Phillips-Brown (2025): Some-Things-Considered Desire #
Phillips-Brown gives a question-based semantics for desire ascriptions. Conflicting ascriptions,
you want to take a nap and you don't want to take a nap both true, falsify the belief-based
semantics of Heim and von Fintel, which evaluate the agent's preferences over her whole belief set
with no context sensitivity, and a context-sensitive preference relation that values whole worlds
overgenerates, predicting you want to fail the exam wherever Nap is true. The proposal
evaluates an ascription against a contextual question, a partition of the worlds: the answers
compatible with the beliefs are ranked by the desires they entail, S wants p holds when every
best answer entails p (Want), and the ascription is defined only if the question decides p,
is diverse, does not stack the deck, and the beliefs are sensitive to it (Defined).
Main results #
vonFintel_no_conflict,heim_no_conflict: the belief-based semantics cannot make Nap and Not-nap both true.closure_under_doxastic_equivalence,cpr_overgenerates: on a belief-based semantics wanting the act is wanting its believed cost, Villalta's closure under doxastic equivalence.act_true,not_act_true,cost_undefined: Nap and Not-nap are each true in their own context, and Fail is undefined in the first.not_rain_deckstacked,deckstacked_excluded: the deck-stacked question of Lu's case is excluded by the anti-deckstacking constraint, which the level playing field satisfies.undefined_of_insensitive,want_strawsonEntails: an agent whose beliefs are insensitive to every question deciding p has S wants p undefined, which leaves the semantics Strawson upward monotone.want_bot_iff: on the finest question the semantics is the best-worlds one,Desire.BestWorlds.Want.
Implementation notes #
- A question is a
Setoid, its answers the cells; the question raised by a list of issues is theirSetoid.ofProps, and p is considered relative to a question when the question decides it. Answers are ordered by the desires they entail, Kratzer's ordering with entailment as satisfaction (entailed), and the best answers are theMaximalForelements of that valuation. - The act, its benefit and its cost are the three issues of the nap and lobster cases (nap,
feeling rested, failing the exam; eating the lobster, the gustatory experience, dying), the
beliefs tying benefit and cost to the act, and the desires being the benefit and not the
cost. The Anti-deckstacking Constraint quantifies over all propositions; read so, it admits
only the finest partition (
antiDeckstacking_univ_singleton), so it is restricted here to a list of salient propositions, the issues of each case. - Heim's semantics is the conditional one,
Desire.Conditional.Want. Levinson's expected-value comparison, the sufficient-desirability semantics of §2.4, and the Heimian question-based semantics of footnote 16 are prose.
References #
Question-based desire (§3) #
An answer, the cell of w, compatible with the beliefs.
Equations
- PhillipsBrown2025.Live s bel w = ∃ v ∈ s.cell w, v ∈ bel
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The desires an answer entails, by whose inclusion answers are ordered.
Equations
- PhillipsBrown2025.entailed G s = Preorder.satisfied (fun (w : W) (g : Finset W) => s.cell w ⊆ ↑g) {g : Finset W | g ∈ G}
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S wants p holds when every best live answer entails p.
Equations
- PhillipsBrown2025.Want G s bel p = ∀ (w : W), MaximalFor (PhillipsBrown2025.Live s bel) (PhillipsBrown2025.entailed G s) w → s.cell w ⊆ p
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Some answer entails p and some entails ¬p.
Equations
- PhillipsBrown2025.IsDiverse s p = ((∃ (w : W), s.cell w ⊆ p) ∧ ∃ (w : W), s.cell w ⊆ pᶜ)
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Every salient proposition in N that some answer entails is itself decided.
Equations
- PhillipsBrown2025.IsAntiDeckstacking N s = ∀ q ∈ N, (∃ (w : W), s.cell w ⊆ ↑q) → s.Decides ↑q
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The beliefs discriminate among the answers when some answer is live and some is not.
Equations
- PhillipsBrown2025.IsBelSensitive s bel = ((∃ (w : W), PhillipsBrown2025.Live s bel w) ∧ ∃ (w : W), ¬PhillipsBrown2025.Live s bel w)
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The four metasemantic constraints jointly.
Equations
- PhillipsBrown2025.Defined N s bel p = (s.Decides p ∧ PhillipsBrown2025.IsDiverse s p ∧ PhillipsBrown2025.IsAntiDeckstacking N s ∧ PhillipsBrown2025.IsBelSensitive s bel)
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Question-based want as a trivalent proposition, with its definedness conditions as presupposition.
