Docs / Discourse / SpeechAct / Basic

Speech acts

import Linglib.Discourse.SpeechAct.Basic

The illocutionary force of an utterance is the act it performs, the $F$ in $F(p)$: an assertion, a question, a directive, a promise or an exclamation. Each sentence type conventionally performs one force, every interrogative a question, and a form used for another act, a rising declarative that asks or an interrogative that requests, departs from that pairing.

The epistemic authority of an act is the participant whose commitment to its content the act projects. In Krifka's commitment spaces an assertion adds the speaker's commitment to its content and a polar question proposes the addressee's commitment to it or to its negation, so the authority is the speaker of an assertion and the addressee of a question: the interrogative flip is the difference between the two updates.

A request is felicitous only if its preparatory conditions hold, first among them that the addressee is able to do what is requested, and asking whether the addressee is able is a way of making the request indirectly. A question is a request for information, and the conditions on giving information are ordered by specificity, knowing it being a way of being able to give it.

Main definitions

Implementation notes

  • The authority is partial. Coppock and Wechsler assign it for declaratives and polar interrogatives, and Theiler's source of information is the same participant for assertions and questions. For imperatives the sources diverge: Speas and Tenny's seat of knowledge, which Coppock and Wechsler equate with the authority, is the hearer, who is to realize the content, while Searle's command requires the speaker's authority over the hearer, a deontic notion.
  • The authority is not definable over the Table of Farkas and Bruce, where a polar question raises an issue and commits no one (Commitment.Table.polarQuestion); Coppock and Wechsler, who work over the Table, take it as a parameter of the context. It is definable over Krifka's commitment spaces, whose questions propose the addressee's commitment.
  • Searle counts the addressee's wanting to do what is requested among the reasons for doing it, not among the preparatory conditions; Francik and Clark count willingness among the preconditions of a request.

References

Illocutionary force

The illocutionary force of an utterance is the act it performs, the $F$ in $F(p)$, which its sentence type conventionally fixes and which form and use may pull apart.

inductive SpeechAct.ForceL74–87
  • assertion : Force

    Putting the content forward as true.

  • question : Force

    Asking the addressee for information.

  • directive : Force

    Trying to get the addressee to act, as a command or a request does.

  • promise : Force

    Committing the speaker to act.

  • exclamation : Force

    Expressing the speaker's attitude to the content.

Derives DecidableEq, Repr, Inhabited, Fintype.

Used by SpeechAct.Force.authority, SpeechAct.Force.commitmentUpdate, SpeechAct.Force.projectsCommitment_of_authority_eq_some, SpeechAct.Force.authority_eq_some_iff, Clause.SentenceType.force

Used in Semantics/Mood/Context, AlonsoOvalleRoyer2024, NapoliNespor1976, Roberts2023, Theiler2021

The epistemic authority of an act is the participant whose commitment to its content the act projects: the speaker of an assertion and the addressee of a question. The other acts have none.

def SpeechAct.Force.authorityL91–97
:
Force → Option Role

Built from

Used by SpeechAct.Force.authority_assertion, SpeechAct.Force.authority_question, SpeechAct.Force.projectsCommitment_of_authority_eq_some, SpeechAct.Force.authority_eq_some_iff

Used in Theiler2021

Authority from projected commitments

An act of force f with content φ as an update of a commitment space, after Krifka: an assertion adds the speaker's commitment to φ, and a question proposes the addressee's commitment to φ or to ¬φ. Commitment Space Semantics gives the other forces no such update.

def SpeechAct.Force.commitmentUpdateL112–119
{W : Type u_1} (C : Commitment.Space (Set (Set W))) (O : Role → SetRel W W) (φ : Set W) :
Force → Option (Commitment.Space (Set (Set W)))
Equations

Built from

Used by SpeechAct.Force.projectsCommitment_of_authority_eq_some, SpeechAct.Force.authority_eq_some_iff

Coppock and Wechsler's epistemic authority is the participant whose commitment the act projects: when the participants' commitments to φ and to ¬φ are four distinct propositions, the authority of an assertion or a question is exactly the participant whose commitment its update of the space of all states projects.

theorem SpeechAct.Force.authority_eq_some_iffL131–150
{W : Type u_1} {O : Role → SetRel W W} {φ : Set W} (hO : Function.Injective fun (x : Role × Bool) => (O x.1).core (bif x.2 then φ else φᶜ)) {f : Force} {D : Commitment.Space (Set (Set W))} (hD : D ∈ commitmentUpdate (Commitment.Space.Ici ∅) O φ f) (r : Role) :
f.authority = some r ↔ (Commitment.Space.Ici ∅).ProjectsCommitment O r φ D

Built from , ,

Preparatory conditions

A preparatory condition of a request is one that must hold for the addressee to comply: that the addressee is able and willing to do what is requested, and, when what is requested is information, the ways of being able to give it and the speaker's not having asked for it already. Searle's preparatory condition of a request is the addressee's ability, and on his first generalization about indirect speech acts asking whether it holds is a way of making the request.

inductive SpeechAct.PreparatoryConditionL184–205

Derives DecidableEq, Repr, Inhabited, Fintype.

Used by SpeechAct.PreparatoryCondition.le, SpeechAct.PreparatoryCondition.instLE, SpeechAct.PreparatoryCondition.instDecidableLE, SpeechAct.PreparatoryCondition.instPartialOrder, SpeechAct.PreparatoryCondition.instNoTopOrder, SpeechAct.PreparatoryCondition.instNoBotOrder

Used in FrancikClark1985, RuytenbeekEtAl2017

Satisfying the first condition is a way of satisfying the second: knowing, remembering, having noticed the source and being allowed to tell are ways of being able to give the information, and remembering or having noticed the source are ways of knowing it. Willingness and the speaker's memory stand apart, so the order has neither a top nor a bottom. Being allowed falls under being able as in Francik and Clark's gloss of an addressee unable to tell, although their scenarios on it were written as borderline between ability and willingness.

def SpeechAct.PreparatoryCondition.leL209–218
Equations

Built from

Used by SpeechAct.PreparatoryCondition.instDecidableRelLe, SpeechAct.PreparatoryCondition.instLE

L233
L235

The conventional force of a sentence type

The force a sentence type conventionally performs: a question for each of the three interrogatives, and for each other type the act it is named for.

def Clause.SentenceType.forceL247–254
Equations

Built from

Used by Clause.SentenceType.force_surjective, Clause.SentenceType.force_eq_question_iff

Used in RuytenbeekEtAl2017

L256