Documentation

Linglib.Studies.Coppock2018

Coppock 2018: outlook-based semantics #

[Cop18]

[Cop18]'s relativism for statements of opinion: outlooks — refinements of worlds that settle matters of opinion as well as fact — replace possible worlds as circumstances of evaluation, rather than supplementing them with a judge as in world-judge relativism ([Las05]). A proposition is a function from outlooks to three truth values (Prop3 Ω, with [Cop18]'s Weak Kleene connectives available as Trivalent.meetWeak/ Trivalent.joinWeak/Trivalent.neg); it is objective when its truth value never splits within a world's refinement class, discretionary when it does, and strongly discretionary when it splits within every world's class. Faultless disagreement ([Kol03]) then falls out: two agents can accept and reject the same strongly discretionary proposition at one outlook (genuine disagreement) while neither violates the norm of accuracy (no world makes such a proposition objectively false). The subjective attitude verb tycka 'think[opinion]' presupposes strong discretionariness of its complement relative to the common ground; the paper's ∂-operator rendering of that presupposition is played here by the project-canonical PartialProp.

The formal fragment's syntax (types, translations ), the context-set parameter sequence, and the §4 pragmatics (assertion-as-proposal, seeking a common outlook) are not modelled. Studies/Kubota2026.lean borrows the outlook term for its two-layered outlook-marker denotation; the apparatus here is the paper's own, where outlook-relativity is a property of at-issue discretionary content. [KW16]'s counterstance contingency appears via the paper's translation: radically counterstance-contingent = strongly discretionary.

Main definitions #

Main results #

References #

[Cop18] [Kol03] [Las05] [KW16] [Kle52] [BK01]

Refinement and objectivity (§3.1) #

Outlooks refine worlds: each outlook settles all the facts its world settles, plus matters of opinion. The refinement structure is a map ρ : Ω → W; the refinement class of w is the fiber ρ ⁻¹' {w}, so classes are automatically mutually non-overlapping and in one-to-one correspondence with (inhabited fibers of) worlds — [Cop18]'s .

def Coppock2018.Objective {W : Type u_1} {Ω : Type u_2} (ρ : ΩW) (O : Set Ω) :

A set-of-outlooks proposition is objective when it corresponds to a set of possible worlds: a union of refinement classes, i.e. a preimage of a set of worlds.

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    def Coppock2018.Discretionary {W : Type u_1} {Ω : Type u_2} (ρ : ΩW) (O : Set Ω) :

    A discretionary proposition doesn't "color within the lines": it is not objective.

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      theorem Coppock2018.objective_iff_fiberInvariant {W : Type u_1} {Ω : Type u_2} (ρ : ΩW) (O : Set Ω) :
      Objective ρ O ∀ (o o' : Ω), ρ o = ρ o'(o O o' O)

      Objectivity is invariance across each refinement class: an outlook proposition is objective iff membership depends only on the refined world.

      theorem Coppock2018.objective_iff_preimage_image {W : Type u_1} {Ω : Type u_2} (ρ : ΩW) (O : Set Ω) :
      Objective ρ O ρ ⁻¹' ρ '' O = O

      Objectivity is saturation under the refinement map: O already contains every outlook that shares a world with one of its members.

      theorem Coppock2018.objective_iff_ker_invariant {W : Type u_1} {Ω : Type u_2} (ρ : ΩW) (O : Set Ω) :
      Objective ρ O ∀ (o o' : Ω), (Setoid.ker ρ) o o'(o O o' O)

      Only the kernel of the refinement map matters: objectivity is constancy on the classes of Setoid.ker ρ. (The worlds beyond the fibers are inert — W could be replaced by Quotient (Setoid.ker ρ) without loss.)

      def Coppock2018.objectiveSubalgebra {W : Type u_1} {Ω : Type u_2} (ρ : ΩW) :
      BooleanSubalgebra (Set Ω)

      The objective propositions form a Boolean subalgebra of the powerset of Ω: the image of the powerset of W under Set.preimage ρ bundled as a bounded-lattice homomorphism, so closure under // is inherited wholesale rather than proved operation-by-operation.

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        @[simp]
        theorem Coppock2018.mem_objectiveSubalgebra {W : Type u_1} {Ω : Type u_2} (ρ : ΩW) {O : Set Ω} :
        O objectiveSubalgebra ρ Objective ρ O
        def Coppock2018.objectiveOrderIso {W : Type u_1} {Ω : Type u_2} (ρ : ΩW) ( : Function.Surjective ρ) :
        Set W ≃o (objectiveSubalgebra ρ)

        When every world is refined by some outlook — [Cop18]'s pairs each world with an inhabited refinement class — the objective subalgebra is order-isomorphic to the powerset of the worlds (and an order iso between Boolean algebras preserves the whole Boolean structure).

