Documentation

Studies.GoodmanStuhlmuller2013

Goodman and Stuhlmüller (2013): Knowledge and Implicature #

Goodman and Stuhlmüller model scalar implicature under a speaker with incomplete knowledge. The state is how many of N objects have a property, and the speaker's access is how many of them she looks at. She observes how many of those have the property, a hypergeometric draw, believes her posterior over states, and softmax-optimizes the expected log-probability the literal listener gives the state under that belief. The listener, who knows her access but not her observation, models her with the observation drawn at the state (speaker) and applies Bayes' rule (listener).

Main statements #

Implementation notes #

References #

The states an observation leaves possible #

def GoodmanStuhlmuller2013.compatible {N : ℕ} (n : ℕ) (k : Fin (N + 1)) :
Finset (Fin (N + 1))

The states an observation leaves possible are those at which the speaker could see k objects with the property among the n she looks at.

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    theorem GoodmanStuhlmuller2013.mem_compatible {N n : ℕ} {k s : Fin (N + 1)} :
    s ∈ compatible n k ↔ ProbabilityTheory.hypergeometricCount N (↑s) n ↑k ≠ 0
    theorem GoodmanStuhlmuller2013.posterior_ne_zero_iff_mem_compatible {N n : ℕ} {k : Fin (N + 1)} (hk : (compatible n k).Nonempty) (s : Fin (N + 1)) :
    ((ProbabilityTheory.posterior (ProbabilityTheory.hypergeometric N n) (ProbabilityTheory.uniformOn Set.univ)) k) {s} ≠ 0 ↔ s ∈ compatible n k

    After a possible observation the posterior under the uniform prior charges exactly the states compatible with it.

    The speaker and the listener #

    @[reducible, inline]
    noncomputable abbrev GoodmanStuhlmuller2013.literal {N : ℕ} {U : Type u_1} [MeasurableSpace U] [Fintype U] [MeasurableSingletonClass U] (sem : U → Finset (Fin (N + 1))) :
    ProbabilityTheory.Kernel U (Fin (N + 1))

    The literal listener Plex of section 1 conditions the uniform prior on the extension of the utterance.

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      @[reducible, inline]
      noncomputable abbrev GoodmanStuhlmuller2013.informed {N : ℕ} {U : Type u_1} [MeasurableSpace U] [Fintype U] [MeasurableSingletonClass U] (sem : U → Finset (Fin (N + 1))) (α : ℝ) :
      ProbabilityTheory.Kernel (Fin (N + 1)) U

      The informed speaker knows the state and addresses the literal listener.

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        noncomputable def GoodmanStuhlmuller2013.speaker {N : ℕ} {U : Type u_1} [MeasurableSpace U] [Fintype U] [MeasurableSingletonClass U] (sem : U → Finset (Fin (N + 1))) (α : ℝ) (n : ℕ) :
        ProbabilityTheory.Kernel (Fin (N + 1)) U

        The speaker of equations (2) and (3) sees how many of the n objects she looks at have the property, believes her posterior over states under the uniform prior, and addresses the literal listener. The listener cannot see her observation, so the speaker he models (equation 4) draws it at the state.

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          instance GoodmanStuhlmuller2013.instIsFiniteKernelFinHAddNatOfNatSpeaker {N : ℕ} {U : Type u_1} [MeasurableSpace U] [Fintype U] [MeasurableSingletonClass U] (sem : U → Finset (Fin (N + 1))) (α : ℝ) (n : ℕ) :
          ProbabilityTheory.IsFiniteKernel (speaker sem α n)
          noncomputable def GoodmanStuhlmuller2013.listener {N : ℕ} {U : Type u_1} [MeasurableSpace U] [Fintype U] [MeasurableSingletonClass U] (sem : U → Finset (Fin (N + 1))) (α : ℝ) (n : ℕ) :
          ProbabilityTheory.Kernel U (Fin (N + 1))

          The listener (equation 1) inverts the speaker against a uniform prior.

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            theorem GoodmanStuhlmuller2013.speaker_real_singleton {N : ℕ} {U : Type u_1} [MeasurableSpace U] [Fintype U] [MeasurableSingletonClass U] {sem : U → Finset (Fin (N + 1))} {α : ℝ} {n : ℕ} (hα : 0 < α) (s : Fin (N + 1)) (u : U) :
            ((speaker sem α n) s).real {u} = ∑ k : Fin (N + 1), ((ProbabilityTheory.hypergeometric N n) s).real {k} * ((if compatible n k ⊆ sem u then (↑(sem u).card)⁻¹ ^ α else 0) / ∑ u' : U, if compatible n k ⊆ sem u' then (↑(sem u').card)⁻¹ ^ α else 0)

            The speaker says only what holds at every state her observation leaves possible, and weights such an utterance by the inverse size of its extension to the power α.

            theorem GoodmanStuhlmuller2013.speaker_real_singleton_le_one {N : ℕ} {U : Type u_1} [MeasurableSpace U] [Fintype U] [MeasurableSingletonClass U] {sem : U → Finset (Fin (N + 1))} {α : ℝ} {n : ℕ} (s : Fin (N + 1)) (u : U) :
            ((speaker sem α n) s).real {u} ≤ 1
            theorem GoodmanStuhlmuller2013.speaker_full {N : ℕ} {U : Type u_1} [MeasurableSpace U] [Fintype U] [MeasurableSingletonClass U] {sem : U → Finset (Fin (N + 1))} {α : ℝ} :
            speaker sem α N = informed sem α

