Documentation

Linglib.Studies.QingFranke2015

[QF15] #

[FG12] [Gri75] [DR95]

Variations on a Bayesian theme: comparing Bayesian models of referential reasoning. In Bayesian Natural Language Semantics and Pragmatics, 91–117.

One referential game (green square, green circle, blue circle; Fig. 1) and a family of models decomposed along three design dimensions: the speaker's goal (belief-oriented log-informativity, eq. 10, vs action-oriented raw informativity, eq. 9), the speaker's belief about the literal listener (uniform vs salience prior), and the listener's own prior (eqs. 12–13). Utterance cost is a constant c on adjectives (eq. 11), marginalized over (−0.4, 0.4) in the paper's model comparison.

Main results #

The belief-oriented chain is stated parametrically in the cost factor k = exp(−c) (k < 1 ↔ a noun preference c > 0), so each prediction carries its exact validity region:

Implementation notes #

At λ = 1 the belief-oriented weight is L0 · k, so the chain is rational in k and every prediction is symbolic algebra over PMF.normalizeOrUniform — no transcendental atoms; c re-enters only through the threshold identities (k = 1/2c = ln 2).

The three objects in the reference game context (Fig. 1): unique shape, unique color, and both features shared.

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    @[implicit_reducible]
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    def QingFranke2015.instReprObject.repr :
    ObjectStd.Format
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      The four single-word utterances (feature predicates).

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          "square" and "blue" each denote a single object; "circle" and "green" are two-ways ambiguous.

          Empirical data (Tables 1–2) #

          Salience prior: the salience condition of Table 2 (N = 240), the paper's empirical estimate of S(t).

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            Uniform prior.

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              Speaker goal types #

              The goal dimension (eqs. 9–10), generic in the literal listener and λ.

              noncomputable def QingFranke2015.beliefGoalScore (cost : Utterance) (l0 : UtteranceObject) (α : ) (w : Object) (u : Utterance) :

              Belief-oriented S1 score (eq. 10): exp (λ (log L0 − Cost)), gated at false utterances (Lean's log 0 = 0 would otherwise leak mass).

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                noncomputable def QingFranke2015.actionGoalScore (cost : Utterance) (l0 : UtteranceObject) (α : ) (w : Object) (u : Utterance) :

                Action-oriented S1 score (eq. 9): exp (λ (L0 − Cost)) — positive even on false utterances (the paper's fn. 7 restricts comparisons to truthful ones).

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                  theorem QingFranke2015.beliefGoal_gt_iff (cost : Utterance) (l0 : UtteranceObject) (u₁ u₂ : Utterance) (w : Object) {α : } ( : 0 < α) (h1 : l0 u₁ w 0) (h2 : l0 u₂ w 0) :
                  beliefGoalScore cost l0 α w u₁ > beliefGoalScore cost l0 α w u₂ Real.log (l0 u₁ w) - cost u₁ > Real.log (l0 u₂ w) - cost u₂

                  Belief-oriented ranking is λ-independent: it compares log L0 − cost.

                  theorem QingFranke2015.actionGoal_gt_iff (cost : Utterance) (l0 : UtteranceObject) (u₁ u₂ : Utterance) (w : Object) {α : } ( : 0 < α) :
                  actionGoalScore cost l0 α w u₁ > actionGoalScore cost l0 α w u₂ l0 u₁ w - cost u₁ > l0 u₂ w - cost u₂

                  Action-oriented ranking is λ-independent: it compares L0 − cost.

                  The belief-oriented chain, parametric in the cost factor #

                  At λ = 1, exp (log L0 − c) = L0 · exp (−c), so the whole σ_b chain is rational in the cost factor k = exp (−c): k = 1 is zero cost, k < 1 a noun preference, and thresholds in k translate back to cost bounds (k > 1/2c < ln 2).

                  noncomputable def QingFranke2015.l0 (p : Object) (u : Utterance) (w : Object) :

                  Literal listener at prior p (eq. 1): prior conditioned on the extension.

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                    noncomputable def QingFranke2015.sbScore (p : Object) (k : ) (w : Object) (u : Utterance) :

                    Belief-oriented speaker weight at λ = 1: L0 · k^cost.

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                      noncomputable def QingFranke2015.s1 (p : Object) (k : ) (w : Object) :

                      Belief-oriented speaker (eq. 10).

