Goodman and Stuhlmüller (2013): Knowledge and Implicature #
Goodman and Stuhlmüller model scalar implicature under a speaker with incomplete knowledge. The
state is how many of N objects have a property, and the speaker's access is how many of them
she looks at. She observes how many of those have the property, a hypergeometric draw, believes
her posterior over states, and softmax-optimizes the expected log-probability the literal
listener gives the state under that belief. The listener, who knows her access but not her
observation, models her with the observation drawn at the state (speaker) and applies Bayes'
rule (listener).
Main statements #
speaker_real_singleton: the speaker says only what holds at every state her observation leaves possible, and weights such an utterance by the inverse size of its extension to the power of the rationality.listener_full_lt: with complete access the speaker knows the state, and of two states at which an utterance is true the listener favours the one at which fewer alternatives are true. For three objects, some implicates not all (some_full) and a numeral its exact reading (two_full,one_full).speaker_of_isUpperSet: when every meaning is upward closed, as the lower-bounded numerals are, the speaker who has seenkobjects with the property speaks as one who knows there are exactlyk.some_partial,one_minimal,two_partial,one_partial_three,one_partial_two: with access to one or two of three objects the some implicature is canceled, one after one object and two after two carry none, and one after two objects keeps the implicature against three but not against two.
Implementation notes #
- The speaker is
RSA.speakerat her posterior belief and no cost, composed with the draw of her observation. The literal listener is uniform on an utterance's extension, so only the support of the belief matters. - The model takes any number of objects, and the alternatives and predictions are for three. An utterance's extension is a row of the tree of numbers, the numerals on their lower-bounded meaning.
- The alternatives are the paper's, none, some, all and one, two, three, without a silent option, so a speaker whose observation supports none of them says nothing.
- The prior is uniform, the regime of the paper's expository predictions; its fitted binomial prior and its rationality only reshape the plotted magnitudes. Experiment results and the quantitative fit are not formalized.
References #
The states an observation leaves possible #
The states an observation leaves possible are those at which the speaker could see k
objects with the property among the n she looks at.
Equations
- GoodmanStuhlmuller2013.compatible n k = {s : Fin (N + 1) | ProbabilityTheory.hypergeometricCount N (↑s) n ↑k ≠ 0}
Instances For
After a possible observation the posterior under the uniform prior charges exactly the states compatible with it.
The speaker and the listener #
The literal listener Plex of section 1 conditions the uniform prior on the extension of
the utterance.
Equations
- GoodmanStuhlmuller2013.literal sem = RSA.listener (ProbabilityTheory.uniformOn Set.univ) (RSA.truthful fun (u : U) => ↑(sem u))
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The informed speaker knows the state and addresses the literal listener.
Equations
- GoodmanStuhlmuller2013.informed sem α = RSA.speaker α 0 (⇑(GoodmanStuhlmuller2013.literal sem)) MeasureTheory.Measure.dirac
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The speaker of equations (2) and (3) sees how many of the n objects she looks at have the
property, believes her posterior over states under the uniform prior, and addresses the literal
listener. The listener cannot see her observation, so the speaker he models (equation 4) draws
it at the state.
Equations
- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
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The listener (equation 1) inverts the speaker against a uniform prior.
Equations
- GoodmanStuhlmuller2013.listener sem α n = RSA.listener (ProbabilityTheory.uniformOn Set.univ) ⇑(GoodmanStuhlmuller2013.speaker sem α n)
Instances For
The speaker says only what holds at every state her observation leaves possible, and weights
such an utterance by the inverse size of its extension to the power α.
With complete access the speaker knows the state.
When every object has the property the speaker sees it of each object she looks at. If the
utterances true at every state this leaves possible are those true at s, she speaks as one who
knows the state is s.
When every meaning is upward closed, as the lower-bounded numerals are, the speaker draws her observation and speaks as one who knows it to be the state, what she has seen being her lower bound.
With complete access, of two states at which an utterance is true the listener favours the one at which fewer alternatives are true, since the speaker's choice is spread over them.
The alternatives of section 1.1, for three objects #
Equations
- GoodmanStuhlmuller2013.instDecidableEqQUtt x✝ y✝ = if h : x✝.ctorIdx = y✝.ctorIdx then isTrue ⋯ else isFalse ⋯
Equations
- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
Equations
The states at which a quantifier holds of the three objects, the row of its tree of numbers.
Equations
Instances For
Equations
- GoodmanStuhlmuller2013.instDecidableEqNumUtt x✝ y✝ = if h : x✝.ctorIdx = y✝.ctorIdx then isTrue ⋯ else isFalse ⋯
Equations
- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
Equations
The number a numeral names.
Equations
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The states at which a numeral holds of the three objects on the lower-bounded meaning of [Hor72], its number or more.
Equations
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The predictions of section 1.1, for every rationality #
With complete access some is read as some but not all; the state with two objects is more probable than the state with three, where the speaker could have said all.
With access to one or two objects the implicature is canceled; the state with two objects is no more probable than the state with three, since a speaker who has seen only objects with the property can say nothing stronger than some.
With complete access two is read as exactly two; the state with two objects is more probable than the state with three, where the speaker could have said three.
With complete access one is read as exactly one; the state with one object is more probable than a state with more.
After one object one carries no implicature; a state with more objects with the property is at least as probable, since the speaker says one exactly when the object she looks at has the property.
After two objects two carries no implicature; the state with two objects is no more probable than the state with three, since the speaker says two only when both objects she looks at have the property.
After two objects one keeps its implicature against three; the state with one object is more probable than the state with three, where the speaker saw two objects with the property and would rather have said two.
After two objects one loses its implicature against two; the state with one object is no more probable than the state with two, where the speaker may have seen only one object with the property.