Documentation

Linglib.Phenomena.Polarity.Studies.VonFintel1999

@cite{von-fintel-1999} — Strawson entailment as a rescue for Fauconnier-Ladusaw #

von Fintel, K. (1999). NPI Licensing, Strawson Entailment, and Context Dependency. Journal of Semantics 16(2), 97–148.

The paper defends the Fauconnier-Ladusaw analysis of NPI licensing — that NPIs are licensed in DE positions — against four "recalcitrant" arenas where NPIs are licensed despite the host context not being classically DE: only, the adversative attitude predicates (sorry, surprised, regret), superlatives, and conditional antecedents. The key move is to weaken classical DE to Strawson-DE (Definition 14): an inference f(q) ⊨ f(p) need only hold under the additional assumption that the conclusion's presupposition is satisfied. With this weakening, all four contexts come out DE and the Fauconnier-Ladusaw schema goes through.

What this study file does #

It is not a re-derivation of Strawson-DE — that lives in Theories/Semantics/Entailment/StrawsonEntailment.lean, which already proves onlyFull_isStrawsonDE, sorryFull_isStrawsonDE, gladFull_isUE, superlative_isStrawsonDE, conditional_antecedent_strawsonDE, and the relevant non-DE lemmas. This file is the paper-citation index: each theorem is named after the paper's example number(s) and discharged by specializing the corresponding theorem from StrawsonEntailment.lean to the example's lexical instance. NPI grammaticality judgments themselves (starred or unstarred sentences) are not theorems — they are the empirical motivation, recorded in section docstrings with the sentences quoted from the paper.

Coverage #

§2 — only #

The Fauconnier-Ladusaw puzzle: only John licenses NPIs in its scope (ex. 10) yet the canonical DE inference fails (ex. 11) — extending the inference to a narrower scope (kale ⊆ vegetables) is not classically truth-preserving because the conclusion Only John ate kale carries a presupposition (someone ate kale) that the premise does not guarantee. Strawson-DE plugs the gap (ex. 18): with the conclusion's presupposition added as an extra premise, the DE inference goes through, and Strawson-DE is sufficient for NPI licensing.

(10) Only John ever ate any kale for breakfast. (p. 101) (11) Only John ate vegetables for breakfast. ⇏ Only John ate kale for breakfast. (p. 101) (18) Kale is a vegetable. John ate kale for breakfast. Only John ate vegetables for breakfast. ∴ Only John ate kale for breakfast. (p. 104)

Ex. 11 (p. 101): only is not classically downward entailing. Witness: kale ⊆ vegetables but the inference fails because the conclusion's existence presupposition (someone ate kale) is not guaranteed by the premise.

Ex. 18 (p. 104): only is Strawson-DE. The definedness predicate encodes the existence presupposition: there is some w' such that the focused individual John (here · == .w0) holds at w' and the scope predicate holds at w'.

Ex. 11 + 18: the central separation. only is Strawson-DE without being classically DE — and Strawson-DE is enough to license NPIs under von Fintel's revised Fauconnier-Ladusaw schema. This is the paper's headline result for §2.

§2.2 since (Iatridou, p.c.) #

Von Fintel relays an example from Sabine Iatridou:

(20) It's been five years since I saw a bird of prey in this area. ⇏ It's been five years since I saw an eagle in this area. (p. 107) (21) It's been five years since I saw any bird of prey in this area. ✓ (22) (with the additional premise "Five years ago I saw an eagle") the inference of (20) is restored.

Same dialectical shape as only: since licenses NPIs but is not classically DE; adding the temporal presupposition (the eagle-sighting) makes the inference go through.

Ex. 22 (p. 107): since is Strawson-DE in its complement. The definedness predicate is the temporal presupposition (a past p-event existed).

§2.3 — pseudo-anti-additivity is useless for NPI licensing #

@cite{atlas-1996} suggests that only John is "pseudo-anti-additive" (ex. 25, p. 109): it satisfies the half of anti-additivity in which f(x) ∧ f(y) → f(x ∨ y). Von Fintel shows this is "useless for the analysis of NPI licensing" (p. 110): pseudo-anti-additivity is too weak — it is shared by many quantifiers that license NPIs (no student) and many that do not (some student, every student, at least three students); see exs. 26 and 27. The negative argument doesn't admit a single-theorem formalization — it is a survey of counterexamples — but the upshot for the formal substrate is exactly what we already have: Strawson-DE, not pseudo-AA, is the operative notion.