Equations
- PhillipsBrown2025.want G N s bel p = {_w : W | PhillipsBrown2025.Defined N s bel p}.indicator fun (x : W) => SignType.ofProp (PhillipsBrown2025.Want G s bel p)
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Equations
- PhillipsBrown2025.instDecidableLive s bel w = { decide := decide (∃ a ∈ Finset.univ, (fun (v : W) => v ∈ s.cell w ∧ v ∈ bel) a), reflects_decide := ⋯ }
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- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
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- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
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- PhillipsBrown2025.instDecidableIsDiverse s p = { decide := decide (∃ (w : W), s.cell w ⊆ p) && decide (∃ (w : W), s.cell w ⊆ pᶜ), reflects_decide := ⋯ }
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- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
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- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
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Without a p-answer the ascription is false as soon as some answer is live, which the
diversity constraint against vacuous falsity rules out.
With the question deciding p and no ¬p-answer the ascription is true, which the diversity
constraint against vacuous truth rules out.
The semantics is Strawson upward monotone, since where both ascriptions are defined,
want p entails want q for p ⊆ q.
On the finest question, question-based want is best-worlds want (§3.4).
The nap and lobster cases (§2.1, §2.2) #
A state records whether the act is done, whether its benefit obtains and whether its cost obtains.
- act : Bool
- benefit : Bool
- cost : Bool
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- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
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The act is napping, or eating the lobster.
Equations
- PhillipsBrown2025.act = {x : PhillipsBrown2025.World | x.act = true}
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Its benefit is feeling rested, or the gustatory experience.
Equations
- PhillipsBrown2025.benefit = {x : PhillipsBrown2025.World | x.benefit = true}
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Its cost is failing the exam, or dying of anaphylactic shock.
Equations
- PhillipsBrown2025.cost = {x : PhillipsBrown2025.World | x.cost = true}
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The beliefs have the benefit and the cost each come exactly with the act.
Equations
- PhillipsBrown2025.bel = {w : PhillipsBrown2025.World | w.benefit = w.act ∧ w.cost = w.act}
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Equations
- PhillipsBrown2025.instDecidablePredWorldMemSetBel w = { decide := decide (w.benefit = w.act) && decide (w.cost = w.act), reflects_decide := ⋯ }
The desires are the benefit and not the cost.
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Von Fintel's semantics cannot make Nap and Not-nap both true, whatever the desires, since some belief-world is best and it settles the act one way.
Neither can Heim's, under her definedness amendment and antisymmetric desirability.
On a belief-based semantics, the cost being believed to come exactly with the act, wanting the act is wanting the cost, Nap entailing Fail, the closure under doxastic equivalence of §4.1.
Equations
- PhillipsBrown2025.instDecidableRelWorldLe w z = decidable_of_iff (z ∈ PhillipsBrown2025.benefit → w ∈ PhillipsBrown2025.benefit) ⋯
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A context-sensitive preference relation overgenerates (§2.2), since the value of feeling rested makes Nap true, and with it Fail.
Some-things-considered desire (§3) #
The question considering whether the act is done and whether its benefit obtains (Figure 3).
Equations
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The question considering whether the act is done and whether its cost obtains (Figure 5).
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The salient propositions of the case, the test set of the anti-deckstacking constraint.
Equations
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In that context the cost is ignored, so Fail and Die are undefined (§3.6), which blocks the inference from Nap to Fail (§4.1).
Deck-stacking (§3.7) #
A state of Lu's case records whether it rains and whether Lu is happy.
- rain : Bool
- happy : Bool
Instances For
Equations
- PhillipsBrown2025.instDecidableEqLuWorld.decEq { rain := a, happy := a_1 } { rain := b, happy := b_1 } = if h : a = b then h ▸ if h : a_1 = b_1 then h ▸ isTrue ⋯ else isFalse ⋯ else isFalse ⋯
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Equations
- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
It rains tomorrow.
Equations
- PhillipsBrown2025.rain = {x : PhillipsBrown2025.LuWorld | x.rain = true}
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Lu is happy tomorrow.
Equations
- PhillipsBrown2025.happy = {x : PhillipsBrown2025.LuWorld | x.happy = true}
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Lu believes she is happy whatever the weather.
Equations
- PhillipsBrown2025.belLu = {w : PhillipsBrown2025.LuWorld | w.happy = true}
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The deck-stacked question (Figure 7) asks whether it rains, and if not, whether Lu is happy.
Equations
- PhillipsBrown2025.qStacked = Setoid.ker fun (w : PhillipsBrown2025.LuWorld) => if w.rain = true then none else some w.happy
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The level playing field (Figure 9).
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The deck-stacked question violates the constraint at happy, which one answer entails and another leaves open, while the level playing field satisfies it for every proposition.
Read with q ranging over all propositions, the Anti-deckstacking Constraint admits only
the finest partition. Two worlds in one cell, with a second cell available, are equal, since
the union of the second cell with the first minus one of the worlds is entailed by an answer
and decided by none.
Belief-sensitivity (§4.2) #
An agent whose beliefs are insensitive to every question that decides p, William III and
England avoiding nuclear war with France, has S wants p undefined in every context, since
where p is decided the beliefs are insensitive, and where they are sensitive p is not
decided.