Égré, Rossi and Sprenger (2026): Trivalent Conditionals, Kratzer Style #
Égré, Rossi and Sprenger extend the trivalent semantics of indicative conditionals to epistemic might and must. A sentence takes a trivalent value at a context and a world; the modals quantify over the context with the trivalent quantifiers that skip void instances; and the conditional stays a binary connective while hard-wiring Kratzer's restriction into its truth conditions: it asserts its consequent at the context updated with its antecedent, and is void where the world drops out or the update collapses. Acceptance is non-falsity throughout the context, equivalently probability 1 under every credence mirroring it, and the Restrictor View's predictions (the covert must, the test behaviour of modals, epistemic and if-might contradictions) come out at the level of acceptance and inference, not truth conditions.
Main statements #
Sentence.cond_ofCooper,ofFormula_cond: on nonmodal sentences the conditional is Cooper's, so the semantics extends the Cooper valuations of [ERS26b].Sentence.ContextFree.update_eq_restrict(Fact 1);Sentence.update_box_of_accepts,Sentence.update_dia_ofand their converses (Fact 2), which on a conditional-free prejacent is [Vel96]'s test (update_dia_ofSet).Sentence.cond_box_eq_neg_one(Fact 3),Sentence.neg_cond(Proposition 2),Sentence.ContextFree.update_update(Proposition 3),Sentence.ContextFree.cond_cond(Corollary 1), andimport_export_failsfor a modal antecedent, (18) against (19).not_accepts_contra',update_contra'(Fact 5): throughAgrees, the semantics is [Yal07]'s domain semantics on conditional-free sentences, and Fact 5 isYalcin2007.not_accepted_contra'.Mirrors.prob_eq_one_iff,accepts_iff_forall_mirrors(Definition 7);prob_box_eq_zero_or_one(Fact 4);accepts_cond_box_iff,prob_cond_box_le,prob_cond_box_eq_prob_box_cond(Theorem 1);cEntails_iff_entails(Theorem 2).schema_K(Fact 6),entails_box(Fact 7),entails_cond_box(Corollary 2),accepts_cond_dia_iff(Fact 8),entails_dia_conj,entails_cond_dia(Fact 9),eq_empty_of_accepts_neg_dia,eq_empty_of_if_might,not_entails_of_dia(Proposition 5),modus_ponens(Fact 10),modus_tollensand its failures (Fact 11), the structural rules and failures of Proposition 4, andentails_insert_iff(Theorem 3) with the Conditional Proof counterexample.cond_ofSet,prob_cond_ofSet(Adams's Thesis, through [ERS26b]'s conditional events),prob_cond_contra(footnote 11),prob_contra'_coin(footnote 12),die_bare_vs_must((20) and (21)).
Implementation notes #
- A sentence denotes its valuation, a function
Set W → W → SignType, so the semantics is compositional by construction (Proposition 1), and a schema proved for all such functions holds of the formulas of every model. Definition 3's degenerate clause⟦A⟧^{s,w} := ⟦A⟧^{{w},w}forw ∉ sis stated for everyA; the modal and conditional clauses evaluate atSentence.ctxto build it in. Nonmodal sentences are then context-independent at every world, as the proof of Fact 1 asserts (Sentence.ContextFree), and conditional-free ones areSentence.ofSet. - The value
1/2is0inSignType, so⟦A⟧ ≥ 1/2is0 ≤ ⟦A⟧. - Definition 6 requires only that the credence give the context probability 1, but footnote 8
and the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 use a credence positive exactly on the context.
Mirrorsis that regular reading; under the literal one the probability half of Theorem 1 fails (not_prob_cond_box_eq_of_literal). - Footnote 18 prints its premise as
q ∧ ¬◇p, which its own model does not accept (not_accepts_fn18_printed); the main text's◇¬pis meant. - Consequence is stated for a fixed world space, quantifying over its contexts, which is what the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 use; countermodels are concrete world spaces.
TODO #
- The pragmatic acceptance condition for disjunctions in §4.3, under which disjunctions of epistemic contradictions are unacceptable.
- The motivating clause (4), which makes (15) false, and the §4.4 discussion of how speakers negate conditionals.
References #
A sentence of the conditional–modal language denotes a trivalent value at each context–world pair.
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- EgreRossiSprenger2026b.Sentence W = (Set W → W → SignType)
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The context a sentence is evaluated in, s itself when the world belongs to it and the
singleton {w} otherwise, which is Definition 3's degenerate stipulation read globally.
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- EgreRossiSprenger2026b.Sentence.ctx s w = if w ∈ s then s else {w}
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A sentence respects the degenerate stipulation when, outside the context, it is evaluated at its own singleton. The operators below produce only normalized sentences.
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- φ.Normalized = ∀ (s : Set W), ∀ w ∉ s, φ s w = φ {w} w
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A nonmodal sentence places no condition on the context.
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- φ.ContextFree = ∀ (s s' : Set W) (w : W), φ s w = φ s' w
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The L-sentence expressing the classical proposition p.
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- EgreRossiSprenger2026b.Sentence.ofSet p x✝ w = SignType.ofProp (w ∈ p)
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Cooper negation is Kleene's, pointwise.