§3 — adversative attitude predicates #

Adversative factive verbs (sorry, regret, surprised, amazed) license NPIs in their complement clauses despite the complement position not being classically DE.

(28a) Sandy is amazed/surprised that Robin ever ate kale. (p. 111) (28b) Sandy is sorry/regrets that Robin bought any car. (p. 111) (29) Robin ate kale ⇒ Robin ate a green vegetable; but Sandy is amazed that Robin ate a green vegetable ⇏ Sandy is amazed that Robin ate kale. (p. 111) (30) Robin bought a Honda Civic ⇒ Robin bought a car; but Sandy is sorry that Robin bought a car ⇏ Sandy is sorry that Robin bought a Honda Civic. (p. 111)

The factivity presupposition (the complement holds at the evaluation world) blocks classical DE: the conclusion's narrower complement may not hold even when the premise does. Strawson-DE rescues the inference by adding factivity at the world of evaluation.

Ex. 31 — Kadmon-Landman's prima-facie coherence challenge #

(31) Sandy regrets that Robin bought a car, but Sandy does not regret that Robin bought a Honda Civic. (p. 112)

If regret were uniformly DE, (31) should be incoherent. @cite{kadmon-landman-1993} defend monotonicity by appealing to a change of perspective between the conjuncts; von Fintel's §3.1 reanalysis treats this as a shift of the modal-base parameter rather than a failure of the underlying operator's monotonicity. The Strawson-DE result for sorry below holds on a constant perspective.

Ex. 30 (p. 111): sorry is not classically DE in its complement. The factivity component is what blocks DE: doxastic factivity of the narrower complement p ⊆ q may fail at the evaluation world even when q's does.

Ex. 28b (p. 111) — the explanatory result: sorry is Strawson-DE. The definedness predicate is doxastic factivity (dox w ⊆ p): the agent at the evaluation world w believes p. Given doxastic factivity of the conclusion's complement and p ⊆ q, the inference sorry q ⊨ sorry p goes through.

This explains why "Sandy is sorry that Robin bought any car" licenses any despite the complement position not being classically DE.

§3.2 — want and the Asher/Heim non-monotonicity puzzle #

vF §3.2 (pp. 115-121) defends want as upward entailing under a doxastic modal base (DOX*), in response to the Asher 1987 Concorde example (eq. 46) and the Heim 1992 couch example (eq. 48). The "non-monotonicity" of want collapses to a context shift in the modal base, parallel to the §3.4 shifting-context analysis for adversatives. Headline: want is monotonic relative to a constant context.

want is upward entailing in its complement (vF §3.2 headline; eq. 45).

§3 footnote 8 — Asher's WDE as a sibling notion #

vF p. 112 (footnote 8) cites @cite{asher-1987}'s Weakened Downward Entailment as a related but formally distinct notion: it has a doxastic side condition (belief in the conclusion's complement) and operates in the upward direction, in contrast to Strawson-DE's presuppositional side condition in the downward direction. The substrate's IsWDE predicate captures this; classical UE implies WDE trivially (monotone_implies_WDE).

§3.3 — glad is upward entailing, hence does not license NPIs #

(52) glad is UE: from α is glad that p and p ⇒ q, infer α is glad that q (paraphrasing the analysis on p. 124).

The asymmetry between sorry (DE in the complement under Strawson-DE) and glad (UE) is what predicts the asymmetry in NPI licensing: "*Sandy is glad that Robin bought any car" is ungrammatical; the same sentence with sorry is fine.

The same adversative/non-adversative asymmetry shows up in Hindi (@cite{lahiri-1998} §4.5): aaScarya 'surprised' licenses koii bhii / ek bhii; khuS 'glad' does not. See Phenomena/Polarity/Studies/Lahiri1998.lean for the Hindi data (npi_adversative_surprise_ek, npi_adversative_surprise_koii, npi_glad_bad). The two papers offer different explanations — Lahiri posits a covert anti-additive operator over the complement; von Fintel derives the asymmetry from the lexical monotonicity of the attitude — but they make the same predictions on the basic English/Hindi data.

Ex. 50 / K&L (p. 122): glad (K&L eq. 50 semantics) is upward entailing. Predicts NPIs are not licensed in the complement of glad.

Ex. 52 (p. 124) — vF's preferred replacement: glad (vF eq. 52 semantics) is also upward entailing. Same NPI-licensing prediction, different content (cf. vF's Honda Civic example, p. 124-125).

