Iterated belief revision #
This file defines revision operators on epistemic states and the postulates of Darwiche and Pearl for iterated belief revision, and proves their representation by total preorders on worlds.
Darwiche and Pearl revise epistemic states rather than belief sets. A state carries the worlds
its belief set admits together with a disposition to revise, and a revision operator sends a state
and a proposition, a set of worlds, to a new state. The postulates of Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and
Makinson, in the form Katsuno and Mendelzon gave them, transfer to states with syntax-irrelevance
weakened. An operator satisfies them iff a faithful assignment of total preorders to states
represents it, which means that the belief worlds of a state are its least worlds and that
revision by μ selects the least μ-worlds (Theorem 2). A state accepts β given α when
revising it by α yields a state that believes β. These conditional beliefs form a rational
consequence relation in the sense of Lehmann and Magidor, and the preorder of the state encodes
them. This is the translation between belief revision and nonmonotonic inference that Gärdenfors
and Makinson describe, under which superexpansion corresponds to Or, subexpansion to rational
monotonicity, and consistency to consistency preservation. The iterated-revision postulates C1–C4
say which conditional beliefs a revision preserves. Each of them, and Boutilier's postulate CB, is
equivalent to a condition on how the preorder of a state relates to the preorder of its revision
(Theorems 3 and 4). The conditions are agreement on the μ-worlds, agreement on the
non-μ-worlds, preservation of strict and of weak rankings of a μ-world over a non-μ-world,
and agreement outside the revised belief set. Spohn's conditionalisation of rankings, which makes
the evidence one degree more plausible than it was implausible, is represented by the rankings'
own orderings and meets every postulate (Theorem 5). On a normalised ranking it is
conditionalisation on the evidence at the firmness one above the rank of its negation.
Implementation notes #
- Rankings are bare functions
W → ℕ, as the paper relaxes normalisation so that revision by an unsatisfiable proposition yields an unsatisfiable belief set;rankof a proposition is the infimum of its worlds' ranks. - A faithful assignment sends each state to a preorder given as a term, with totality a field
of
Faithful. The revised belief worlds are thenPreorder.minimalsof the evidence, and the conditional beliefs of a state areNonmonotonic.Entailsof its preorder (Faithful.accepts_iff). - The postulate of syntax-irrelevance holds by construction: propositions are sets of worlds and revision is a function of the state.
- The consistency postulate and the representation of C3 and C4 need least elements to exist, which a finite set of worlds, the paper's propositional setting, guarantees.
References #
- A. Darwiche and J. Pearl, On the Logic of Iterated Belief Revision (1997)
- C. E. Alchourrón, P. Gärdenfors and D. Makinson, On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions (1985)
- H. Katsuno and A. O. Mendelzon, Propositional Knowledge Base Revision and Minimal Change (1991)
- D. Lehmann and M. Magidor, What Does a Conditional Knowledge Base Entail? (1992)
- P. Gärdenfors and D. Makinson, Nonmonotonic Inference Based on Expectations (1994)
- W. Spohn, Ordinal Conditional Functions: A Dynamic Theory of Epistemic States (1988)
A revision operator on epistemic states over the worlds W assigns each state the worlds
its belief set admits and revises a state by a proposition.
- bel : S → Set W
The worlds admitted by the state's belief set.
- revise : S → Set W → S
Revision of a state by a proposition.
Instances For
Two preorders agree on d.
Equations
- BeliefRevision.AgreesOn p q d = ∀ w ∈ d, ∀ v ∈ d, w ≤ v ↔ w ≤ v
Instances For
A μ-world strictly below a non-μ-world in p stays strictly below in q.
Equations
- BeliefRevision.PreservesLt p q μ = ∀ w ∈ μ, ∀ v ∉ μ, w < v → w < v
Instances For
A μ-world weakly below a non-μ-world in p stays weakly below in q.
Equations
- BeliefRevision.PreservesLe p q μ = ∀ w ∈ μ, ∀ v ∉ μ, w ≤ v → w ≤ v
Instances For
Equations
- BeliefRevision.instDecidableAgreesOn = id inferInstance
Equations
- BeliefRevision.instDecidablePreservesLt = id inferInstance
Equations
- BeliefRevision.instDecidablePreservesLe = id inferInstance
A revision operator satisfies the AGM postulates on epistemic states when it has success, expansion when the evidence is consistent with the beliefs, consistency, superexpansion and subexpansion.
