Coppock 2018: outlook-based semantics #
[Cop18]'s relativism for statements of opinion: outlooks — refinements of worlds
that settle matters of opinion as well as fact — replace possible worlds as circumstances
of evaluation, rather than supplementing them with a judge as in world-judge relativism
([Las05]). A proposition is a function from outlooks to three truth values
(Prop3 Ω, with [Cop18]'s Weak Kleene connectives available as Trivalent.meetWeak/
Trivalent.joinWeak/Trivalent.neg); it is objective when its truth value never splits within
a world's refinement class, discretionary when it does, and strongly discretionary when
it splits within every world's class. Faultless disagreement ([Kol03]) then falls out:
two agents can accept and reject the same strongly discretionary proposition at one outlook
(genuine disagreement) while neither violates the norm of accuracy (no world makes such a
proposition objectively false). The subjective attitude verb tycka 'think[opinion]'
presupposes strong discretionariness of its complement relative to the common ground; the
paper's ∂-operator rendering of that presupposition is played here by the project-canonical
PartialProp.
The formal fragment's syntax (types, translations ⤳), the context-set parameter sequence,
and the §4 pragmatics (assertion-as-proposal, seeking a common outlook) are not modelled.
Studies/Kubota2026.lean borrows the outlook term for its two-layered outlook-marker
denotation; the apparatus here is the paper's own, where outlook-relativity is a property of
at-issue discretionary content. [KW16]'s counterstance contingency appears
via the paper's translation: radically counterstance-contingent = strongly discretionary.
Main definitions #
Objective,objective_iff_fiberInvariant,objective_iff_preimage_image— set-of-outlooks propositions (§3.1): objective = union of refinement classes = fiber-invariant = saturated under the refinement map.objectiveSubalgebrabundles the objective propositions as aBooleanSubalgebraof the powerset ofΩ, andobjectiveOrderIsorealizes the paper's note that it is isomorphic to the powerset of the worlds. The classification predicates carryDecidableinstances for finite models.Objective3,Discretionary3,StronglyDiscretionary3— the revised three-valued classification, plus the information-state-relativizedObjectiveIn/DiscretionaryIn/StronglyDiscretionaryIn.Accepts,Rejects,DisagreeAt,Opinionated— doxastic accessibility as a binary relation on outlooks (§5'sR_a), acceptance as the Kripke box (Core.Logic.Modal.box).AtFault— the norm of accuracy: asserting what is objectively false at the context world.think,tycka— the attitude verbs asPartialProps: same assertion (doxastic acceptance), differing only in tycka's strong-discretionariness presupposition.
Main results #
stronglyDiscretionary3_never_atFault— a strongly discretionary proposition never puts its asserter at fault: the faultlessness half of faultless disagreement.chili_disagreement,tasty_never_atFault— the chili dialogue in a four-outlook model: genuine disagreement about tasty with neither party at fault; contrastopera_atFault(objective propositions do incur fault) and the sexy linguist hybrid (discretionary but not strongly so, hence world-level falsity).think_tycka_same_assertion,tycka_presup_survives_neg— tycka differs from think only in its presupposition, and that presupposition projects through negation.tycka_undefined_of_objectiveIn— an objective complement yields presupposition failure (the "#I think[opinion] it's Tuesday" effect).stronglyDiscretionaryIn_discretionaryIn— strong discretionariness entails discretionariness on nonempty restricted classes: [Cop18]'s translation of [KW16]'s find (radical) vs consider (mere counterstance contingency).
References #
Refinement and objectivity (§3.1) #
Outlooks refine worlds: each outlook settles all the facts its world settles, plus matters
of opinion. The refinement structure is a map ρ : Ω → W; the refinement class of w is
the fiber ρ ⁻¹' {w}, so classes are automatically mutually non-overlapping and in
one-to-one correspondence with (inhabited fibers of) worlds — [Cop18]'s ∝.
A set-of-outlooks proposition is objective when it corresponds to a set of possible worlds: a union of refinement classes, i.e. a preimage of a set of worlds.
Equations
- Coppock2018.Objective ρ O = ∃ (V : Set W), O = ρ ⁻¹' V
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A discretionary proposition doesn't "color within the lines": it is not objective.
Equations
- Coppock2018.Discretionary ρ O = ¬Coppock2018.Objective ρ O
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Objectivity is invariance across each refinement class: an outlook proposition is objective iff membership depends only on the refined world.
Objectivity is saturation under the refinement map: O already contains every outlook
that shares a world with one of its members.
Only the kernel of the refinement map matters: objectivity is constancy on the classes
of Setoid.ker ρ. (The worlds beyond the fibers are inert — W could be replaced by
Quotient (Setoid.ker ρ) without loss.)
