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Linglib.Core.Discourse.IllocutionaryForce

Illocutionary Force: F in F(p) #

@cite{searle-1969} @cite{searle-1979} @cite{searle-1983} @cite{lakoff-1970} @cite{francik-clark-1985}

The pragmatic-act side of the Searlean parallel: direction of fit, the five-class taxonomy, and preparatory conditions. The Intentional-state counterpart S(r) — psychological mode, sincerity conditions, causal self-referentiality, and IntentionalState — lives in Core/Discourse/Intentionality.lean. Discourse commitments live in Core/Discourse/Commitment.lean.

The mood-category material that used to live here was split out for mathlib-style cleanliness:

This file extends IllocutionaryMood with searleClass/directionOfFit, which depend on the act taxonomy below.

Organization #

Direction of fit: how responsibility for matching is distributed between the Intentional state (or speech act) and the world.

@cite{searle-1983}'s key classification principle. The metaphor: if a shopper's list doesn't match what's in the cart, the list is at fault (mind-to-world). If a builder's blueprint doesn't match the building, the building is at fault (world-to-mind).

  • mindToWorld : DirectionOfFit

    Mind-to-world: the state must match independently existing reality. Beliefs, perceptions, assertions. If wrong, the state is at fault.

  • worldToMind : DirectionOfFit

    World-to-mind: the world must be changed to match the state. Desires, intentions, orders, promises. If unfulfilled, the world is at fault.

  • null : DirectionOfFit

    Null direction: the state presupposes the truth of its content but imposes no fit responsibility. Expressives (apologies, congratulations).

  • double : DirectionOfFit

    Double direction: both mind-to-world and world-to-mind simultaneously. Declarations bring about a state of affairs by representing it as obtaining.

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      @cite{searle-1979}'s five basic categories of illocutionary acts, derived from the mind's representational capacities. These are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. Restated in @cite{searle-1983} Ch. 6: "the taxonomy is fundamentally a reflection of the various ways in which representations can have directions of fit."

      • assertive : SearleClass

        We tell people how things are (assertions, statements, descriptions).

      • directive : SearleClass

        We try to get people to do things (orders, commands, requests).

      • commissive : SearleClass

        We commit ourselves to doing things (promises, vows, pledges).

      • declaration : SearleClass

        We bring about changes by representing them as obtaining (verdicts, appointments).

      • expressive : SearleClass

        We express feelings about presupposed states of affairs (apologies, congratulations).

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          Direction of fit for an illocutionary mood, derived via Searle class.

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            Preparatory conditions for directive speech acts.

            @cite{searle-1969}: for a request to be felicitous, the hearer must satisfy certain preconditions — ability to comply and willingness to comply. @cite{francik-clark-1985} show that speakers design indirect requests to target the specific preparatory condition most at risk, refining "ability" into a subsumption hierarchy:

            ability
            ├── knowledge
            │   ├── memory       ("Do you remember?")
            │   └── perception   ("Did you see/hear/notice?")
            └── permission       ("Are you allowed?")
            willingness           ("Would you mind?")
            

            More specific conditions correspond to more specific (less direct) request forms.

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                Subsumption: c₁.subsumes c₂ iff satisfying c₂ entails satisfying c₁.

                Memory and perception are subtypes of knowledge; knowledge and permission are subtypes of ability. Willingness is independent.

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                  The specificity chain: memory/perception → knowledge → ability.

                  Willingness is independent of ability: neither subsumes the other.

                  Directives are the speech act class that has preparatory conditions on the hearer's ability and willingness.