Documentation

Studies.GrusdtLassiterFranke2022

Grusdt, Lassiter, and Franke (2022): Rational Communication with Conditionals #

This file formalizes the toy example of section 2.3 of Grusdt, Lassiter and Franke, "Probabilistic modeling of rational communication with conditionals", together with the two arguments of section 5 that rest on its assertability conditions alone. A state is a probability measure on the four worlds that fix the truth of A and C; an utterance is assertable in a state by the conditions of Table 1, P(A ∧ C) ≥ θ for the conjunction, P(C) ≥ θ for the literal, P(C | A) ≥ θ for the conditional, and P(C) > 1/2 for likely C (Assertable); and the vanilla Rational Speech Act model of section 2.1, the library's RSA.speaker and its posterior at α = 1 without costs, runs over the three states of Table 2. Its predictions are derived: the extensions of Table 2(b), the speaker shares of Table 2(d), and the listener posteriors of Table 2(e), on which hearing if A then C favors the state where the conditional is the most informative assertable utterance over the one where the literal was available (l1_conditional_prefers_s2). Section 5's observations hold for every state: when antecedent and consequent are independent the conditional is assertable only where the literal is, so a speaker never prefers it, which is what lies behind the infelicity of missing-link conditionals (assertable_C_of_indep), and a speaker who can assert both if A then C and if not A then C could have asserted C outright (assertable_C_of_conditionals).

Implementation notes #

States are measures built from the cells of Table 2(a); the threshold is the paper's θ = 0.9. Section 5.3's argument takes P(A) = 1/2, but the theorem needs only that the antecedent and its negation both have positive probability. The causal Bayes-net prior of sections 2.4 to 3 and the simulation results over it, including the strength of conditional perfection in Figure 8, are not formalized; perfection_not_semantic records only that in the toy example the conditional is assertable at s2 while P(¬C | ¬A) falls short of the threshold, so any perfection reading there is pragmatic.

References #

World states, utterances and assertability, section 2.2 #

def GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.A :
Set (Bool × Bool)

The event that A holds, on worlds (A, C) : Bool × Bool.

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    def GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.C :
    Set (Bool × Bool)

    The event that C holds.

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      theorem GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.A_eq :
      A = ↑{(true, true), (true, false)}
      theorem GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.C_eq :
      C = ↑{(true, true), (false, true)}
      theorem GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.A_inter_C_eq :
      A ∩ C = ↑{(true, true)}
      theorem GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.Ac_eq :
      Aᶜ = ↑{(false, true), (false, false)}
      theorem GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.Ac_inter_Cc_eq :
      Aᶜ ∩ Cᶜ = ↑{(false, false)}

      The toy example's utterances, in Table 1's order of informativity, are the conjunction A and C, the literal C, the conditional if A then C, and likely C.

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        noncomputable def GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.θ :
        ℝ

        The assertability threshold of Table 2, θ = 0.9.

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          def GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.Assertable (θ : ℝ) :
          Utt → MeasureTheory.Measure (Bool × Bool) → Prop

          By Table 1, an utterance is assertable in a state μ when the probability it conveys reaches the threshold, P(A ∧ C) ≥ θ, P(C) ≥ θ, P(C | A) ≥ θ, and likely C when P(C) > 1/2.

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            theorem GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.real_cond (μ : MeasureTheory.Measure (Bool × Bool)) (S T : Set (Bool × Bool)) :
            μ[|S].real T = μ.real (S ∩ T) / μ.real S

            A conditional probability as a ratio of real masses.

            Two consequences of the assertability conditions, section 5 #

            Section 5.1: when antecedent and consequent are independent, the conditional is assertable only where the literal is, so an informative speaker never chooses it, and a listener who takes the two to be independent is surprised by it, the source of the infelicity of missing-link conditionals. Section 5.3: a speaker who can assert both if A then C and if not A then C could have asserted C outright.

            theorem GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.assertable_C_of_indep {μ : MeasureTheory.Measure (Bool × Bool)} {t : ℝ} (hA : 0 < μ.real A) (hind : μ.real (A ∩ C) = μ.real A * μ.real C) (h : Assertable t Utt.conditional μ) :
            theorem GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.assertable_C_of_conditionals {μ : MeasureTheory.Measure (Bool × Bool)} [MeasureTheory.IsProbabilityMeasure μ] {t : ℝ} (hA : 0 < μ.real A) (hAc : 0 < μ.real Aᶜ) (h₁ : t ≤ μ[|A].real C) (h₂ : t ≤ μ[|Aᶜ].real C) :

            The toy example, section 2.3 and Table 2 #

            In the three states of Table 2(a), Alex and Chris come to the party independently in s1 and s3, and in s2 "usually not without each other".

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              noncomputable def GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.State.cell :
              State → Bool × Bool → NNReal

              Table 2(a) gives the probability of each world (A, C) in each state.

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                noncomputable def GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.State.dist (s : State) :
                MeasureTheory.Measure (Bool × Bool)

                A state as a probability measure on worlds.

