Admissible actions in finite decision problems #
A decision problem without data has parameters Θ, actions 𝓨 and a loss ℓ : Θ → 𝓨 → ℝ≥0∞. A
randomized action ν is the estimator Kernel.const Unit ν for the data kernel Kernel.discard Θ,
which observes nothing, and its risk at θ is ∫⁻ y, ℓ θ y ∂ν. With finitely many parameters and
actions and finite losses, being a Bayes action and escaping domination coincide. An action is a
Bayes estimator for some prior iff no randomized action has smaller risk at every parameter, and it
is admissible iff it is a Bayes estimator for a prior that charges every parameter, the complete
class theorem. Both come from theorems of the alternative for the matrix of risk differences.
Against nature in game theory these are Pearce's lemmas, an act that is never a best response is
strictly dominated and an act that no mixture weakly dominates is a best response to a belief of
full support, and the payoff versions state them for utilities. [UPSTREAM] candidate for
Mathlib/Probability/Decision/.
Main definitions #
ProbabilityTheory.IsStrictlyDominated: another randomized action has smaller risk at every parameter.ProbabilityTheory.IsAdmissible: no randomized action has risk at most as large everywhere and smaller somewhere.
Main statements #
ProbabilityTheory.exists_isBayesEstimator_iff_not_isStrictlyDominated: an action is Bayes for some prior iff it is not strictly dominated.ProbabilityTheory.isAdmissible_iff_exists_isBayesEstimator: an action is admissible iff it is Bayes for a prior of full support.ProbabilityTheory.exists_maximizesPayoff_iff_not_isStrictlyPayoffDominated,ProbabilityTheory.not_isWeaklyPayoffDominated_iff_exists_maximizesPayoff: the payoff versions, Pearce's lemmas.
References #
Helpers on finite types #
Dominance and admissibility #
A randomized action is strictly dominated when another has smaller risk at every parameter.
Equations
- ProbabilityTheory.IsStrictlyDominated ℓ ν = ∃ (ν' : MeasureTheory.Measure 𝓨), MeasureTheory.IsProbabilityMeasure ν' ∧ ∀ (θ : Θ), ∫⁻ (y : 𝓨), ℓ θ y ∂ν' < ∫⁻ (y : 𝓨), ℓ θ y ∂ν
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A randomized action is admissible when every action whose risk is nowhere larger has the same risk everywhere.
Equations
- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
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The payoff of the randomized action ν at the parameter θ.
Equations
- ProbabilityTheory.mixedPayoff U ν θ = ∫ (y : 𝓨), U y θ ∂ν
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ν is strictly dominated in payoff when another randomized action pays more at every
parameter.
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- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
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ν is weakly dominated in payoff when another randomized action pays at least as much at
every parameter and more at some.
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- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
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Risks and payoffs on reals #
Bayes actions #
The expected payoff of the randomized action ν under the belief P.
Equations
- ProbabilityTheory.expectedPayoff U P ν = ∫ (θ : Θ), ProbabilityTheory.mixedPayoff U ν θ ∂P
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ν maximizes the expected payoff under P among the randomized actions.
Equations
- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
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Without data, a randomized action is a Bayes estimator for π iff no randomized action has
smaller average risk.
A randomized action that pays more at every parameter has a larger expected payoff under every belief.
Strict dominance and Bayes actions #
In a finite decision problem, a randomized action is a Bayes estimator for some prior iff no randomized action has smaller risk at every parameter. This is Pearce's lemma.
Admissibility and the complete class theorem #
Complete class theorem. In a finite decision problem, a randomized action is admissible iff it is a Bayes estimator for a prior that charges every parameter.
Payoffs #
A payoff table U : 𝓨 → Θ → ℝ is a loss with the sign reversed: the regret C − U at a bound C
on the payoffs ranks randomized actions as their payoffs do, the other way round.
A randomized action maximizes the expected payoff under some belief iff no randomized action pays more at every parameter. This is Pearce's lemma for payoffs.
A randomized action that no randomized action weakly dominates in payoff maximizes the expected payoff under a belief of full support, and conversely. This is Pearce's lemma for weak dominance.