The §3 headline: sorry and glad agree on factivity but differ on monotonicity in the complement, and this monotonicity asymmetry directly tracks the NPI-licensing asymmetry. Holds for both the K&L and the vF analyses of glad.

§3.4 — shifting contexts #

The coherent sequences

(60) Sandy is glad that Robin bought a car, but Sandy is sorry/not glad that Robin bought a Honda. (p. 129) (61) Sandy is sorry that Robin bought a car, but Sandy is glad/not sorry that Robin bought a Honda. (p. 129)

Von Fintel argues these do not threaten the monotonicity analysis: their coherence depends on a shift in the modal-base parameter between the conjuncts (an "implicit conditionalization"; see ex. 61 discussion). Validity of monotonic inferences is checked against a constant context. A formal treatment requires dynamic-context machinery not yet present in StrawsonEntailment.lean.

§3.4 — Curveball #2: focus-sensitive only over a non-name (p. 133) #

(66) There only was any precipitation in [MEDFORD]_F. (67) (66) plus "There was rain in Medford" ⊢_S There only was rain in [MEDFORD]_F. (p. 133)

Focus-sensitive only over a place name (or any non-proper-name associate) is also Strawson-DE in its prejacent. Von Fintel notes (eq. 68 (a/b), p. 134) that this requires the option-(a) semantics for propositional only (weakening the asserted claim by closure under entailment of the prejacent), not the option-(b) semantics adopted in @cite{von-fintel-1997}. The substrate's onlyFull already captures the option-(a) reading via its assertion clause "no y ≠ x satisfies the scope".

§4 — conditional antecedents and superlatives #

§4.1 — conditional antecedents #

(70a) If John subscribes to any newspaper, he is probably well informed. (p. 135) (70b) If he has ever told a lie, he must go to confession. (p. 135) (70c) If you had left any later, you would have missed the plane. (p. 135)

Conditional antecedents license NPIs (ex. 70). Whether they are DE depends on the conditional analysis adopted:

We formalize the restrictor side. Stalnaker-Lewis non-monotonicity is a property of a different operator (a similarity-based would) not yet in the substrate.

Ex. 72 (p. 137), restrictor analysis with idle ordering source: a Kratzer-style condNecessity is classically DE in its antecedent. Domain restriction is monotone.

Note: this is the strict subcase of vF eq. 72 where max_g is trivial. The full Kratzer/Stalnaker-Lewis conditional with a non-trivial preference ordering is not monotone — see the ex73_* theorems below for the counterexample built from the real Kratzer apparatus in Conditionals/Restrictor.lean.

Restrictor-style conditional antecedents are a fortiori Strawson-DE (since classical DE implies Strawson-DE via de_implies_strawsonDE).

§4.2 — superlatives #

(75) Emma is the tallest girl to ever win the dance contest. (p. 138) (76) Emma is the tallest girl in her class. ⇏ Emma is the tallest girl in her class to have learned the alphabet. (p. 139) (77) Emma has learned the alphabet. Emma is the tallest girl in her class. ∴ Emma is the tallest girl in her class to have learned the alphabet. (p. 139)

Adding a restriction to the comparison class can change the ranking, so ex. 76 is not classically DE. With the additional premise that Emma satisfies the new restriction (ex. 77's "Emma has learned the alphabet"), the inference is Strawson-valid.

The substrate's superlativeAssert and superlative_isStrawsonDE encode this for the predicative use of the superlative (ex. 75 / 77). The non-predicative case where the superlative restricts a definite description (ex. 80 p. 140) does not have local Strawson-DE — this is documented in the substrate's superlative section.

Ex. 77 (p. 139): the superlative is Strawson-DE in the restriction position. The definedness predicate encodes the presupposition that the designated subject α (Emma) satisfies the restriction (has learned the alphabet).

