Erotetic reasoning with alternatives #
The erotetic theory of reasoning of Koralus and Mascarenhas treats the premises of a deductive
task asymmetrically: a disjunction-like first premise raises a set of alternatives, a question;
the second premise is a hint toward an answer; the reasoner selects the alternative the hint
bears on and reads conclusions off the selected alternative, a mental-models analog of
conjunction elimination. A Problem is the alternative set with its hint; a conclusion is
Illusory under a selection rule when some selected alternative yields it although it does not
follow from the premises' classical content. The selection rule is a parameter: Matches is
the exact content overlap of the mental-models and erotetic literature, the alternative
carrying the hint's content, and Overlaps is bare consistency with the hint; probabilistic
rules such as selection by confirmation are study-specific refinements. The schema indirect
covers the classical illusory inference from disjunction as the special case where the hint is
the first conjunct itself (disjunction_eq_indirect), and matching provably undergenerates
the indirect case while certifying the classical one.
The generators formalized with the schema are the three the literature has established: disjunction, indefinites (one alternative per witness), and the epistemic modal might, whose attentive content is the alternative pair of the prejacent with the tautology.
Implementation notes #
- Alternatives are bare
Set Wpropositions;Matches p := p ⊆ hintrenders exact content overlap semantically, with no syntactic conjunct structure. - Under the weak
Overlapsrule the symmetric conclusion of the classical schema is also certified (disjunction_illusory_overlaps_right): the rule records attention, not the asymmetry, which comes from the selection theory.
References #
A reasoning problem whose first premise raises alternatives and whose second premise is a hint.
- alts : Set (Set W)
The Hamblin alternatives raised by the first premise.
- hint : Set W
The second premise.
Instances For
A conclusion is illusory under the selection rule sel when some selected alternative the
hint partially overlaps yields it by conjunction elimination, though it does not follow
classically.
Equations
Instances For
The classical schema: the premise (a ∧ b) ∨ c raising {a ∧ b, c}, with hint a.
Equations
- Erotetic.disjunction a b c = { alts := {a ∩ b, c}, hint := a }
Instances For
The indirect schema: the same disjunctive premise with an arbitrary hint d.
Equations
- Erotetic.indirect a b c d = { alts := {a ∩ b, c}, hint := d }
Instances For
might φ raises the alternatives {φ, ⊤}, its attentive content.
Equations
- Erotetic.might p = {p, Set.univ}
Instances For
The might schema: might (a ∧ b) with hint a.
Equations
- Erotetic.mightProblem a b = { alts := Erotetic.might (a ∩ b), hint := a }
Instances For
An indefinite raises one alternative per member of its domain.
Equations
- Erotetic.indefinite P D hint = { alts := P '' D, hint := hint }
Instances For
The classical schema is the indirect schema whose hint is the first conjunct itself.
The schema is classically invalid: a world verifying the second disjunct and the hint but not the conclusion.
In the classical schema, matching selects exactly the first disjunct.
The classical illusory inference from disjunction, under exact matching.
Under bare overlap the symmetric, unattractive conclusion is certified too: Overlaps
records attention, not the selection asymmetry.
Matching never selects the second disjunct of the classical schema.
Exact matching undergenerates the indirect schema: when neither alternative carries the hint, no conclusion at all is illusory under matching.
The might schema is the classical schema with the tautologous second disjunct.
The might premise is informationally idle.
It is nevertheless not the alternative set of the tautology.
The might conclusion is illusory under matching.
The indefinite conclusion about a witness is illusory under overlap whenever another witness could verify the indefinite: its match is on the individual, which bare propositions cannot see.
Posteriors over the schema #
Conditioning a measure on the schema's premises cannot separate the attractive conclusion from the symmetric one: the premises distribute, and the two posteriors agree exactly when the priors of the two conjunctions do.
The premises ((a ∧ b) ∨ c) ∧ a are classically (a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ c).
Conditioning any finite measure on the premises, the posteriors of b and of c agree iff
the priors of a ∧ b and a ∧ c do: a posterior-based account distinguishes the conclusions
only through the priors.