Documentation

Linglib.Studies.Heim1992Desire

[Hei92] — Comparative-Belief Desire Semantics #

⟦α wants φ⟧^w is true iff for every doxastic alternative w' ∈ Dox_α(w), every closest φ-world to w' is more desirable to α than every closest ¬φ-world to w'. The semantics builds on [Lew73b] / [Sta68] similarity orderings, departs from a Kratzer [Kra81]-style ordering source, and treats desirability as a primitive comparative relation parameterized by agent and evaluation world.

This study file replicates the desire-semantics half of [Hei92] (the presupposition-projection half is at Studies/Heim1992.lean). Substrate is Semantics/Attitudes/Desire.lean (wantHeim, wantHeimDefined, HeimDesireParams, wantHeim_no_simultaneous_pq_and_negpq).

§-by-§ map #

PaperStudy file
§3 naive Hintikka (informally rejected)§2 (wantHeimNaive + Asher-style failure case)
(32) Asher Concorde example, p. 194§2 (analog scenario; see §2 caveat)
§4.2.2 (37/39) CCP-rephrased§3 / substrate wantHeim
§4.2.3 (40) amendmentsubstrate wantHeimDefined
§4.3 conflicting desires (implicit)§4 (substrate no-go)
Stalnaker get-well/¬have-been-sick (p. 195)§5 (deferred — needs richer model)

Cross-references #

§1. World model #

A simple 4-world model with two binary dimensions:

Worldrecovered (r)sick (s)
w0TT
w1TF
w2FT
w3FF

Models the Stalnaker [Sta84]-style example "I want to get well [recovered] but I don't want to have been sick" — the agent prefers r ∧ ¬s worlds (recovered without ever being sick) but believes they were sick (so all believed worlds have s). The (40) amendment makes wantHeim ¬s undefined under those beliefs.

inductive Heim1992.W :
  • w0 : W
  • w1 : W
  • w2 : W
  • w3 : W
Instances For
    @[implicit_reducible]
    instance Heim1992.instDecidableEqW :
    DecidableEq W
    Equations
    def Heim1992.instReprW.repr :
    WStd.Format
    Equations
    Instances For
      @[implicit_reducible]
      instance Heim1992.instReprW :
      Repr W
      Equations
      @[implicit_reducible]
      instance Heim1992.instInhabitedW :
      Inhabited W
      Equations
      @[implicit_reducible]
      instance Heim1992.instFintypeW :
      Fintype W
      Equations
      def Heim1992.sick :
      Set W
      Equations
      Instances For
        @[implicit_reducible]
        Equations
        • One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
        @[implicit_reducible]
        instance Heim1992.instDecidablePredWSick :
        DecidablePred sick
        Equations
        • One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.

        §2. Naive Hintikka rule fails on Asher-style cases #

        The "naive Hintikka" rule for wants (α wants φ iff every doxastic alternative is a φ-world) is rejected informally by Heim (it is not her numbered (27); (27) is the CCP rule). Heim cites [Ash87]'s example at (32), p. 194 ("Nicholas wants a free trip on the Concorde"): the agent wants φ but does not believe φ, so the naive rule wrongly predicts the ascription false.

        The analog below is structurally weaker than Asher's Concorde case (no inferential gradient between propositions; no probability weighting). It exhibits only the basic shape — want φ under beliefs that don't entail φ — sufficient to falsify the naive rule. A faithful Concorde-style witness (free-trip ⊨ trip + agent assigns high prob to "trip ∧ pay") requires a richer model and is part of the deferred Phase 2.

        Beliefs: agent believes they are sick. belS = {w0, w2}. Neither belief-world entails recovered.

        Equations
        Instances For

          The naive Hintikka rule predicts wants recovered false here (because w2belSick and ¬ recovered w2). Empirically the ascription can be true, so the naive rule is inadequate — this motivates the move to a comparative semantics.

          §3. Truth-conditional comparative-belief (31) #

          Heim's canonical formulation: ⟦α wants φ⟧ at w iff for every doxastic alternative w', every closest φ-world to w' is more desirable than every closest ¬φ-world to w'.

          Trivial similarity ordering: every world is equally close to every other world. The closer relation is the constant True predicate.

          Equations
          Instances For
            def Heim1992.prefRecovered :
            WWWProp

            Desirability: prefer recovered worlds to non-recovered worlds. The evaluation-world argument is suppressed (constant preference).

            Equations
            Instances For
              @[implicit_reducible]
              instance Heim1992.instDecidablePrefRecovered (w x y : W) :
              Decidable (prefRecovered w x y)
              Equations
              @[implicit_reducible]
              instance Heim1992.instDecidablePredWUniv :
              DecidablePred Set.univ
              Equations

              The (40) amendment: wantHeim recovered is defined under Set.univ (both recovered and ¬recovered worlds are believed possible).

              §4. Heim (40) does not validate simultaneous want p ∧ want ¬p #

              A side-effect of (40) — flagged by Heim herself in §4.3 (cf. (41)/(42), where she worries that (40) is in fact too restrictive and proposes shrinking Dox to a "favored" subset F_α) — is that under preference asymmetry, no (belS, w_eval) configuration validates both wantHeim p and wantHeim ¬p. The substrate theorem wantHeim_no_simultaneous_pq_and_negpq discharges this generically.

              Whether this side-effect is a virtue (Heim's account correctly rejects co-wanting p and ¬p) or a defect (Heim's account cannot represent genuine ambivalence) is the locus of subsequent debate; Heim's own §4.3 already concedes "a genuine modification is called for." Comparative discussion of later proposals (vF 1999, Phillips-Brown 2025, etc.) belongs in those later study files under the chronological-dependency rule.

              theorem Heim1992.prefRecovered_asymm (w_eval x y : W) :
              prefRecovered w_eval x yprefRecovered w_eval y xx = y

              prefRecovered is asymmetric: if x is preferred to y, then y is not preferred to x — and the implication "both directions ⇒ equality" requires that no two distinct worlds are both recovered and not-recovered, which is vacuously true.

              Witness on this concrete model: under Set.univ, no wantHeim recovered ∧ wantHeim ¬recovered configuration is consistent. Delegates to the substrate's general theorem.

              §5. Stalnaker get-well / ¬have-been-sick — deferred #

              Heim's central worked example (p. 195) is Stalnaker's "I want to get well, but I don't want to have been sick": both want recover and ¬want have-been-sick come out true even though recover ⊨ have-been-sick. Handling it requires the comparative-similarity machinery to do real work — Heim's Sim_w selects a single closest sick-recover-world, and desirability is compared between selections, not over the full belief set.

              The minimal witness model (per PDF p. 195) has three worlds with desirability w₁ (healthy throughout) > w₂ (sick then recovered) > w₃ (sick and stays sick) and Dox(w₀) = {w₂, w₃}. The trivial similarity ordering used in §3 collapses this case onto a static rule; a faithful instantiation needs Sim non-trivial. Phase 2 will land this scenario along with prefRecovered's evaluation-world parameter genuinely exercised.