            With complete access the speaker knows the state.

            theorem GoodmanStuhlmuller2013.speaker_last {N : ℕ} {U : Type u_1} [MeasurableSpace U] [Fintype U] [MeasurableSingletonClass U] {sem : U → Finset (Fin (N + 1))} {α : ℝ} {n : ℕ} (hα : 0 < α) (hn : n ≤ N) {s : Fin (N + 1)} (h : ∀ (u : U), compatible n ⟨n, ⋯⟩ ⊆ sem u ↔ s ∈ sem u) :
            (speaker sem α n) (Fin.last N) = (informed sem α) s

            When every object has the property the speaker sees it of each object she looks at. If the utterances true at every state this leaves possible are those true at s, she speaks as one who knows the state is s.

            theorem GoodmanStuhlmuller2013.speaker_of_isUpperSet {N : ℕ} {U : Type u_1} [MeasurableSpace U] [Fintype U] [MeasurableSingletonClass U] {sem : U → Finset (Fin (N + 1))} {α : ℝ} {n : ℕ} (hα : 0 < α) (hsem : ∀ (u : U), IsUpperSet ↑(sem u)) (hn : n ≤ N) :
            speaker sem α n = (informed sem α).comp (ProbabilityTheory.hypergeometric N n)

            When every meaning is upward closed, as the lower-bounded numerals are, the speaker draws her observation and speaks as one who knows it to be the state, what she has seen being her lower bound.

            theorem GoodmanStuhlmuller2013.listener_full_lt {N : ℕ} {U : Type u_1} [MeasurableSpace U] [Fintype U] [MeasurableSingletonClass U] {sem : U → Finset (Fin (N + 1))} {α : ℝ} {u : U} (hα : 0 < α) {s s' : Fin (N + 1)} (hu : s ∈ sem u) (h : {x : U | s ∈ sem x} ⊂ {x : U | s' ∈ sem x}) :
            ((listener sem α N) u).real {s'} < ((listener sem α N) u).real {s}

            With complete access, of two states at which an utterance is true the listener favours the one at which fewer alternatives are true, since the speaker's choice is spread over them.

            The alternatives of section 1.1, for three objects #

            The quantifier alternatives none, some, all.

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              The numeral alternatives one, two, three.

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                The states at which a numeral holds of the three objects on the lower-bounded meaning of [Hor72], its number or more.

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                  theorem GoodmanStuhlmuller2013.NumUtt.mem_extension {u : NumUtt} {s : Fin 4} :
                  s ∈ u.extension ↔ u.value ≤ ↑s

                  The predictions of section 1.1, for every rationality #

                  theorem GoodmanStuhlmuller2013.some_full {α : ℝ} (hα : 0 < α) :
                  ((listener QUtt.extension α 3) QUtt.some_).real {3} < ((listener QUtt.extension α 3) QUtt.some_).real {2}

                  With complete access some is read as some but not all; the state with two objects is more probable than the state with three, where the speaker could have said all.

                  theorem GoodmanStuhlmuller2013.some_partial {α : ℝ} (hα : 0 < α) {n : ℕ} (hn : n = 1 ∨ n = 2) :
                  ((listener QUtt.extension α n) QUtt.some_).real {2} ≤ ((listener QUtt.extension α n) QUtt.some_).real {3}

                  With access to one or two objects the implicature is canceled; the state with two objects is no more probable than the state with three, since a speaker who has seen only objects with the property can say nothing stronger than some.

                  theorem GoodmanStuhlmuller2013.two_full {α : ℝ} (hα : 0 < α) :

                  With complete access two is read as exactly two; the state with two objects is more probable than the state with three, where the speaker could have said three.

                  theorem GoodmanStuhlmuller2013.one_full {α : ℝ} (hα : 0 < α) {s : Fin 4} (hs : 1 < s) :

                  With complete access one is read as exactly one; the state with one object is more probable than a state with more.

                  theorem GoodmanStuhlmuller2013.one_minimal {α : ℝ} (hα : 0 < α) {s s' : Fin 4} (h : s ≤ s') :
                  ((listener NumUtt.extension α 1) NumUtt.one).real {s} ≤ ((listener NumUtt.extension α 1) NumUtt.one).real {s'}

                  After one object one carries no implicature; a state with more objects with the property is at least as probable, since the speaker says one exactly when the object she looks at has the property.

                  theorem GoodmanStuhlmuller2013.two_partial {α : ℝ} (hα : 0 < α) :

                  After two objects two carries no implicature; the state with two objects is no more probable than the state with three, since the speaker says two only when both objects she looks at have the property.

                  theorem GoodmanStuhlmuller2013.one_partial_three {α : ℝ} (hα : 0 < α) :

                  After two objects one keeps its implicature against three; the state with one object is more probable than the state with three, where the speaker saw two objects with the property and would rather have said two.

                  theorem GoodmanStuhlmuller2013.one_partial_two {α : ℝ} (hα : 0 < α) :

                  After two objects one loses its implicature against two; the state with one object is no more probable than the state with two, where the speaker may have seen only one object with the property.