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                • s.dist = MeasureTheory.Measure.sum fun (w : Bool × Bool) => ↑(s.cell w) • MeasureTheory.Measure.dirac w
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                  theorem GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.State.dist_finset (s : State) (E : Finset (Bool × Bool)) :
                  s.dist ↑E = ∑ w ∈ E, ↑(s.cell w)
                  theorem GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.State.dist_real_finset (s : State) (E : Finset (Bool × Bool)) :
                  s.dist.real ↑E = ∑ w ∈ E, ↑(s.cell w)
                  theorem GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.State.sum_cell (s : State) :
                  ∑ w : Bool × Bool, s.cell w = 1
                  instance GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.instIsProbabilityMeasureProdBoolDist (s : State) :
                  MeasureTheory.IsProbabilityMeasure s.dist
                  theorem GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.real_A (s : State) :
                  s.dist.real A = ↑(s.cell (true, true)) + ↑(s.cell (true, false))
                  theorem GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.real_C (s : State) :
                  s.dist.real C = ↑(s.cell (true, true)) + ↑(s.cell (false, true))
                  theorem GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.real_A_inter_C (s : State) :
                  s.dist.real (A ∩ C) = ↑(s.cell (true, true))
                  theorem GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.real_Ac (s : State) :
                  s.dist.real Aᶜ = ↑(s.cell (false, true)) + ↑(s.cell (false, false))
                  theorem GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.real_Ac_inter_Cc (s : State) :
                  s.dist.real (Aᶜ ∩ Cᶜ) = ↑(s.cell (false, false))

                  The assertability extension of an utterance at the threshold θ.

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                    Likely C is assertable everywhere (Table 2(b)).

                    The conditional is assertable in s1 and s2, where P(C | A) is 9/10 and 12/13, and not in s3, where it is 3/5 (Table 2(b)).

                    C is assertable in s1 only (Table 2(b)).

                    A and C is assertable nowhere (Table 2(b)).

                    Literal listener and speaker, Table 2(c) and (d) #

                    The vanilla model at α = 1 without costs, against the uniform prior over the three states: the literal listener conditions the prior on the extension, the speaker is RSA.speaker, and the pragmatic listener is the posterior of the speaker against the prior. A and C, assertable in no state, has the zero measure as its literal listener and drops out of the competition.

                    noncomputable def GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.prior :
                    MeasureTheory.Measure State

                    The uniform prior over the three states.

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                      noncomputable def GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.L0 :
                      ProbabilityTheory.Kernel Utt State

                      The literal listener conditions the prior on the utterance's extension.

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                        instance GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.instIsFiniteKernelUttStateL0 :
                        ProbabilityTheory.IsFiniteKernel L0
                        theorem GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.L0_apply (u : Utt) :
                        L0 u = ProbabilityTheory.uniformOn (ext u)

                        The literal listener is uniform on the extension.

                        theorem GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.L0_ne_top (u : Utt) (s : State) :
                        (L0 u) {s} ≠ ⊤
                        noncomputable def GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.S1 :
                        ProbabilityTheory.Kernel State Utt

                        The speaker of Table 2(d) is RSA.speaker at α = 1 without costs.

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                          instance GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.instIsFiniteKernelStateUttS1 :
                          ProbabilityTheory.IsFiniteKernel S1
                          theorem GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.S1_real (s : State) (u : Utt) :
                          (S1 s).real {u} = (L0 u).real {s} / ∑ u' : Utt, (L0 u').real {s}

                          In s1 the speaker says C with share 6/11, the conditional 3/11, and likely C 2/11 (Table 2(d)).

                          In s2 the speaker says the conditional with share 3/5, likely C 2/5, and C never (Table 2(d)).

                          In s3 the speaker says likely C with certainty (Table 2(d)).

                          The pragmatic listener, Table 2(e) #

                          noncomputable def GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.L1 :
                          ProbabilityTheory.Kernel Utt State

                          The pragmatic listener of Table 2(e) inverts S1 against the uniform prior.

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                            theorem GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.L1_real (u : Utt) (s : State) :
                            (L1 u).real {s} = (S1 s).real {u} / ∑ s' : State, (S1 s').real {u}

                            Hearing the conditional, the listener puts 11/16 on s2, 5/16 on s1 and nothing on s3 (Table 2(e)).

                            Hearing C, the listener identifies s1 (Table 2(e)).

                            Hearing likely C, the listener puts 55/87 on s3, 22/87 on s2 and 10/87 on s1 (Table 2(e)).

                            Hearing if A then C, the listener prefers s2 to s1. The speaker in s1 would have said C (S1_s1_C), so the conditional signals the state where it is the most informative assertable utterance.

                            Hearing likely C, the listener prefers s3 to s1, since in s1 and s2 a stronger utterance was available.

                            Conditional perfection #

                            The paper derives conditional perfection, hearing if A then C as if not A then not C, as a pragmatic inference, section 3. It is absent from the assertability semantics: at s2 the conditional is assertable while P(¬C | ¬A) = 6/7 falls short of θ.