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          The revised three-valued classification (§3.5) #

          To carry presupposition, propositions become total functions from outlooks to {T, F, #}Prop3 Ω. The classification now quantifies over truth-value splits within refinement classes.

          def Coppock2018.ObjectivelyTrueAt {W : Type u_1} {Ω : Type u_2} (ρ : ΩW) (p : Trivalent.Prop3 Ω) (w : W) :

          p is objectively true at w: true at every refinement of w.

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            def Coppock2018.ObjectivelyFalseAt {W : Type u_1} {Ω : Type u_2} (ρ : ΩW) (p : Trivalent.Prop3 Ω) (w : W) :

            p is objectively false at w: false at every refinement of w.

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              def Coppock2018.Objective3 {W : Type u_1} {Ω : Type u_2} (ρ : ΩW) (p : Trivalent.Prop3 Ω) :

              Objective (revised): no world has refinements assigning p both T and F.

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                def Coppock2018.Discretionary3 {W : Type u_1} {Ω : Type u_2} (ρ : ΩW) (p : Trivalent.Prop3 Ω) :

                Discretionary (revised): some world has refinements assigning p both T and F.

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                  def Coppock2018.StronglyDiscretionary3 {W : Type u_1} {Ω : Type u_2} (ρ : ΩW) (p : Trivalent.Prop3 Ω) :

                  Strongly discretionary (revised): every world's refinements split p into T and F — the proposition makes a cut across all the worlds.

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                    theorem Coppock2018.discretionary3_iff_not_objective3 {W : Type u_1} {Ω : Type u_2} (ρ : ΩW) (p : Trivalent.Prop3 Ω) :
                    Discretionary3 ρ p ¬Objective3 ρ p

                    Discretionary is exactly the failure of objective.

                    The classification predicates are finitely checkable, so they carry Decidable instances (delegating to the definitional quantifier forms) — model verifications below are bare decides.

                    @[implicit_reducible]
                    instance Coppock2018.instDecidableObjectivelyTrueAt {W : Type u_1} {Ω : Type u_2} (ρ : ΩW) [Fintype Ω] [DecidableEq W] (p : Trivalent.Prop3 Ω) (w : W) :
                    Decidable (ObjectivelyTrueAt ρ p w)
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                    @[implicit_reducible]
                    instance Coppock2018.instDecidableObjectivelyFalseAt {W : Type u_1} {Ω : Type u_2} (ρ : ΩW) [Fintype Ω] [DecidableEq W] (p : Trivalent.Prop3 Ω) (w : W) :
                    Decidable (ObjectivelyFalseAt ρ p w)
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                    @[implicit_reducible]
                    instance Coppock2018.instDecidableObjective3 {W : Type u_1} {Ω : Type u_2} (ρ : ΩW) [Fintype Ω] [DecidableEq W] (p : Trivalent.Prop3 Ω) :
                    Decidable (Objective3 ρ p)
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                    @[implicit_reducible]
                    instance Coppock2018.instDecidableDiscretionary3 {W : Type u_1} {Ω : Type u_2} (ρ : ΩW) [Fintype Ω] [DecidableEq W] (p : Trivalent.Prop3 Ω) :
                    Decidable (Discretionary3 ρ p)
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                    @[implicit_reducible]
                    instance Coppock2018.instDecidableStronglyDiscretionary3OfFintype {W : Type u_1} {Ω : Type u_2} (ρ : ΩW) [Fintype Ω] [DecidableEq W] (p : Trivalent.Prop3 Ω) [Fintype W] :
                    Decidable (StronglyDiscretionary3 ρ p)
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                    theorem Coppock2018.StronglyDiscretionary3.discretionary3 {W : Type u_1} {Ω : Type u_2} (ρ : ΩW) {p : Trivalent.Prop3 Ω} [Nonempty W] (h : StronglyDiscretionary3 ρ p) :

                    Strong discretionariness entails discretionariness whenever some world exists.

                    Relativization to an information state (§3.5) #

                    Discretionariness for tycka is evaluated against the common ground: an information state is a set of outlooks C, and the classification quantifies over the C-restricted refinement classes ρ ⁻¹' {w} ∩ C.

                    def Coppock2018.ObjectiveIn {W : Type u_1} {Ω : Type u_2} (ρ : ΩW) (C : Set Ω) (p : Trivalent.Prop3 Ω) :

                    Objective relative to C: no C-restricted refinement class splits p.

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                      def Coppock2018.DiscretionaryIn {W : Type u_1} {Ω : Type u_2} (ρ : ΩW) (C : Set Ω) (p : Trivalent.Prop3 Ω) :

                      Discretionary relative to C: some C-restricted refinement class splits p.