Restriction and update (Definition 2) #
The restriction s/A keeps the worlds of s where A is not false.
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- EgreRossiSprenger2026b.Sentence.restrict s φ = {w : W | w ∈ s ∧ 0 ≤ φ s w}
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The update s[A] is the restriction if the restriction still accepts A, and the collapsed
context ∅ if the update would be self-defeating.
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- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
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A world survives the update exactly when it survives the restriction and the restriction accepts the sentence.
Restriction and update agree on nonmodal sentences, whose evaluation does not move with the context (Fact 1).
The modals (Definition 3) #
□ and ◇ generalize Cooper conjunction and disjunction over the worlds of the context: false
when some instance is false, void when every instance is void, true otherwise — Haug's trivalent
quantifiers over the context, in the form [Bel70] gave restricted quantification.
Epistemic must is Haug's universal quantifier over the context.
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- φ.box s w = Trivalent.forallHaug ((EgreRossiSprenger2026b.Sentence.ctx s w).indicator fun (w' : W) => φ (EgreRossiSprenger2026b.Sentence.ctx s w) w')
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Epistemic might is Haug's existential quantifier over the context.
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- φ.dia s w = Trivalent.existsHaug ((EgreRossiSprenger2026b.Sentence.ctx s w).indicator fun (w' : W) => φ (EgreRossiSprenger2026b.Sentence.ctx s w) w')
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□A is false at a context exactly when A is false somewhere in it.
□A is void at a context exactly when A is void throughout it.
◇A is true at a context exactly when A is true somewhere in it.
◇A is void at a context exactly when A is void throughout it.
The conditional (Definition 3) #
A → B asserts B at the context updated with A, and is void where the world of evaluation
drops out of the update or the update collapses.
The trivalent, Kratzer-style conditional.
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- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
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Acceptance and the test behaviour of modals #
A context accepts a sentence when the sentence is not false at any of its worlds, evaluated at the context itself (Definition 7).
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- EgreRossiSprenger2026b.Sentence.Accepts s φ = ∀ w ∈ s, 0 ≤ φ s w
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Nonmodal sentences and Cooper's conditional #
The nonmodal sentence with Cooper value p at each world, whatever the context.
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A nonmodal sentence is the sentence of its Cooper values.
On nonmodal sentences the conditional is Cooper's connective at every world, inside the context or outside it, the reduction (i) of §3.5.
Updating on nonmodal sentences in turn is updating on their conjunction (Update Commutativity, Proposition 3).
Corollary 1, Import-Export for nonmodal antecedents, whatever the consequent.
Consequence (Definition 9) #
TT-consequence preserves acceptance across every context of the world space; with the meanings fixed, a schema valid for all meanings holds in particular for those the paper's formulas take in any model.
TT-consequence: every context accepting the premises accepts the conclusion.
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- EgreRossiSprenger2026b.Entails Γ ψ = ∀ (s : Set W), (∀ φ ∈ Γ, EgreRossiSprenger2026b.Sentence.Accepts s φ) → EgreRossiSprenger2026b.Sentence.Accepts s ψ
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A context accepts A → B exactly when it accepts A → □B (Theorem 1, acceptance
half)...
... and exactly when it accepts □(A → B).
Might commutes with the conditional at the level of acceptance (Fact 8).
Fact 8, the must half, is Theorem 1.
Structural properties (Proposition 4) #
For nonmodal premises the Deduction Theorem holds (Theorem 3), because their acceptance survives the update on the hypothesis.
Domain semantics on the conditional-free fragment #
On sentences without conditionals, the valuations of Definition 3 are [Yal07]'s domain semantics, equation (1): a trivalent sentence agrees with a domain-semantic one when it is two-valued at every world of every context and true exactly where the other is. The Boolean connectives and the modals preserve agreement, so the paper's verdicts on epistemic contradictions are Yalcin's theorems (Fact 5).
φ agrees with the domain-semantic sentence ψ at every world of every context.
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- EgreRossiSprenger2026b.Agrees φ ψ = ∀ (s : Set W), ∀ w ∈ s, φ s w = SignType.ofProp (ψ s w)
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Agreeing sentences are accepted in the same contexts.
No nonempty context accepts the epistemic contradiction q ∧ ◇¬q (Fact 5), which on the
conditional-free fragment is Yalcin2007.not_accepted_contra'...
... and every update on it collapses.
The epistemic contradiction ¬p ∧ ◇p is [Yal07]'s contra...
... and so is its mirror image ◇p ∧ ¬p, the antecedent of (19).
Import-Export fails for a modal antecedent, (18) against (19): where p is possible the
update on ◇p is idle, so ◇p → (¬p → q) is ¬p → q and true at a ¬p-world where q holds,
while the update on ◇p ∧ ¬p collapses and (◇p ∧ ¬p) → q is void.
Inference with conditionals and modals (§5) #
A conditional with an impossible antecedent is void everywhere.
Fact 2 on a conditional-free prejacent is [Vel96]'s might: the update on ◇p
tests whether p is open in the context.
