Grusdt, Lassiter, and Franke (2022): Rational Communication with Conditionals #
This file formalizes the toy example of section 2.3 of Grusdt, Lassiter and Franke, "Probabilistic
modeling of rational communication with conditionals", together with the two arguments of section 5
that rest on its assertability conditions alone. A state is a probability measure on the four worlds
that fix the truth of A and C; an utterance is assertable in a state by the conditions of Table
1, P(A ∧ C) ≥ θ for the conjunction, P(C) ≥ θ for the literal, P(C | A) ≥ θ for the
conditional, and P(C) > 1/2 for likely C (Assertable); and the vanilla Rational Speech Act
model of section 2.1, the library's RSA.speaker and its posterior at α = 1 without
costs, runs over the three states of Table 2. Its predictions are derived: the extensions of Table
2(b), the speaker shares of Table 2(d), and the listener posteriors of Table 2(e), on which hearing
if A then C favors the state where the conditional is the most informative assertable utterance
over the one where the literal was available (l1_conditional_prefers_s2). Section 5's observations
hold for every state: when antecedent and consequent are independent the conditional is assertable
only where the literal is, so a speaker never prefers it, which is what lies behind the infelicity
of missing-link conditionals (assertable_C_of_indep), and a speaker who can assert both if A then
C and if not A then C could have asserted C outright (assertable_C_of_conditionals).
Implementation notes #
States are measures built from the cells of Table 2(a); the threshold is the paper's θ = 0.9.
Section 5.3's argument takes P(A) = 1/2, but the theorem needs only that the antecedent and
its negation both have positive probability. The causal Bayes-net prior of sections 2.4 to 3
and the simulation results over it, including the strength of conditional perfection in
Figure 8, are not formalized; perfection_not_semantic records only that in the toy example
the conditional is assertable at s2 while P(¬C | ¬A) falls short of the threshold, so any
perfection reading there is pragmatic.
References #
World states, utterances and assertability, section 2.2 #
The event that A holds, on worlds (A, C) : Bool × Bool.
Equations
- GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.A = {w : Bool × Bool | w.1 = true}
Instances For
The event that C holds.
Equations
- GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.C = {w : Bool × Bool | w.2 = true}
Instances For
Equations
- GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.instDecidableEqUtt x✝ y✝ = if h : x✝.ctorIdx = y✝.ctorIdx then isTrue ⋯ else isFalse ⋯
Equations
- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
Equations
The assertability threshold of Table 2, θ = 0.9.
Equations
- GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.θ = 9 / 10
Instances For
By Table 1, an utterance is assertable in a state μ when the probability it conveys
reaches the threshold, P(A ∧ C) ≥ θ, P(C) ≥ θ, P(C | A) ≥ θ, and likely C when
P(C) > 1/2.
Equations
- GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.Assertable θ GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.Utt.conjAC x✝ = (θ ≤ x✝.real (GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.A ∩ GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.C))
- GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.Assertable θ GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.Utt.C x✝ = (θ ≤ x✝.real GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.C)
- GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.Assertable θ GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.Utt.conditional x✝ = (θ ≤ x✝[|GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.A].real GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.C)
- GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.Assertable θ GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.Utt.likelyC x✝ = (1 / 2 < x✝.real GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.C)
Instances For
A conditional probability as a ratio of real masses.
Two consequences of the assertability conditions, section 5 #
Section 5.1: when antecedent and consequent are independent, the conditional is assertable only where the literal is, so an informative speaker never chooses it, and a listener who takes the two to be independent is surprised by it, the source of the infelicity of missing-link conditionals. Section 5.3: a speaker who can assert both if A then C and if not A then C could have asserted C outright.
The toy example, section 2.3 and Table 2 #
Equations
- GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.instDecidableEqState x✝ y✝ = if h : x✝.ctorIdx = y✝.ctorIdx then isTrue ⋯ else isFalse ⋯
Equations
- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
Equations
Table 2(a) gives the probability of each world (A, C) in each state.
Equations
- GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.State.s1.cell (true, true) = 81 / 100
- GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.State.s1.cell (true, false) = 9 / 100
- GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.State.s1.cell (false, true) = 9 / 100
- GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.State.s1.cell (false, false) = 1 / 100
- GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.State.s2.cell (true, true) = 3 / 5
- GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.State.s2.cell (true, false) = 1 / 20
- GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.State.s2.cell (false, true) = 1 / 20
- GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.State.s2.cell (false, false) = 3 / 10
- GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.State.s3.cell (true, true) = 9 / 25
- GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.State.s3.cell (true, false) = 6 / 25
- GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.State.s3.cell (false, true) = 6 / 25
- GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.State.s3.cell (false, false) = 4 / 25
Instances For
A state as a probability measure on worlds.
Equations
Instances For
Likely C is assertable everywhere (Table 2(b)).
A and C is assertable nowhere (Table 2(b)).
Literal listener and speaker, Table 2(c) and (d) #
The vanilla model at α = 1 without costs, against the uniform prior over the three states:
the literal listener conditions the prior on the extension, the speaker is RSA.speaker, and
the pragmatic listener is the posterior of the speaker against the prior. A and C, assertable
in no state, has the zero measure as its literal listener and drops out of the competition.
The uniform prior over the three states.
Equations
- GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.prior = ProbabilityTheory.uniformOn Set.univ
Instances For
The literal listener conditions the prior on the utterance's extension.
Equations
Instances For
The literal listener is uniform on the extension.
The speaker of Table 2(d) is RSA.speaker at α = 1 without costs.
Equations
- GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.S1 = RSA.speaker 1 0 (⇑GrusdtLassiterFranke2022.L0) MeasureTheory.Measure.dirac
Instances For
In s3 the speaker says likely C with certainty (Table 2(d)).
The pragmatic listener, Table 2(e) #
Hearing if A then C, the listener prefers s2 to s1. The speaker in s1 would have
said C (S1_s1_C), so the conditional signals the state where it is the most informative
assertable utterance.
Hearing likely C, the listener prefers s3 to s1, since in s1 and s2 a stronger
utterance was available.
Conditional perfection #
The paper derives conditional perfection, hearing if A then C as if not A then not C, as a
pragmatic inference, section 3. It is absent from the assertability semantics: at s2 the
conditional is assertable while P(¬C | ¬A) = 6/7 falls short of θ.