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Linglib.Phenomena.ScalarImplicatures.Studies.PottsLevy2015

@cite{potts-levy-2015}: Negotiating Lexical Uncertainty and Speaker Expertise with Disjunction #

@cite{potts-levy-2015}

"Negotiating Lexical Uncertainty and Speaker Expertise with Disjunction." Proceedings of the 41st Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society, 417–445.

The Puzzle #

Hurford-violating disjunctions like "X or A" (where A ⊆ X semantically) are predicted to be redundant, yet they are felicitous and carry ignorance implicatures: the listener infers that the speaker is uncertain which disjunct holds.

@cite{potts-levy-2015} show that an RSA model with lexical uncertainty derives this: L1 infers that the speaker might be using a lexicon under which the disjuncts are non-overlapping, and the disjunction signals the speaker's uncertainty about the world.

The Model #

Three worlds:

Three lexica for X:

Five utterances: A, B, X, AorX, null.

Key insight: under syn, "A or X" and "A" are equivalent (Hurford violation). Under excl, "A or X" partitions {w₁, w₂} cleanly. L1 marginalizes over lexica, and excl dominates for "A or X" — deriving the prediction that disjunction implies speaker uncertainty (w₁₂ > w₁ > w₂).

Join Closure #

The join state w₁₂ represents speaker uncertainty. Following the paper's convention, an utterance m is true at w₁₂ iff m is true at BOTH w₁ and w₂ (the "must" reading: the speaker can assert m only if m holds across all worlds compatible with their knowledge).

Expertise Model (S2) #

The paper's key contribution is the expertise parameter β: a level-2 speaker who cares not only about informativity (L1 inferring the correct world) but also about lexicon signaling (L1 inferring the correct lexicon). The S2 utility:

U_S2(m, w, L; β) = ln L₁(w|m) + β · ln L₁(L|m)

When β > 0, the speaker has extra incentive to use utterances that signal the excl lexicon — precisely the Hurford-violating disjunction "A or X". Following the @cite{yoon-etal-2020} pattern, we define S2 utility directly from L1 marginals and prove comparative predictions.

Verification Against Paper #

Our model operates in the Hurfordian parameter regime (α > β) with α = 2, β = 0, C = 0. The paper's Hurfordian worked example (Figure 10) uses α = 2, β = 1, C(or) = 1. All 10 qualitative predictions match the paper:

Two Implementations #

  1. RSAConfig (§4–§10): L₁-level predictions via rsa_predict, zero costs, structural correspondence with linglib's RSA infrastructure.
  2. Full ℚ model (§12): L₂-level predictions via native_decide, with the paper's Hurfordian parameters (α = 2, β = 1, C(or) ≈ 1).

The paper's definitional reading (where syn dominates, e.g., "wine lover or oenophile") requires β > α (paper Section 5.4, Figures 13–14) and is not modeled here.

Connection to @cite{potts-etal-2016} #

Both papers use lexical uncertainty (Latent := Lexicon). @cite{potts-etal-2016} applies it to embedded scalar implicatures; this paper applies it to Hurford-violating disjunctions and speaker expertise. The mechanism is identical — only the domain and lexica differ.

World states. w₁ = only A-state, w₂ = only B-state, w₁₂ = speaker uncertain (both A and B possible).

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    def PottsLevy2015.instReprWorld.repr :
    WorldStd.Format
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      Utterances: A, B, X (the ambiguous term), "A or X", and null.

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          Lexica for X.

          • base: X = A ∪ B (unrefined)
          • excl: X = B only (exhaustified, disjoint from A)
          • syn: X = A (synonymous with A)
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            def PottsLevy2015.instReprLex.repr :
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              def PottsLevy2015.truth (l : Lex) (u : Utterance) (w : World) :
              Bool

              Truth at all worlds including the join state w₁₂. AorX is computed compositionally: A ∨ X. At w₁₂, an utterance is true iff true at BOTH w₁ and w₂ (speaker can only assert what holds across all epistemically accessible worlds — the "must" reading).

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                The excl lexicon is the exhaustified reading of X relative to alternatives {A, X}. We prove this structurally: at every atomic world, excl(X) = base(X) ∧ ¬A, which is what exh_mw({A, X}, X) yields when there are exactly two alternatives with A ⊂ X.

                syn(X) = base(A): X narrowed to overlap with A.

