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Linglib.Phenomena.Modality.Studies.Kratzer2012Conditionals

§2.9 Conditionals — @cite{kratzer-2012} #

@cite{kratzer-2012} §2.9 ("Conditionals", pp. 65-68) presents the if-clause-as- modal-base-restrictor schema [[if α β]]^{f,g} = [[β]]^{f⁺, g} where f⁺(w) = f(w) ∪ {[[α]]^{f,g}}, plus a "Sketch of proof" showing the four conditional types (material, strict, counterfactual, deontic-ordering) fall out of varying f and g. The chapter's only concrete worked example in §2.9 is the German deontic scenario at p. 67 (examples 59-61).

Sections #

  1. The §2.9 four-conditional recipe (abstract over predicates): material and strict implication theorems. Counterfactual case defers to Ch. 3.
  2. Deontic scenario from p. 67: injustice / amended / rewarded propositions over a 4-world model, with morally-good ordering source.
  3. Predictions on the deontic scenario (Kratzer's analysis of (59)-(61)).
  4. Headline argument — Kratzer's analysis differentiates (60) from (61); the traditional □(α → β) analysis collapses them to vacuous truth.

Kratzer's text (p. 67, paraphrased) #

(59) Jedem Menschen muss Gerechtigkeit widerfahren. "Justice must be done to every person." (60) Wenn jemand ungerecht behandelt wurde, muss das Unrecht gesühnt werden. "If someone was treated unjustly, the injustice must be amended." (61) Wenn jemand ungerecht behandelt wurde, muss das Unrecht belohnt werden. "If someone was treated unjustly, the injustice must be rewarded."

"Traditional approaches ... would have to analyze (60) and (61) as modalized material implications and assign them the logical form necessarily (α→β). This leads to trouble. ... if there is no injustice in any morally accessible world, anything you like is true in morally accessible worlds where there is injustice." (p. 67)

"On this analysis [Kratzer's], it is possible for the first two propositions [(59) and (60)] to be true, and the third one [(61)] to be false. For us, a world where injustice is amended for is not good (since there is no injustice in a good world). But it is still closer to what is good than any world where injustice is rewarded." (p. 67)

§1. Four-conditional recipe (abstract) #

Pointwise-realistic modal base: f(w) = [(= w)], so ⋂f(w) = {w}.

NB: This is the trivial collapse where one proposition already IS the singleton {w}. @cite{kratzer-2012} distinguishes this from totally-realistic backgrounds proper (isTotallyRealistic in Core/Logic/Intensional/ConversationalBackground.lean), which carry many propositions — facts about w — whose intersection is {w}. The lumping/dividing of those propositions does theoretical work in counterfactuals (Ch. 3 §3.1). For the §2.9 recipe only ⋂f(w) = {w} matters, so the collapse is sound here — but it is NOT Kratzer's totally-realistic notion.

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    Material implication recipe (Kratzer 2012 §2.9, p. 65-66 "Sketch of proof", Case one). With a pointwise-realistic modal base and empty ordering source, the conditional (if p) (necessarily q) reduces to material implication p w → q w at the evaluation world.

    Strict implication recipe (Kratzer 2012 §2.9, p. 66 "Sketch of proof" for strict implication). With an empty modal base and empty ordering source, the conditional (if p) (necessarily q) reduces to logical implication: q must hold at every p-world.

    §2. Deontic scenario (Kratzer 2012 §2.9 p. 67, ex. 59-61) #

    Four worlds:

    WorldinjusticeamendedrewardedNotes
    w0non/an/a"Morally good" — no injustice exists
    w1yesyesnoInjustice amended for
    w2yesnoyesInjustice rewarded
    w3yesnonoInjustice neither amended nor rewarded

    Morally-good ordering source. Two propositions track moral goodness: no-injustice (the ideal), and if-injustice-then-amended (the corrective ideal). Their joint pattern induces:

    • w0 satisfies both (no injustice; vacuously amends)
    • w1 satisfies only the corrective ideal (injustice + amended)
    • w2, w3 satisfy neither (injustice without amends)

    So w0 < w1 < {w2, w3} in the at-least-as-good ordering. Kratzer's "morally good" ordering source is left informal in §2.9; this is a minimal encoding sufficient for the (60)/(61) contrast.

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      Traditional analysis modal base (the foil Kratzer is arguing against, p. 67). Treats "morally accessible worlds" as a single modal base — only the morally good world (w0) is accessible. Under this analysis, □(α → β) becomes vacuously true at the actual world whenever the antecedent is false in all accessible worlds.

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        §3. Predictions on the deontic scenario #

        (59) "Justice must be done" under Kratzer's analysis. With empty modal base + morally-good ordering, the only best world is w0 (no injustice). So necessity of ¬ injustice holds.

        (60) "If injustice, must be amended" under Kratzer's analysis succeeds. With empty modal base restricted by injustice + morally-good ordering, the only best world is w1 (amended is closer to the moral ideal than rewarded or unredressed). So necessity of amended holds.

        (61) "If injustice, must be rewarded" under Kratzer's analysis fails. The best injustice-world is w1, but w1 is NOT rewarded.

        §4. Headline: Kratzer differentiates (60) and (61); traditional analysis collapses them. #

        Kratzer's analysis differentiates (60) and (61). Per @cite{kratzer-2012} p. 67: "On this analysis, it is possible for the first two propositions [(59) and (60)] to be true, and the third one [(61)] to be false."

        Traditional □(α → β) analysis collapses (60) and (61) at the actual world (where actual = w0, the morally good world). When morally accessible worlds = {w0} and w0 has no injustice, both injusticeamended and injusticerewarded are vacuously true at every accessible world. This is the "vacuous truth" problem Kratzer flags on p. 67.