The objective propositions form a Boolean subalgebra of the powerset of Ω: the image
of the powerset of W under Set.preimage ρ bundled as a bounded-lattice homomorphism, so
closure under ⊔/⊓/ᶜ is inherited wholesale rather than proved operation-by-operation.
Equations
- Coppock2018.objectiveSubalgebra ρ = BooleanSubalgebra.map (CompleteLatticeHom.setPreimage ρ).toBoundedLatticeHom ⊤
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When every world is refined by some outlook — [Cop18]'s ∝ pairs each world with
an inhabited refinement class — the objective subalgebra is order-isomorphic to the
powerset of the worlds (and an order iso between Boolean algebras preserves the whole
Boolean structure).
Equations
- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
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The revised three-valued classification (§3.5) #
To carry presupposition, propositions become total functions from outlooks to {T, F, #} —
Prop3 Ω. The classification now quantifies over truth-value splits within refinement
classes.
p is objectively true at w: true at every refinement of w.
Equations
- Coppock2018.ObjectivelyTrueAt ρ p w = ∀ (o : Ω), ρ o = w → p o = Trivalent.true
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p is objectively false at w: false at every refinement of w.
Equations
- Coppock2018.ObjectivelyFalseAt ρ p w = ∀ (o : Ω), ρ o = w → p o = Trivalent.false
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Objective (revised): no world has refinements assigning p both T and F.
Equations
- Coppock2018.Objective3 ρ p = ∀ (o o' : Ω), ρ o = ρ o' → p o = Trivalent.true → p o' ≠ Trivalent.false
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Discretionary (revised): some world has refinements assigning p both T and F.
Equations
- Coppock2018.Discretionary3 ρ p = ∃ (o : Ω) (o' : Ω), ρ o = ρ o' ∧ p o = Trivalent.true ∧ p o' = Trivalent.false
Instances For
Strongly discretionary (revised): every world's refinements split p into T and
F — the proposition makes a cut across all the worlds.
Equations
- Coppock2018.StronglyDiscretionary3 ρ p = ∀ (w : W), ∃ (o : Ω) (o' : Ω), ρ o = w ∧ ρ o' = w ∧ p o = Trivalent.true ∧ p o' = Trivalent.false
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Discretionary is exactly the failure of objective.
The classification predicates are finitely checkable, so they carry Decidable
instances (delegating to the definitional quantifier forms) — model verifications below are
bare decides.
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Strong discretionariness entails discretionariness whenever some world exists.
Relativization to an information state (§3.5) #
Discretionariness for tycka is evaluated against the common ground: an information
state is a set of outlooks C, and the classification quantifies over the C-restricted
refinement classes ρ ⁻¹' {w} ∩ C.
Objective relative to C: no C-restricted refinement class splits p.
Equations
- Coppock2018.ObjectiveIn ρ C p = ∀ o ∈ C, ∀ o' ∈ C, ρ o = ρ o' → p o = Trivalent.true → p o' ≠ Trivalent.false
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Discretionary relative to C: some C-restricted refinement class splits p.
Equations
- Coppock2018.DiscretionaryIn ρ C p = ∃ o ∈ C, ∃ o' ∈ C, ρ o = ρ o' ∧ p o = Trivalent.true ∧ p o' = Trivalent.false
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Strongly discretionary relative to C: every nonempty C-restricted refinement
class splits p — the proposition makes a cut within every world the state leaves open.
Equations
- Coppock2018.StronglyDiscretionaryIn ρ C p = ∀ (w : W), (ρ ⁻¹' {w} ∩ C).Nonempty → ∃ o ∈ C, ∃ o' ∈ C, ρ o = w ∧ ρ o' = w ∧ p o = Trivalent.true ∧ p o' = Trivalent.false
Instances For
Strong discretionariness entails discretionariness on any state leaving a world open — [Cop18]'s rendering of [KW16]: find demands radical counterstance contingency (strong discretionariness), consider mere counterstance contingency (discretionariness), so whatever embeds under find embeds under consider.
The norm of accuracy and faultlessness (§3.2) #
Being at fault is relative to a world (the world of the context of utterance — contexts
determine worlds, not outlooks): one is at fault for expressing φ iff φ is objectively
false at that world. A strongly discretionary proposition is never objectively false at any
world, so no speaker of one is ever at fault — the faultlessness half of faultless
disagreement; genuine contradiction is supplied by the propositions being complements.
The norm of accuracy: an asserter of p is at fault at w iff p is objectively
false at w.
Equations
- Coppock2018.AtFault ρ p w = Coppock2018.ObjectivelyFalseAt ρ p w
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A strongly discretionary proposition never puts its asserter at fault: every world has a refinement where it is true.
Doxastic states, acceptance, and disagreement (§3.3) #
An agent's accessibility is a binary relation on outlooks ([Cop18] §5's R_a); the
doxastic state at o is the set of outlooks it reaches (states vary from outlook to
outlook, since whether an agent holds a belief is itself settled by outlooks). To accept
a proposition is for it to hold throughout one's accessible outlooks — the Kripke box
(Core.Logic.Modal.box) over outlooks with the proposition's truth as valuation.