Hierarchy connection #

The paper's §1 establishes the standard DE / AA / AM hierarchy and von Fintel's §2 (Strawson move) extends it with Strawson-DE as the weakest licensing level. The substrate proves AM → AA → DE → Strawson-DE (de_implies_strawsonDE); this study file just records that the four recalcitrant operators (onlyFull, sorryFull, superlativeAssert, condNecessity) all land at exactly Strawson-DE, while gladFull sits outside the hierarchy entirely (UE).

theorem Phenomena.Polarity.Studies.VonFintel1999.strawson_DE_recalcitrants :
((Semantics.Entailment.StrawsonEntailment.IsStrawsonDE (Semantics.Entailment.StrawsonEntailment.onlyFull fun (x : Semantics.Entailment.World) => x = Semantics.Entailment.World.w0) fun (scope : Set Semantics.Entailment.World) (_w : Semantics.Entailment.World) => ∃ (w' : Semantics.Entailment.World), w' = Semantics.Entailment.World.w0 scope w') ¬Semantics.Entailment.Polarity.IsDownwardEntailing (Semantics.Entailment.StrawsonEntailment.onlyFull fun (x : Semantics.Entailment.World) => x = Semantics.Entailment.World.w0)) ((Semantics.Entailment.StrawsonEntailment.IsStrawsonDE (Semantics.Entailment.StrawsonEntailment.sorryFull (fun (w : Semantics.Entailment.World) => {w}) fun (x : Semantics.Entailment.World) => {Semantics.Entailment.World.w1}) fun (p : Set Semantics.Entailment.World) (w : Semantics.Entailment.World) => w'{w}, p w') ¬Semantics.Entailment.Polarity.IsDownwardEntailing (Semantics.Entailment.StrawsonEntailment.sorryFull (fun (w : Semantics.Entailment.World) => {w}) fun (x : Semantics.Entailment.World) => {Semantics.Entailment.World.w1})) (Semantics.Entailment.StrawsonEntailment.IsStrawsonDE (fun (α : Set Semantics.Entailment.World) => Semantics.Entailment.StrawsonEntailment.condNecessity (fun (x : Semantics.Entailment.World) => {Semantics.Entailment.World.w0, Semantics.Entailment.World.w1}) α fun (x : Semantics.Entailment.World) => True) fun (x : Set Semantics.Entailment.World) (x_1 : Semantics.Entailment.World) => True) Semantics.Entailment.StrawsonEntailment.IsStrawsonDE (Semantics.Entailment.StrawsonEntailment.superlativeAssert Semantics.Entailment.World.w0) (Semantics.Entailment.StrawsonEntailment.superlativePresup Semantics.Entailment.World.w0)

The four "recalcitrant" Strawson-DE operators of @cite{von-fintel-1999}, each strict (Strawson-DE without classical DE) where applicable:

Cross-framework bridges #

These theorems make explicit the relationships between vF's Strawson-DE analysis and three sibling NPI theories already formalized in linglib. Per CLAUDE.md "chronological dependency" rule: this file may reference @cite{kadmon-landman-1993} (1993 < 1999), @cite{lahiri-1998} (1998 < 1999), and @cite{hoeksema-1983} (1983 < 1999), but not the reverse.

K&L ≡ vF on the basic adversative asymmetry. Both @cite{kadmon-landman-1993} (K&L) and @cite{von-fintel-1999} (vF) derive the sorry/glad asymmetry from formally identical Lean theorems — K&L via "lexical entailment to want ¬A", vF via Strawson-DE / UE of the attitude operator. The two prose explanations are different; the formalizations agree by rfl.

This is exactly the kind of theoretical-incompatibility-collapse that linglib's interconnection-density discipline aims to surface. The empirical predictions are the same; choosing between the two analyses requires looking at examples that distinguish their semantic predictions, e.g. K&L's "settle for less" reading (bridge_lahiri_glad_settle_overgeneration below).

gladFull_isUE overgenerates against Lahiri's "settle for less" Hindi data. @cite{lahiri-1998} §4.5 (datum npi_glad_settle) records that Hindi khuS + NPI koii bhii IS grammatical on a "settle for less" reading. K&L flag the same in English (file KadmonLandman1993.settle_glad_anybody, settle_glad_tickets). The substrate's gladFull_isUE predicts uniformly NO licensing — so the substrate undergenerates here, and the "settle for less" reading would require either (a) a different gladFull semantics with a perspective shift, or (b) a Strawson-DE treatment of the rescued reading.

This theorem records the empirical refutation as a Lean-checkable incompatibility between the substrate and the data.

Hoeksema's S-comparative is anti-additive, hence trivially Strawson-DE. @cite{hoeksema-1983} proves the S-comparative anti-additive (Semantics.Degree.Comparative.sComparative_isAntiAdditive); the inheritance chain AA → DE → Strawson-DE makes the bridge automatic.

This places the S-comparative in the same Strawson-DE class as @cite{von-fintel-1999}'s recalcitrants, but with the additional classical AA backing — meaning S-comparatives license strong NPIs too (whereas vF's only only licenses weak NPIs).