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Linglib.Studies.Montague1973Attitudes

Montague (1973) intensional examples [Mon73] #

Toy examples in Montague's PTQ-style intensional logic:

Uses the infrastructure from Semantics/Intensional/Examples.lean.

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    A small domain for examples

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        In the actual world (w0), morning star = evening star. But their INTENSIONS differ (they pick out different things in other worlds).

        Doxastic accessibility relation: which worlds are compatible with what an agent believes. R(a, w, w') means w' is compatible with what a believes in w.

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          "believe" as an attitude verb. ⟦believe⟧(a)(p)(w) = ∀w'. R(a,w,w') → p(w')

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            Extended believe that's world-dependent.

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              "John believes Mary sleeps" (de dicto)

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                John does NOT believe Mary sleeps: Mary doesn't sleep in w0 (John's accessible world).

                "John believes John sleeps" (de dicto)

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                  John believes he sleeps: he sleeps in both w0 and w2.

                  Proposition: "John ate some cookies" (simplified)

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                    Mary believes John ate some cookies (trivially true proposition).

                    Belief is intensional: co-extensional expressions can differ under belief.

                    Up-down identity: applying down after up returns the original value.

                    Bridge to Direct Reference Theory #

                    The morningStar/eveningStar individual concepts defined above are Fregean concepts (world-dependent). In contrast, proper names in Semantics.Reference.Basic are Kripkean rigid designators.

                    This section makes the distinction explicit, connecting the existing Hesperus/Phosphorus examples to the direct reference framework.

                    "Hesperus" as a Kripkean proper name: rigid designator.

                    Contrast with morningStar above, which is a Fregean individual concept that varies across worlds. The proper name always returns .hesperus.

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                      morningStar is NOT rigid: it picks out different entities at different worlds. This contrasts with hesperus_rigid which IS rigid.

                      hesperus_rigid IS rigid (a proper name in the Kripkean sense).

                      Independence of names vs concepts: a Fregean individual concept (morningStar) can agree with a Kripkean name (hesperus_rigid) at one world while diverging at others.