For conditional-free A and B, ◇A, A → ◇B ⊨ ◇(A ∧ B) (Fact 9)...
... and ◇(A ∧ B) ⊨ A → ◇B.
Without the premise ◇A the first entailment fails. If my team wins out, they might win it
all (27) does not entail it might turn out that my team wins out and wins it all (26), since
a context excluding A accepts the conditional vacuously.
A sentence never void at a world of its context, as every conditional-free sentence is.
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- EgreRossiSprenger2026b.NeverVoid φ = ∀ (s : Set W), ∀ w ∈ s, φ s w ≠ 0
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Proposition 5, the is-might contradiction: no nonempty context accepts both ¬B and
◇B for a never-void B, that is, ¬B, ◇B ⊨ ⊥.
Proposition 5, the if-might contradiction: for nonmodal A and never-void B,
◇A, A → ¬B, A → ◇B ⊨ ⊥.
Proposition 5, non-veridical might: ◇C ⊭ C.
Replacement of Logical Equivalents fails for must (§5), since □A ⊨ A but ¬□A ⊭ ¬A.
Modus Tollens holds for conditional-free sentences (Fact 11)...
... but fails once the consequent may be void, at a true antecedent with a void consequent.
... and fails for a modal consequent, [Yal12]'s marble (28): with a green and a black marble possible, if the marble is not green, it must be black and it is not the case that it must be black are accepted, the marble is green is not.
The marble also refutes contraposition, since ¬A → □B ⊭ ¬□B → A.
Uniform Substitution fails (Proposition 4). Although p ⊨ p ∨ q for conditional-free p...
... but not when a void conditional is substituted for p.
Replacement of Logical Equivalents fails (Proposition 4). For conditional-free p and q,
p → q and ¬p ∨ q are equivalent...
... but their negations are not.
Conditional Proof fails with modal premises (§5). q, ◇¬p, p ⊨ ¬q, since no nonempty context
accepts both p and ◇¬p...
... yet q, ◇¬p ⊭ p → ¬q, in footnote 18's model of a pq-world and a ¬pq-world.
Footnote 18 prints the premise as q ∧ ¬◇p, which its own model does not accept; the main
text's ◇¬p is meant.
Probability and acceptance (§4) #
A credence over the worlds gives each sentence, at a context, the trivalent probability of
[ERS26b] (Definition 5). Mirroring coordinates the credence with the context.
Definition 6 asks only that the credence give the context probability 1, but the paper uses it as
regularity on the context, a credence positive at exactly the context's worlds (footnote 8 and
the proof of Theorem 2), and under the literal reading the probability half of Theorem 1 fails
(not_prob_cond_box_eq_of_literal). Mirrors is the regular reading.
A credence mirrors a context when its positive-weight worlds are exactly the context's.
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- EgreRossiSprenger2026b.Mirrors μ s = ∀ (w : W), μ {w} ≠ 0 ↔ w ∈ s
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Under mirroring, a set is null exactly when it misses the context.
Under mirroring, probability 1 is acceptance (§4.1).
A sentence uniform across the context has probability 0 or 1 under a credence mirroring it.
Under a mirroring credence, must sentences have probability 0 or 1 (Fact 4)...
... and so do might sentences.
Under a mirroring credence A → □B is never more probable than A → B (Theorem 1,
probability half)...
... and exactly as probable as □(A → B).
Under Definition 6 read literally, a credence giving the context probability 1 without
positive weight at each of its worlds, the probability half of Theorem 1 fails: concentrated on a
¬p-world, the credence makes p → □¬p certain by All Void and □(p → ¬p) impossible.
The uniform credence on a finite context mirrors it.
A finite nonempty context has a mirroring credence, the uniform one.
Acceptance is probability 1 under every credence mirroring the context (Definition 7).
An inference preserves certainty (Definition 8) when every credence mirroring a context that makes the premises certain makes the conclusion certain.
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- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
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Predictions #
The conditional between conditional-free sentences denotes, in every context, the conditional event of [ERS26b]'s reading of an Adams formula.
A conditional whose antecedent is an epistemic contradiction is void throughout, so its probability is 1 by All Void, under every credence and at every context (footnote 11).
For conditional-free A and B, the probability of A → B is the conditional probability of
B given A (Adams's Thesis, §4.1), at every context and under every credence, since the
degenerate clause makes nonmodal sentences context-independent.
On a fair coin the epistemic contradiction the coin is facing heads and might not face heads
has probability 1/2, true at the heads world and false at the tails world (footnote 12).
If the die has been tossed, the outcome is greater than 1 (20) has probability 5/6 and if
the die has been tossed, the outcome must be greater than 1 (21) probability 0, though a
context accepts the one exactly when it accepts the other.
The nonmodal fragment is the Mind paper's language #
The Cooper valuations of Definition 1 are those of [ERS26b], and the conditional–modal semantics extends them: a formula of that paper's language denotes the nonmodal sentence of its Cooper values, and the connectives commute with the embedding.
The nonmodal sentence a formula of the conditional language expresses, at worlds whose atoms
t values.
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The conditional–modal conditional restricts to Cooper's on the Mind paper's formulas.