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                        def Coppock2018.StronglyDiscretionaryIn {W : Type u_1} {Ω : Type u_2} (ρ : ΩW) (C : Set Ω) (p : Trivalent.Prop3 Ω) :

                        Strongly discretionary relative to C: every nonempty C-restricted refinement class splits p — the proposition makes a cut within every world the state leaves open.

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                          theorem Coppock2018.stronglyDiscretionaryIn_discretionaryIn {W : Type u_1} {Ω : Type u_2} (ρ : ΩW) (C : Set Ω) {p : Trivalent.Prop3 Ω} (h : StronglyDiscretionaryIn ρ C p) {w : W} (hw : (ρ ⁻¹' {w} C).Nonempty) :

                          Strong discretionariness entails discretionariness on any state leaving a world open — [Cop18]'s rendering of [KW16]: find demands radical counterstance contingency (strong discretionariness), consider mere counterstance contingency (discretionariness), so whatever embeds under find embeds under consider.

                          The norm of accuracy and faultlessness (§3.2) #

                          Being at fault is relative to a world (the world of the context of utterance — contexts determine worlds, not outlooks): one is at fault for expressing φ iff φ is objectively false at that world. A strongly discretionary proposition is never objectively false at any world, so no speaker of one is ever at fault — the faultlessness half of faultless disagreement; genuine contradiction is supplied by the propositions being complements.

                          def Coppock2018.AtFault {W : Type u_1} {Ω : Type u_2} (ρ : ΩW) (p : Trivalent.Prop3 Ω) (w : W) :

                          The norm of accuracy: an asserter of p is at fault at w iff p is objectively false at w.

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                            @[implicit_reducible]
                            instance Coppock2018.instDecidableAtFaultOfFintypeOfDecidableEq {W : Type u_1} {Ω : Type u_2} (ρ : ΩW) [Fintype Ω] [DecidableEq W] (p : Trivalent.Prop3 Ω) (w : W) :
                            Decidable (AtFault ρ p w)
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                            theorem Coppock2018.stronglyDiscretionary3_never_atFault {W : Type u_1} {Ω : Type u_2} (ρ : ΩW) {p : Trivalent.Prop3 Ω} (h : StronglyDiscretionary3 ρ p) (w : W) :
                            ¬AtFault ρ p w

                            A strongly discretionary proposition never puts its asserter at fault: every world has a refinement where it is true.

                            Doxastic states, acceptance, and disagreement (§3.3) #

                            An agent's accessibility is a binary relation on outlooks ([Cop18] §5's R_a); the doxastic state at o is the set of outlooks it reaches (states vary from outlook to outlook, since whether an agent holds a belief is itself settled by outlooks). To accept a proposition is for it to hold throughout one's accessible outlooks — the Kripke box (Core.Logic.Modal.box) over outlooks with the proposition's truth as valuation.

                            An agent with accessibility R accepts p at o: p holds at every accessible outlook.

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                              An agent with accessibility R rejects p at o: p fails at every accessible outlook. Rejection is stronger than non-acceptance.

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                                def Coppock2018.DisagreeAt {Ω : Type u_2} (R₁ R₂ : Core.Logic.Modal.AccessRel Ω) (p : Trivalent.Prop3 Ω) (o : Ω) :

                                Two agents disagree about p at o when one accepts it and the other rejects it.

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                                  An agent is opinionated about p at o when they accept or reject it; lack of opinionatedness — both live possibilities — is the state tycka-reports deny without contradiction ([Cop18] (38)).

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                                    @[implicit_reducible]
                                    instance Coppock2018.instDecidableAccepts {Ω : Type u_2} [Fintype Ω] (R : Core.Logic.Modal.AccessRel Ω) [DecidableRel R] (p : Trivalent.Prop3 Ω) (o : Ω) :
                                    Decidable (Accepts R p o)
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                                    @[implicit_reducible]
                                    instance Coppock2018.instDecidableRejects {Ω : Type u_2} [Fintype Ω] (R : Core.Logic.Modal.AccessRel Ω) [DecidableRel R] (p : Trivalent.Prop3 Ω) (o : Ω) :
                                    Decidable (Rejects R p o)
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                                    @[implicit_reducible]
                                    instance Coppock2018.instDecidableDisagreeAtOfDecidableRel {Ω : Type u_2} [Fintype Ω] (R : Core.Logic.Modal.AccessRel Ω) [DecidableRel R] (p : Trivalent.Prop3 Ω) (o : Ω) (R₂ : Core.Logic.Modal.AccessRel Ω) [DecidableRel R₂] :
                                    Decidable (DisagreeAt R R₂ p o)
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                                    @[implicit_reducible]
                                    instance Coppock2018.instDecidableOpinionated {Ω : Type u_2} [Fintype Ω] (R : Core.Logic.Modal.AccessRel Ω) [DecidableRel R] (p : Trivalent.Prop3 Ω) (o : Ω) :
                                    Decidable (Opinionated R p o)
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                                    The chili dialogue: faultless disagreement in a four-outlook model #

