past) [MeasureTheory.IsProbabilityMeasure μ] (hw : s.worth = t.worth) (hb : s.bar ≤ t.bar) (ht : t.bar ≤ t.worth Past.different) (hx : (μ.bind ⇑s.spoke) {true} ≠ 0) (hx' : (μ.bind ⇑t.spoke) {true} ≠ 0) (hs : μ {Past.same} ≠ 0) (hd : μ {Past.different} ≠ 0) (h : μ.real {Past.different} < ((ProbabilityTheory.posterior s.spoke μ) true).real {Past.different}) :
            μ.real {Past.different} < ((ProbabilityTheory.posterior t.spoke μ) true).real {Past.different}

            A quieter speaker with the same view of the situation licenses the inference whenever a more talkative one does, as long as a change would still be worth mentioning to her.

            The timing of the inference #

            An answer endorses the inference when it asserts that the situation was different, as no to was it the same? does in Experiment 3 and yes to was it different? in Experiment 4.

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              Answering considers the alternative to the situation as presented when the answer is negative or endorses the inference.

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                In the paper's account of the verification times, an answer takes a base time, and longer by a fixed cost when it considers the alternative to the situation as presented.

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                • alternative : ℝ
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                  The predicted time to answer a to was it q?.

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                    An additive model of the verification times with separate costs of a negative answer and of endorsing the inference.

                    • base : ℝ
                    • negative : ℝ
                    • inference : ℝ
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                      The predicted time to answer a to was it q?.

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                        In Experiment 3 the inference-endorsing no is slower than yes by the cost of considering the alternative.

                        In Experiment 4 yes and no take equally long.

                        The inference-endorsing yes of Experiment 4 is slower than the yes of Experiment 3 by the cost of considering the alternative.

                        The no answers of the two experiments take equally long, since both consider the alternative.

                        In Experiment 3 the contrast between no and yes confounds the cost of the inference with that of a negative answer.

                        The contrast between the yes answers of the two experiments isolates the cost of the inference.

                        If the no answers of the two experiments take equally long, so do the yes answers, so the additive model cannot give the paper's pattern.