Epistemic ortholattices #
This file defines epistemic ortholattices, Holliday and Mandelkern's algebraic semantics for
must and might. A modal ortholattice is an ortholattice with a necessity operator □
preserving ⊓ and ⊤, and its possibility operator ◇a = ¬□¬a preserves ⊔ and ⊥. It is
T when □a ≤ a, and epistemic when it is T and satisfies Wittgenstein's Law ¬a ∧ ◇a = 0,
which makes "p, but it might be that not p" a contradiction.
The law is what forces ortholattices on the account. In a Boolean algebra it makes ◇¬a entail
¬a, and with T it makes □ the identity. In an ortholattice, where a ⊓ b = ⊥ need not give
b ≤ aᶜ, it is compatible with a non-trivial □.
Main definitions #
Orthologic.diamondHom:◇a = ¬□¬aas a map preserving⊔and⊥.Orthologic.WittgensteinLaw:¬a ∧ ◇a = 0.
Main results #
Orthologic.wittgensteinLaw_iff: the law in the forma ∧ ◇¬a = 0.Orthologic.wittgensteinLaw_iff_eq_bot: with T, the law holds iff□a = 0impliesa = 0.Orthologic.WittgensteinLaw.disjoint_diamondHom_iterate: with T,a ∧ ◇ⁿ¬a = 0for everyn.Orthologic.diamondHom_le_box_diamondHom: 4 anda ≤ □◇agive 5,◇a ≤ □◇a.Orthologic.wittgensteinLaw_iff_diamondHom_compl_le,Orthologic.WittgensteinLaw.eq_id: the collapse whenᶜis a pseudocomplement, as in a Boolean algebra.
Implementation notes #
The paper's modal ortholattice is not a new structure: □ is a bundled InfTopHom L L, since
one lattice carries many modalities, and T is the hypothesis ∀ a, box a ≤ a. An epistemic
ortholattice is the conjunction of T and WittgensteinLaw. The frame semantics producing
epistemic ortholattices is Logic/Orthologic/ModalFrame.lean, and the logic they characterize
is Logic/Orthologic/EpistemicOrthologic.lean.
References #
diamondHom box is the possibility operator ◇a = ¬□¬a of box, which preserves joins
and ⊥ ([HM24] Definition 3.15 and Lemma 3.16).
Equations
- Orthologic.diamondHom box = { toFun := fun (a : L) => (box aᶜ)ᶜ, map_sup' := ⋯, map_bot' := ⋯ }
Instances For
Iterated possibility of a complement is the complement of iterated necessity,
◇ⁿ¬a = ¬□ⁿa.
With 4, □a ≤ □□a, the principle a ≤ □◇a yields 5, ◇a ≤ □◇a, so that □ makes an
S5 modal ortholattice when it is also T ([HM24] Definition 3.19 and the
proof of Theorem 5.7.3).
Wittgenstein's Law ¬a ∧ ◇a = 0 makes "p is not the case but might be" a contradiction.
With T it makes an ortholattice with □ an epistemic ortholattice
([HM24] Definition 3.18).
Equations
- Orthologic.WittgensteinLaw box = ∀ (a : L), Disjoint aᶜ ((Orthologic.diamondHom box) a)
Instances For
Wittgenstein's Law is equivalent by involution to its form a ∧ ◇¬a = 0, "p, but it
might be that not p" ([HM24] after Definition 3.18).
A proposition whose necessity is contradictory is itself contradictory ([HM24] Lemma 3.25, algebraically).
Over T, Wittgenstein's Law is equivalent to the principle of Lemma 3.25 that a proposition whose necessity is contradictory is itself contradictory ([HM24] after Lemma 3.25).
Generalized Wittgenstein sentences are contradictions, since with T a ∧ ◇ⁿ¬a = 0 for every
n, here in the form a ⊓ ¬□ⁿa = ⊥ ([HM24] Fact 3.28, algebraically).
This is Fact 3.28 in the paper's form a ∧ ◇ⁿ¬a = 0.
The collapse under pseudocomplementation #
The hypothesis hp says that ᶜ is a pseudocomplement, a ⊓ b = ⊥ → b ≤ aᶜ. It holds in every
Boolean algebra (Disjoint.le_compl_left), and in an ortholattice it is equivalent to
distributivity ([HM24] Proposition 3.7).
When ᶜ is a pseudocomplement, as in a Boolean algebra, Wittgenstein's Law says that ◇¬a
entails ¬a, so treating p ∧ ◇¬p as a contradiction collapses might
([HM24] §1).
When ᶜ is a pseudocomplement, with T Wittgenstein's Law makes □ the identity, so a Boolean
algebra has no non-trivial epistemic modality.