                Base X strictly entails excl X (excl is a proper refinement).

                @cite{potts-levy-2015} lexical uncertainty model for Hurford disjunctions.

                Latent variable = Lex (base vs excl vs syn). L0: literal listener under lexicon l. S1: belief-based scoring, rpow(L0(w|u), α). L1: marginalizes over lexica with uniform prior.

                α = 2 to sharpen speaker preferences.

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                  Under syn lexicon, "A or X" has the same extension as "A" alone. This is the Hurford violation: the disjunction is redundant.

                  Under excl lexicon, A and X are semantically disjoint. This is the exhaustified reading that rescues the disjunction.

                  Under excl, "A or X" is true at w₁₂ and is the only non-null utterance true there. A, B, X alone each fail at w₁₂ because they cannot cover both atomic states.

                  Under syn, "A or X" is FALSE at w₁₂ (syn X = A, so AorX = A, and A fails the "must" check because A is false at w₂).

                  Under base, "A or X" is true at w₁₂ (base X covers both w₁ and w₂, so the disjunction holds at both atomic states).

                  The key prediction: hearing "A or X", L1 infers the speaker is uncertain (w₁₂), not that the speaker knows A (w₁) or knows B (w₂).

                  This is the ignorance/uncertainty implicature. The speaker could have said just "A" if they knew w₁, or just "X" if they knew w₂ (under the excl lexicon). By choosing the disjunction, the speaker signals that they cannot commit to either disjunct — i.e., they are in w₁₂.

                  Uncertainty implicature: w₁₂ > w₁ given "A or X".

                  Uncertainty implicature: w₁₂ > w₂ given "A or X".

                  Complete uncertainty ordering: w₁ > w₂. The listener assigns higher posterior to w₁ than w₂ because under excl, "A or X" at w₁ has A as the operative disjunct (a natural reading), while at w₂ only excl-X contributes (a refined reading).

                  L1 also infers which lexicon the speaker is using. For "A or X", the excl lexicon dominates: it makes the disjunction maximally informative (A and X partition the space). The syn lexicon makes the disjunction redundant (Hurford violation), so L1 disprefers it.

                  Lexicon inference: excl preferred over base for "A or X".

                  Lexicon inference: excl preferred over syn for "A or X".

                  Lexicon inference: base preferred over syn for "A or X". Completes the full ordering: excl > base > syn. The syn lexicon makes "A or X" redundant (= "A"), so it gets the least support from L1.

                  The paper argues that a rational speaker at w₁₂ (uncertain) should prefer the disjunction "A or X" over simpler utterances. This is the production-side counterpart to the L1 uncertainty implicature: the speaker KNOWS they're in w₁₂ and chooses AorX because it is the most informative utterance at that world.

                  Speaker at w₁₂ prefers "A or X" over "A" (under excl lexicon). If the speaker only said "A", the listener would infer w₁ (since A is only true at w₁ under excl). The disjunction conveys the uncertainty.

                  Speaker at w₁₂ prefers "A or X" over "X" (under excl lexicon). "X" alone would lead to inference of w₂.

                  Speaker at w₁ prefers "A" over "A or X" (under excl lexicon). When the speaker KNOWS w₁, saying just "A" is more informative than the disjunction.

                  The Hurford data in Phenomena.ScalarImplicatures.Basic records that "some or all" is felicitous, rescued by exhaustification. This is exactly the phenomenon @cite{potts-levy-2015} models: the excl lexicon plays the role of exhaustification, making the disjuncts non-overlapping and the sentence informative.

                  The connection: someOrAll.rescueMethod = some "exh(some) = some but not all" corresponds to our excl_is_base_minus_A theorem, which shows excl(X) = base(X) ∧ ¬A — the same operation as exh.

                  The Hurford datum "some or all" is felicitous. Our model explains WHY: the excl lexicon makes the disjunction informative (proved by excl_disjoint and the L1 predictions above).

                  The rescue method is exhaustification — matching our excl lexicon.

                  The paper's key contribution: the expertise parameter β.

                  @cite{potts-levy-2015}'s distinctive insight beyond generic LU-RSA is that speakers of Hurford-violating disjunctions signal their expertise about the meaning of the broader term. This is modeled as an S2-level speaker who cares not only about informativity (L1 inferring the correct world) but also about lexicon signaling (L1 inferring the speaker's lexicon).

