Documentation

Linglib.Core.Discourse.Intentionality

Intentional States: S in S(r) #

@cite{searle-1983}

The Intentional-state side of the Searlean parallel: psychological mode, sincerity conditions linking speech acts to states, causal self-referentiality, and the IntentionalState type.

The Central Parallel (@cite{searle-1983}) #

Intentional states (beliefs, desires, intentions) and speech acts share identical logical structure:

Performing F(p) sincerely expresses the corresponding S(r). The conditions of satisfaction of the speech act are identical to those of the expressed state. The illocutionary side (F, direction of fit, Searle taxonomy) lives in Core/Discourse/IllocutionaryForce.lean.

Organization #

Named psychological modes: the "S" in @cite{searle-1983}'s S(r) notation.

Parallel to illocutionary force "F" in F(p) for speech acts. Each mode has a direction of fit and may or may not be causally self-referential.

@cite{searle-1983}, Ch. 1: belief, desire, and intention are the prototypical modes. Perception (Ch. 2) is a causally self-referential mode that plays a key role in the theory's account of how the mind relates to the world.

  • belief : PsychMode

    Bel(p): satisfied iff p obtains. Not self-referential — HOW p came to obtain is irrelevant (Ch. 1, p. 8).

  • desire : PsychMode

    Des(p): satisfied iff p comes about. Not self-referential — HOW p is brought about is irrelevant (Ch. 1, p. 8).

  • intention : PsychMode

    Int(p): satisfied iff p is brought about BY WAY OF carrying out this intention. Self-referential: state→world (Ch. 3, pp. 85–86).

  • perception : PsychMode

    Per(p): satisfied iff the object/state of affairs CAUSES this experience. Self-referential: world→state (Ch. 2; Ch. 3, p. 91).

  • expressive : PsychMode

    Expressive states (pleasure, sorrow, etc.): presuppose the truth of their content but impose no fit responsibility (Ch. 1, pp. 7–8).

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      The sincerity condition: performing a speech act with mood F necessarily expresses the corresponding Intentional state S, and the conditions of satisfaction of the speech act are identical to those of the expressed state.

      @cite{searle-1983}, Ch. 1 §3: you can't say "It's snowing but I don't believe it's snowing" — the assertion eo ipso expresses the belief. Ch. 6, p. 174: "the conditions of satisfaction of the sincerity condition" are "identical with the conditions of satisfaction" of the speech act.

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        Causal self-referentiality: whether the Intentional state must itself figure in the causal chain producing its conditions of satisfaction.

        Beliefs: no self-referentiality — satisfied iff the state of affairs obtains. Intentions: self-referential — "my arm goes up as a result of this intention." Perceptions: self-referential in reverse — the object must cause the experience.

        • none : CausalSelfRef

          Not self-referential: satisfaction depends only on the state of affairs obtaining. Example: beliefs.

        • stateToWorld : CausalSelfRef

          State-to-world: the state must cause its conditions of satisfaction. Example: intentions — "by way of carrying out this intention."

        • worldToState : CausalSelfRef

          World-to-state: the conditions of satisfaction must cause the state. Example: perceptions — the object causes the visual experience.

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            Causal self-referentiality for each psychological mode.

            @cite{searle-1983}, Ch. 3 (table on p. 91): self-referentiality is NOT determined by direction of fit alone. Both beliefs and perceptions have mind-to-world fit, but only perceptions are self-referential. Both desires and intentions have world-to-mind fit, but only intentions are.

            • Perception: the object must cause the experience (world→state)
            • Intention: the intention must cause its conditions of satisfaction (state→world)
            • Belief/Desire: satisfaction depends only on whether the state of affairs obtains
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              structure Core.Discourse.IntentionalState (W : Type u_1) :
              Type u_1

              An Intentional state: psychological mode + representative content.

              @cite{searle-1983}, Ch. 1: "every Intentional state consists of a representative content in a psychological mode." Symbolized S(r).

              Conditions of satisfaction are determined by the content under the direction of fit given by the mode — they are internal to the state.

              • mode : PsychMode

                The psychological mode (belief, desire, intention, ...)

              • content : WProp

                The representative content

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                Conditions of satisfaction: what must obtain for the state to be satisfied. These are identical to the content — not a separate component.

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                  @cite{searle-1983}'s central parallel: the direction of fit of the sincerity condition matches the direction of fit of the speech act class.

                  Asserting p expresses a mind-to-world state (belief); ordering p expresses a world-to-mind state (desire); promising p expresses a world-to-mind state (intention). This is constitutive (@cite{searle-1983}, Ch. 1 §3).

                  @cite{searle-1983}'s key insight (Ch. 3, p. 91): causal self-referentiality is NOT determined by direction of fit alone. Beliefs and perceptions share mind-to-world fit, but only perceptions are self-referential.

                  Conditions of satisfaction are internal to the content — not a separate component. This rfl proof IS the formalization of @cite{searle-1983}'s claim (Ch. 1, p. 12): "the Intentional content determines the conditions of satisfaction."