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                        noncomputable def QingFranke2015.l1Score (prior : Object) (k : ) (u : Utterance) (w : Object) :

                        Pragmatic-listener score (eqs. 12–13): the listener's own prior times the σ_bU speaker (the paper's best-supported speaker model).

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                          noncomputable def QingFranke2015.l1 (prior : Object) (k : ) (u : Utterance) :
                          PMF Object

                          Pragmatic listener (eq. 6).

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                            Speaker predictions (Table 1 directions) #

                            For the green square, σ_bU prefers the unique "square" over the ambiguous "green" at every cost factor k < 2 (135/144 speakers, Table 1).

                            For the blue circle, σ_bU prefers the unique "blue" over "circle" once the cost factor exceeds 1/2 (c < ln 2); 119/144 speakers chose "blue".

                            For the green circle, cost is the tiebreaker: any noun preference (k < 1) favors "circle" over "green" (81 vs 63, Table 1, n.s.).

                            Without cost (k = 1) the green-circle tie is unbroken: Q1 alone cannot distinguish two equally informative words.

                            σ_bU with any noun preference in (1/2, 1) — covering the paper's whole positive-cost support c ∈ (0, 0.4] — matches all three Table-1 majority directions.

                            Listener predictions: the salience reversal (Tables 2 and 4) #

                            Both listeners embed the same σ_bU speaker and differ only in their prior (eqs. 12–13). The reversals hold at every k > 0: they are pure prior effects, independent of the cost regime.

                            Uniform-prior listener, "circle": pragmatic narrowing favors the green circle (a blue-circle speaker had "blue"), at every k > 0.

                            Salience-prior listener, "circle": salience (139 vs 30) overrides the pragmatic direction, at every k > 0. Matches Table 2 (117/180 blue).

                            Finding 5: the salience reversal for "circle", at every k > 0. The human data follow the salience direction.

                            Uniform-prior listener, "green": pragmatic narrowing favors the green circle (a green-square speaker had "square"), at every k > 0.

                            Salience-prior listener, "green": salience (71 vs 30) overrides the pragmatic direction, at every k > 0. Here the humans go the other way (115/180 green circle, Table 2; p. 212).

                            Finding 6: the salience reversal for "green", at every k > 0. The human data follow the pragmatic direction — no single listener prior gets both "circle" and "green" right.

                            The salience-belief speaker: thresholds inside the cost support #

                            σ_bS replaces the speaker's literal-listener prior with the salience data (eq. 7). Its blue-circle and green-circle predictions flip at k = 139/169 and k = 101/169 — both inside the paper's cost support (c ∈ (0, 0.4) is k ∈ (0.67, 1)) — so that model's content is a pair of thresholds, not directions.

                            σ_bS prefers "blue" at the blue circle iff k > 139/169.

                            σ_bS prefers "green" at the green circle iff k > 101/169.

                            Cost thresholds across the goal dimension #

                            The blue-circle boundary separates the goal types: action-oriented scoring flips at c = 1/2, belief-oriented at c = ln 2 ≈ 0.693 — the log transform amplifies informativity differences, widening the viable cost range. Figure 3's posterior over c peaks well below both.

                            σ_aU threshold: "blue" > "circle" at the blue circle iff c < 1/2; the σ_aU tie at c = 1/2 is the boundary case.

                            σ_bU threshold: "blue" > "circle" at the blue circle iff c < ln 2 — the exponentiated form of speaker_prefers_unique_color's k > 1/2.

                            Data–model match #

                            For "green", the listener majority follows the pragmatic direction, not salience (115 vs 65; p. 212).

                            Bridges #

                            theorem QingFranke2015.zeroCost_beliefGoal_eq (l0 : UtteranceObject) (α : ) (w : Object) (u : Utterance) :
                            beliefGoalScore (fun (x : Utterance) => 0) l0 α w u = if l0 u w = 0 then 0 else Real.exp (α * Real.log (l0 u w))

                            At zero cost the belief-oriented score is [FG12]'s scoring rule — σ_bU generalizes FG2012 by the cost dimension.

                            The cost dimension is [Gri75]'s Q2 sub-maxim (brevity): without cost the equally-informative words tie (Q1 alone cannot break it), any noun preference breaks it, and zero cost is [DR95]'s No-Brevity interpretation at strength 0, independent of Q1.