[CF21]: Rational Interpretation of Numerical Quantity #
[CF21] applies [Mer99a]'s log-likelihood-ratio measure of argumentative strength to numerical quantity expressions: the strength of utterance u toward goal G is log (P(u∣G) / P(u∣¬G)) (eq. 17), and a pragmatic variant replaces truth with felicitous assertability (eq. 25). The §5 worked example: a conference succeeds iff more than 120 people register, registrations are uniform on [0, 200], and the speaker chooses between more than 100 and more than 110.
Main results #
bayesFactor_lt_of_goal_entails: §5.1's alignment of semantic and argumentative strength, in general form — between utterances entailed by the goal, the semantically stronger one is the argumentatively stronger one, since its extra content can only shed ¬G-worlds.cond_prod_byInterpretation: §5.2's computation pattern in general form — over the enriched/literal interpretation mixture, an interpretation-dependent event's conditional probability is the mixture of its branches' conditional probabilities.strength_reversal: the paper's central demonstration — semantically more than 110 is the stronger argument for success (semantic_ordering, Bayes factors 6 < 12), but under assertability with a 90%-enriching listener the ordering reverses (21/8 vs 6/5).
The §5.1–5.2 Bayes-factor values are computed against a counting prior over 20 bands of
width 10 (every threshold in the example — 100, 110, 120, 150 — is a band boundary, so the
paper's continuous uniform distribution on [0, 200] is represented exactly, and conditioning
normalizes away the total mass). Concrete masses evaluate by count_apply_fintype and
comparisons transfer to ℝ, following the countable-space register of
Mathlib.Probability.Decision.Risk.Countable. The measure strength is Real.log (nats)
of DTS.bayesFactor; the paper leaves the log base unspecified (its printed values are base
10) and uses it only ordinally.
Deviation: for more than 110 the paper prints log 11, computed from "the probability that
more than 100 is true given that more than 110 is false equals 1/11" — the Bayes factor
of more than 100 toward the goal more than 110 (bayesFactor_moreThan100_toward110).
Toward the example's stated goal (more than 120) the factor is 12
(bayesFactor_moreThan110); the semantic ordering is the same either way.
Not formalized: the §5.4 rational-hearer conditions (eqs. 27–28), which compare an utterance's strength against the alternatives assertable in ¬G-worlds and are stated but not computed with in the paper; and the §6 corpus study of research-ranking reports.
Semantic strength and goal entailment (§5.1) #
§5.1's alignment of semantic and argumentative strength: between two utterances entailed by the goal, the semantically stronger (smaller) one is the argumentatively stronger one — both are certain given the goal, and the weaker utterance's extra extension can only add ¬G-mass to the denominator of the Bayes factor.
The §5 example #
Registration totals in bands of width 10: band k covers (10k, 10(k+1)]. Every threshold in the §5 example (100, 110, 120, 150) is a band boundary, so the paper's continuous uniform distribution on [0, 200] is represented exactly by a counting prior over the 20 bands.
Equations
- CumminsFranke2021.Band = Fin 20
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The extension of more than n, for thresholds n that are multiples of 10: every total in band k exceeds n iff n ≤ 10k.
Equations
- CumminsFranke2021.moreThan n = {k : CumminsFranke2021.Band | n ≤ 10 * ↑k}
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§5.1: the goal is S = more than 120 (conference success), with the counting prior (conditioning normalizes, so counting and uniform priors induce the same strengths).
Equations
- CumminsFranke2021.successContext = { topic := CumminsFranke2021.moreThan 120, topicMeasurable := CumminsFranke2021.successContext._proof_1, prior := MeasureTheory.Measure.count }
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§5.1: the Bayes factor of more than 100 toward success is 1 / (1/6) = 6 (the paper's log 6 ≈ 0.78).
The Bayes factor of more than 110 toward success is 1 / (1/12) = 12. The paper instead
prints log 11 (see bayesFactor_moreThan100_toward110); the ordering against
bayesFactor_moreThan100 is the same.
The quantity behind the paper's printed log 11: the Bayes factor of more than 100 toward the goal more than 110 ("the probability that more than 100 is true given that more than 110 is false equals 1/11").
§5.1 as an instance of bayesFactor_lt_of_goal_entails: both utterances are entailed by
the goal and more than 110 is semantically stronger, so it is the stronger argument.
The assertability mixture (§5.2) #
Assertability is stochastic: with probability 9/10 the listener enriches the utterance with its scalar implicature (more than 100 ⇝ not more than 150, more than 110 ⇝ not more than 120), so u is felicitously assertable only if the implicature is also true; with probability 1/10 the utterance is interpreted literally. The mixture lives on the product of worlds and interpretations, where interpretation-dependent events are unions of rectangles and conditional probabilities decompose branchwise.
How the listener resolves an utterance (§5.2): enriched with its scalar implicature, or literal.
- enriched : Interpretation
- literal : Interpretation
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Equations
- CumminsFranke2021.instDecidableEqInterpretation x✝ y✝ = if h : x✝.ctorIdx = y✝.ctorIdx then isTrue ⋯ else isFalse ⋯
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- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
An interpretation-dependent event: enr under enrichment, lit under literal
interpretation.
Equations
- CumminsFranke2021.byInterpretation enr lit = enr ×ˢ {CumminsFranke2021.Interpretation.enriched} ∪ lit ×ˢ {CumminsFranke2021.Interpretation.literal}
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Mass of an interpretation-dependent event under a product prior: the branches weigh their events by the interpretation probabilities.
§5.2's computation pattern: conditional on a lifted event, an interpretation-dependent event's probability is the mixture of its branches' conditional probabilities.
The §5.2 interpretation mixture: enriched with probability 9/10, literal otherwise.
Equations
- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
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Assertability in the example (§5.2) #
§5.2: the assertability context — bands crossed with the listener's interpretation, goal lifted along the band.
Equations
- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
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Felicitous assertability of more than n whose enrichment is not more than cap: under enrichment both the content and the implicature must hold; under literal interpretation only the content.
Equations
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§5.2's value for more than 100 (enriched to not more than 150): P(A(u)∣S) = (9/10)·(3/8) + (1/10)·1 = 35/80 against P(A(u)∣¬S) = 1/6, giving Bayes factor 21/8 (the paper's log (21/8) = 0.419).
§5.2's value for more than 110 (enriched to not more than 120): the enriched reading is incompatible with success, so P(A(u)∣S) = (9/10)·0 + (1/10)·1 = 1/10 against P(A(u)∣¬S) = 1/12, giving Bayes factor 6/5 (the paper's log (6/5) = 0.079).
The reversal #
Argumentative strength (eq. 17; eq. 25 on the assertability space): the log of the Bayes factor, positive iff the utterance supports the goal.
Equations
- CumminsFranke2021.strength ctx u = Real.log (DTS.bayesFactor ctx u).toReal
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The paper's central §5.2 demonstration: semantically more than 110 is the stronger argument for success, but under assertability the ordering reverses — precision that looks argumentatively optimal is penalized once the listener's enrichment is priced in.