                                    Four outlooks (tasty?, opera?) : Bool × Bool refine two worlds according to the objective coordinate (whether the speaker is an opera singer); tastiness cuts across both refinement classes. John accepts the chili is tasty, Mary rejects it: genuine disagreement, and by stronglyDiscretionary3_never_atFault neither is at fault. The objective proposition I am an opera singer contrasts on both counts, and the sexy linguist hybrid ([Cop18] (10)) is discretionary without being strongly so — false at every refinement of a world where John is not a linguist, so assertable at fault.

                                    @[reducible, inline]

                                    Chili-model outlooks: (chili is tasty?, speaker is an opera singer?).

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                                      The refinement map: outlooks refine worlds that settle only the objective coordinate.

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                                        The chili is tasty — settled by the discretionary coordinate.

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                                          I am an opera singer — settled by the objective coordinate.

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                                            John is a sexy linguist with world = linguisthood: true only where both coordinates hold, reading the objective coordinate as John is a linguist ([Cop18] (10)).

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                                              @[reducible, inline]

                                              John's doxastic state: only tasty-outlooks accessible.

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                                                @[reducible, inline]

                                                Mary's doxastic state: only non-tasty-outlooks accessible.

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                                                  @[reducible, inline]

                                                  An unopinionated agent: every outlook accessible (Core.Logic.Modal.universalR, inlined for decidability).

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                                                    The chili dialogue is a genuine disagreement: at every outlook, John accepts tasty and Mary rejects it.

                                                    … and it is faultless: no world makes tasty objectively false, so neither party violates the norm of accuracy.

                                                    Lack of opinionatedness is representable: the open-minded agent neither accepts nor rejects tasty — the consistency of [Cop18] (38), which totally-opinionated-judge frameworks wrongly rule out.

                                                    Subjective attitude verbs (§3.5, §5) #

                                                    English think and Swedish tycka 'think[opinion]' are both doxastic-acceptance operators; the only difference is that tycka carries a presupposition that its complement is strongly discretionary relative to the common ground — ∂(discretionary(φ)) ∧ □φ. The ∂-operator's role is played by PartialProp's presupposition field (the project-canonical rendering of partiality); the presupposition is outlook-independent because discretionariness is a global property of p against C.

                                                    think: bare doxastic acceptance, no presupposition.

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                                                      def Coppock2018.tycka {W : Type u_1} {Ω : Type u_2} (ρ : ΩW) (C : Set Ω) (R : Core.Logic.Modal.AccessRel Ω) (p : Trivalent.Prop3 Ω) :

                                                      tycka 'think[opinion]': doxastic acceptance, presupposing that the complement is strongly discretionary relative to the information state C.

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                                                        theorem Coppock2018.think_tycka_same_assertion {W : Type u_1} {Ω : Type u_2} (ρ : ΩW) (C : Set Ω) (R : Core.Logic.Modal.AccessRel Ω) (p : Trivalent.Prop3 Ω) :
                                                        (think R p).assertion = (tycka ρ C R p).assertion

                                                        think and tycka assert the same thing — the verbs differ only in tycka's discretionariness presupposition.

                                                        theorem Coppock2018.tycka_presup_survives_neg {W : Type u_1} {Ω : Type u_2} (ρ : ΩW) (C : Set Ω) (R : Core.Logic.Modal.AccessRel Ω) (p : Trivalent.Prop3 Ω) :
                                                        (tycka ρ C R p).neg.presup = (tycka ρ C R p).presup

                                                        tycka's subjectivity requirement projects through negation (via PartialProp.neg): "#I don't think[opinion] it's Tuesday" is as bad as the unnegated version.

                                                        theorem Coppock2018.tycka_undefined_of_objectiveIn {W : Type u_1} {Ω : Type u_2} (ρ : ΩW) (C : Set Ω) {p : Trivalent.Prop3 Ω} (hobj : ObjectiveIn ρ C p) {w : W} (hw : (ρ ⁻¹' {w} C).Nonempty) (R : Core.Logic.Modal.AccessRel Ω) (o : Ω) :
                                                        ¬(tycka ρ C R p).presup o

                                                        An objective complement is presupposition failure for tycka, given that the state leaves some world's refinements open in a way p actually cuts — the "#I think[opinion] it's Tuesday / that she's a doctor" effect.