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Linglib.Theories.Semantics.Conditionals.Counterfactual.Implicature

Counterfactuals via implicature (Bassi & Bar-Lev) #

@cite{bassi-bar-lev-2018}

@cite{bassi-bar-lev-2018} propose an alternative to the selectional theory: counterfactuals have a basic EXISTENTIAL meaning (true if some closest A-world satisfies B), strengthened to universal by an exhaustivity operator (EXH). In mixed scenarios, EXH strengthening fails, leaving the basic existential meaning.

Under this approach:

Wrong Prediction #

The implicature theory predicts that in mixed scenarios, all quantified counterfactuals have the SAME (existential) individual results. Since existential is always true when B holds for some closest world:

But @cite{ramotowska-marty-romoli-santorio-2025} observe:

The implicature theory gets "every" and "not-every" WRONG:

This file makes those wrong predictions formal as Lean theorems that can be cited (in the contrastive direction) by the @cite{ramotowska-marty-romoli-santorio-2025} study file.

Under the implicature approach with all-true individual results, "every" is predicted true — the OPPOSITE of the observed data (~1.5/99). The implicature theory predicts "every" = TRUE because individual CFs are all existentially true, and conjunctive projection of all-true = true.

This contradicts @cite{ramotowska-marty-romoli-santorio-2025}: the selectional theory correctly predicts "every" = FALSE via conjunctive projection over mixed (not uniformly true) individual results.

Implicature predicts "not-every" = FALSE (since not-every(all-true) = ∃d.¬true = false). This contradicts the observed data (not-every ≈ 86/99). The discriminating case alongside implicature_wrong_for_every.