Counterfactual conditionals: three theories #
This file defines three theories of counterfactuals, all stated over the closest
antecedent-worlds of a similarity ordering. On the universal theory of Lewis and Kratzer if p,
would q is true when every closest p-world is a q-world. On the selectional theory of
Stalnaker a selection function picks one closest p-world and ties are resolved by
supervaluation over the completions of the ordering, so the counterfactual is true when every
closest p-world is a q-world, false when none is, and indeterminate otherwise. On the
homogeneity theory of von Fintel and Križ the universal assertion carries the presupposition
that the closest p-worlds agree on q. The three agree whenever the closest antecedent-worlds
agree on the consequent, and part under embedding.
Main definitions #
selectionalCounterfactual: the selectional counterfactual, super-truth over the closest antecedent-worlds.superCounterfactual: Stalnaker's supervaluation over completions.homogeneityCounterfactual: the homogeneity counterfactual, a trivalent proposition.selectionalMight: the selectional might.
Main results #
homogeneityCounterfactual_eq_selectionalCounterfactual: unembedded, the homogeneity counterfactual is the selectional one.superCounterfactual_eq_selectionalCounterfactual: on a finite, strongly centered ordering the supervaluation over completions is the selectional counterfactual.
References #
- S. Ramotowska, P. Marty, J. Romoli and P. Santorio, Counterfactuals and quantificational force: Experimental evidence for selectional semantics (2025)
- D. Lewis, Counterfactuals (1973)
- A. Kratzer, Modals and Conditionals (2012)
- R. C. Stalnaker, A Theory of Conditionals (1968)
- R. C. Stalnaker, A Defense of Conditional Excluded Middle (1981)
- K. von Fintel, Bare Plurals, Bare Conditionals, and Only (1997)
- M. Križ, Aspects of Homogeneity in the Semantics of Natural Language (2015)
The homogeneity theory #
The homogeneity counterfactual is a trivalent proposition. Unembedded it is the selectional counterfactual, and the two theories part only under embedding, where [RMRS25] test them.
The homogeneity counterfactual, which asserts that every closest p-world is a q-world and
presupposes that the closest p-worlds agree on q.
Equations
- Conditional.homogeneityCounterfactual ord p q = (Conditional.closestImp ord p q ∪ Conditional.closestImp ord p qᶜ).indicator fun (v : W) => SignType.ofProp (v ∈ Conditional.closestImp ord p q)
Instances For
The presupposition is symmetric in the consequent and its negation.
With closest antecedent-worlds, negating the consequent negates the verdict.
The selectional theory #
The selectional counterfactual is super-truth over the closest antecedent-worlds, each of them one resolution of the selection function's tie.
The selectional counterfactual, true when every closest p-world is a q-world, false when
every one is a qᶜ-world, and indeterminate otherwise.
Equations
- Conditional.selectionalCounterfactual ord p q w = SignType.supervaluation ((ord w).minimals p).toFinset fun (x : W) => x ∈ q
Instances For
With closest antecedent-worlds, negating the consequent negates the verdict.
The selectional disjunction of if p, q and if p, not q is never false.
Unembedded, the homogeneity counterfactual is the selectional counterfactual.
Might counterfactuals #
[Lew73b] defines if p, might q as not (if p, would not q). Together with Conditional Excluded Middle that definition makes might equivalent to would, which Lewis counts against a semantics validating it. [Sta81] rejects the definition instead, reading might as a possibility operator over the whole conditional.
The selectional might holds when the selectional counterfactual is not false.
Equations
- Conditional.selectionalMight ord p q w = (Conditional.selectionalCounterfactual ord p q w ≠ -1)
Instances For
Equations
- Conditional.instDecidableSelectionalMight ord p q w = { decide := !decide (Conditional.selectionalCounterfactual ord p q w = -1), reflects_decide := ⋯ }
The selectional might is weaker than would, since with mixed closest worlds might holds while would is indeterminate.
Distribution #
Distribution of a counterfactual over a disjunctive consequent fails for the universal theory, which quantifies over every closest world, and holds for the selectional theory when there is at most one closest world ([Sta81]).
With at most one closest world, the selectional counterfactual distributes over a disjunctive consequent.
The conditional of the closest worlds does not distribute over a disjunctive consequent when
one closest world is a q-world and another an r-world.
The selectional theory as supervaluation #
[Sta81] supervaluates the [Sta68] selection conditional over the completions of
a similarity ordering. A conditional is true when every completion makes it true, false when
every one makes it false, and indeterminate otherwise (superCounterfactual), which for a single
conditional on a finite, strongly centered ordering is the selectional counterfactual.
The supervaluation of the selection conditional over the completions of a family of preorders, true when every compatible selection function makes if p, q true, false when every one makes it false, and indeterminate otherwise.
Equations
- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
Instances For
The selectional counterfactual is true iff the selection conditional is true on every completion.
The selectional counterfactual is false iff the selection conditional is false on every completion.
On a finite, strongly centered family of preorders the supervaluation over completions is the selectional counterfactual.
Under the uniqueness assumption of [Sta81], at most one closest antecedent-world, any compatible selection function decides the selectional counterfactual.
Ties #
With two antecedent-worlds tied for closest, a compatible selection function makes if p, q true while the conditional of the closest worlds does not ([Lew73b], [Sta81]).