                  The paper's expertise speaker utility (eq 15):

                  U_Sk(m, w, L) = α · ln Lk₋₁(w|m,L) + β · ln Lk₋₁(L|m) − C(m)
                  

                  When β = 0, this reduces to standard RSA (pure informativity). When β > 0, the speaker has extra incentive to choose utterances that cause L1 to infer the excl lexicon. "A or X" is the uniquely effective signal because it is maximally informative only under excl (§5, §7).

                  We decompose the expertise model into two independently verifiable components using cfg.S2 (RSA endorsement: S2(u|w) ∝ L₁(w|u)) for informativity and cfg.L1_latent for lexicon signaling.

                  Two Components #

                  1. Informativity (S2 endorsement): S2(AorX|w₁₂) > S2(A|w₁₂), i.e. L1 assigns higher posterior to w₁₂ given AorX than given A.
                  2. Lexicon signaling (L1_latent, §7): L1_latent(excl|AorX) > L1_latent(base|AorX) > L1_latent(syn|AorX) — AorX causes L1 to infer the excl lexicon.

                  When β > 0, the speaker cares about BOTH, and the lexicon-signaling term provides extra motivation beyond pure informativity to use the disjunction.

                  S2 endorsement at w₁₂: the pragmatic speaker prefers "A or X" over "A".

                  S2(u|w) ∝ L₁(w|u): L1 assigns higher posterior to w₁₂ given AorX (the disjunction is informative about uncertainty) than given A (which is false at w₁₂ under all lexica, so L₁(w₁₂|A) ≈ 0).

                  This is the informativity component of the expertise model.

                  S2 endorsement at w₁: the pragmatic speaker prefers "A" over "A or X".

                  When the speaker knows w₁, "A" is the most informative utterance. The expertise model does not override this — even with β > 0, an expert at w₁ prefers the direct utterance.

                  "A or X" signals the excl lexicon more strongly than "A" does.

                  Under "A", all three lexica agree on truth conditions (A is true at w₁ only), so L1_latent is approximately uniform. Under "A or X", the excl lexicon dominates because it makes the disjunction maximally informative (§5). This asymmetry is the mechanism by which β > 0 amplifies the speaker's preference for the disjunction.

                  Combined with s2_w12_AorX_vs_A, this shows that an expert speaker at w₁₂ has TWO reasons to use "A or X": informativity (S2) and lexicon signaling (this theorem).

                  The paper's distinctive contribution is the expertise parameter β in the S₂ speaker utility (eq 15):

                  S₂(m|w,L) ∝ l₁(w|m,L)^α · L₁(L|m)^β · exp(-C(m))

                  The expertise speaker simultaneously signals world knowledge (informativity via l₁) and lexicon knowledge (expertise via L₁). We implement this as a stacked RSAConfig: the base config's per-lexicon listener l₁ becomes the upper level's L0 meaning, with the expertise bonus L₁(L|m) and disjunction cost exp(-C(m)) entering via stack's bonus and costFactor parameters.

                  Since exp(-1) ∉ ℚ, the cost penalty is approximated as 37/100 ≈ 0.37 (close to exp(-1) ≈ 0.368). Qualitative predictions are robust to the exact value (paper Section 5.4).

                  noncomputable def PottsLevy2015.disjCost :
                  Utterance

                  Disjunction cost penalty: exp(-C(m)). The paper uses C(or) = 1, giving exp(-1) ≈ 0.368. We use 37/100 as a rational approximation.

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                    Expertise model: cfg.stack with α₂ = 2, β = 1.

                    S₂(m|w,L) ∝ l₁(w|m,L)^2 · L₁(L|m) · exp(-C(m)).

                    The stacked L1 = L₂ (world posterior), stacked L1_latent = L₂_latent (lexicon posterior).

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                      L₂ hearing "A or X": uncertainty state w₁₂ dominates w₁.

                      L₂ hearing "A or X": uncertainty state w₁₂ dominates w₂.

                      L₂ lexicon inference: base > syn. Full ordering: excl > base > syn.

                      S₂ at w₁₂ prefers "A or X" over "A" (marginalized over lexica).

                      S₂ at w₁ prefers "A" over "A or X" (marginalized over lexica).

                      The qualitative findings from the @cite{potts-levy-2015} LU + expertise model.

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                        def PottsLevy2015.instReprFinding.repr :
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