Instances For
An assignment of total preorders to states is faithful and represents r when the belief
worlds of a state are equally plausible and strictly more plausible than the others, and
revision selects the least worlds of the evidence.
- total (Ψ : S) : Std.Total LE.le
Instances For
Postulate (C4) says that evidence not contradicted by later evidence stays uncontradicted.
Equations
Instances For
Boutilier's postulate (CB) says that evidence contradicted by later evidence is forgotten.
Equations
Instances For
Revising by a conjunction is conditioning the revision by the first conjunct on the second, when that leaves something.
The state Ψ accepts β given α, and β ∣ α is a conditional belief of Ψ, when the
belief set of the revision of Ψ by α entails β.
Instances For
The conditional beliefs of a state of an AGM operator form a rational consequence relation. Superexpansion gives Or, and subexpansion gives cautious and rational monotonicity.
The representation theorem #
Under a faithful assignment the revised belief worlds are the least worlds of the evidence.
Under a faithful assignment w survives revision by the pair {w, v} exactly when it is
at least as plausible as v.
In the ordering an AGM operator induces on a state, w is at least as plausible as v when
w is believed or survives revision by the pair.
Equations
- h.ord Ψ = Preorder.ofLE (fun (w v : W) => w ∈ r.bel Ψ ∨ w ∈ r.bel (r.revise Ψ {w, v})) ⋯ ⋯
Instances For
The preorder of a state encodes its conditional beliefs, since β is accepted given α
exactly when the least α-worlds are β-worlds.
The iterated-revision postulates #
Revising by μ before α ⊆ D Ψ μ leaves the beliefs of revising by α alone iff the
preorders of a state and of its revision agree on D Ψ μ.
Postulate (C1) holds iff the preorders of a state and of its revision by μ agree on the
μ-worlds, which is condition (CR1) of Theorem 4.
Postulate (C2) holds iff the preorders of a state and of its revision by μ agree on the
non-μ-worlds, which is condition (CR2) of Theorem 4.
Postulate (CB) holds iff the preorders of a state and of its revision agree outside the revised belief set, which is condition (CBR) of Theorem 3.
Postulate (C3) holds iff revision by μ preserves each strict ranking of a μ-world below a
non-μ-world, which is condition (CR3) of Theorem 4.
Postulate (C4) holds iff revision by μ preserves each weak ranking of a μ-world below a
non-μ-world, which is condition (CR4) of Theorem 4.
Spohn's revision of rankings #
The rank of a proposition is the least rank of its worlds, and 0 for the empty
proposition.
Equations
- BeliefRevision.rank κ μ = sInf (κ '' μ)
Instances For
Spohn's revision shifts the μ-worlds down so that the best reach rank 0 and the others
up by one, which makes the evidence one degree more plausible than it was implausible.
Equations
- BeliefRevision.spohn κ μ w = if w ∈ μ then κ w - BeliefRevision.rank κ μ else κ w + 1
Instances For
Spohn's revision is an operator on rankings whose belief sets are the rank-0 worlds.
Equations
- BeliefRevision.spohnRevision W = { bel := fun (κ : W → ℕ) => {w : W | κ w = 0}, revise := BeliefRevision.spohn }
Instances For
A revision of rankings that conditions the μ-worlds on μ and leaves the rest
disbelieved is represented by the rankings' own orderings.
Conditioning the μ-worlds on μ preserves their ordering.
The rankings' orderings faithfully represent Spohn's revision (Lemma 2).
Spohn's revision satisfies condition (CR1), the first part of Lemma 3.
Spohn's revision satisfies condition (CR3), the third part of Lemma 3.
Spohn's revision satisfies condition (CR4), the fourth part of Lemma 3.
Spohn's revision satisfies the AGM postulates (Theorem 5).
Spohn's revision satisfies (C1) (Theorem 5).
Spohn's revision satisfies (C2) (Theorem 5).
Spohn's revision satisfies (C3) (Theorem 5).
Spohn's revision satisfies (C4) (Theorem 5).
On a ranking function, Spohn's revision by A is conditionalization on A at the firmness
κ(Aᶜ) + 1.
The conditional beliefs of a ranking function under Spohn's revision are the consequences of its ranked model.