An agent with accessibility R accepts p at o: p holds at every accessible
outlook.
Equations
- Coppock2018.Accepts R p = Core.Logic.Modal.box R fun (x : Ω) => p x = Trivalent.true
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An agent with accessibility R rejects p at o: p fails at every accessible
outlook. Rejection is stronger than non-acceptance.
Equations
- Coppock2018.Rejects R p = Core.Logic.Modal.box R fun (x : Ω) => p x = Trivalent.false
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Two agents disagree about p at o when one accepts it and the other rejects it.
Equations
- Coppock2018.DisagreeAt R₁ R₂ p o = (Coppock2018.Accepts R₁ p o ∧ Coppock2018.Rejects R₂ p o)
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An agent is opinionated about p at o when they accept or reject it; lack of
opinionatedness — both live possibilities — is the state tycka-reports deny without
contradiction ([Cop18] (38)).
Equations
- Coppock2018.Opinionated R p o = (Coppock2018.Accepts R p o ∨ Coppock2018.Rejects R p o)
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The chili dialogue: faultless disagreement in a four-outlook model #
Four outlooks (tasty?, opera?) : Bool × Bool refine two worlds according to the objective
coordinate (whether the speaker is an opera singer); tastiness cuts across both refinement
classes. John accepts the chili is tasty, Mary rejects it: genuine disagreement, and by
stronglyDiscretionary3_never_atFault neither is at fault. The objective proposition
I am an opera singer contrasts on both counts, and the sexy linguist hybrid
([Cop18] (10)) is discretionary without being strongly so — false at every
refinement of a world where John is not a linguist, so assertable at fault.
Chili-model outlooks: (chili is tasty?, speaker is an opera singer?).
Equations
- Coppock2018.ChiliOutlook = (Bool × Bool)
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The refinement map: outlooks refine worlds that settle only the objective coordinate.
Equations
- Coppock2018.chiliWorld = Prod.snd
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The chili is tasty — settled by the discretionary coordinate.
Equations
- Coppock2018.tasty o = Trivalent.ofBool o.1
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I am an opera singer — settled by the objective coordinate.
Equations
- Coppock2018.opera o = Trivalent.ofBool o.2
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John is a sexy linguist with world = linguisthood: true only where both coordinates hold, reading the objective coordinate as John is a linguist ([Cop18] (10)).
Equations
- Coppock2018.sexyLinguist o = Trivalent.ofBool (o.1 && o.2)
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John's doxastic state: only tasty-outlooks accessible.
Equations
- Coppock2018.johnR x✝ o' = (o'.1 = true)
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Mary's doxastic state: only non-tasty-outlooks accessible.
Equations
- Coppock2018.maryR x✝ o' = (o'.1 = false)
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An unopinionated agent: every outlook accessible (Core.Logic.Modal.universalR,
inlined for decidability).
Equations
- Coppock2018.openR x✝¹ x✝ = True
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The chili dialogue is a genuine disagreement: at every outlook, John accepts tasty and Mary rejects it.
… and it is faultless: no world makes tasty objectively false, so neither party violates the norm of accuracy.
Lack of opinionatedness is representable: the open-minded agent neither accepts nor rejects tasty — the consistency of [Cop18] (38), which totally-opinionated-judge frameworks wrongly rule out.
Subjective attitude verbs (§3.5, §5) #
English think and Swedish tycka 'think[opinion]' are both doxastic-acceptance operators;
the only difference is that tycka carries a presupposition that its complement is strongly
discretionary relative to the common ground — ∂(discretionary(φ)) ∧ □φ. The ∂-operator's
role is played by PartialProp's presupposition field (the project-canonical rendering of
partiality); the presupposition is outlook-independent because discretionariness is a global
property of p against C.
think: bare doxastic acceptance, no presupposition.
Equations
- Coppock2018.think R p = { presup := fun (x : Ω) => True, assertion := Coppock2018.Accepts R p }
Instances For
tycka 'think[opinion]': doxastic acceptance, presupposing that the complement is
strongly discretionary relative to the information state C.
Equations
- Coppock2018.tycka ρ C R p = { presup := fun (x : Ω) => Coppock2018.StronglyDiscretionaryIn ρ C p, assertion := Coppock2018.Accepts R p }
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think and tycka assert the same thing — the verbs differ only in tycka's discretionariness presupposition.
tycka's subjectivity requirement projects through negation (via PartialProp.neg):
"#I don't think[opinion] it's Tuesday" is as bad as the unnegated version.
An objective complement is presupposition failure for tycka, given that the state
leaves some world's refinements open in a way p actually cuts — the
"#I think[opinion] it's Tuesday / that she's a doctor" effect.