Documentation

Studies.Kamp1975

Kamp (1975): Two theories about adjectives #

Kamp's first theory treats an adjective as a function from properties to properties, constrained by meaning postulates that make it predicative, privative or affirmative, with alleged satisfying none; extensionality is a separate dimension. His second theory, for vague adjectives, gives them partial extensions and, after van Fraassen, derives the comparative from quantification over the admissible completions: one object is at least as A as another when every completion that puts the second in the extension puts the first in. A rival definition, which compares the measures of the completion sets, makes any two objects comparable, which Kamp rejects for adjectives with several criteria such as clever; for one-dimensional adjectives the two agree. Before this, Kamp argues that no many-valued logic handles borderline cases.

Main statements #

Implementation notes #

References #

Bridge to single-world predicates #

The classification (Modifier.IsIntersective, .IsSubsective, …) is one order-theoretic definition instantiated at two carriers: the intensional Property W E = W → E → Prop and the single-world E → Prop. The bridge theorems below show that fixing a world sends the first instance to the second.

theorem Kamp1975.intersective_at_world {W : Type u_1} {E : Type u_2} {adj : Modifier (Semantics.Property W E)} (h : adj.IsIntersective) (w : W) :
Modifier.IsIntersective fun (N : E → Prop) => adj (fun (x : W) => N) w

At a fixed world an intersective modifier of intensional properties is an intersective modifier of predicates, N ↦ adj (fun _ ↦ N) w.

theorem Kamp1975.subsective_at_world {W : Type u_1} {E : Type u_2} {adj : Modifier (Semantics.Property W E)} (h : adj.IsSubsective) (w : W) :
Modifier.IsSubsective fun (N : E → Prop) => adj (fun (x : W) => N) w

At a fixed world a subsective modifier of intensional properties is a subsective modifier of predicates.

The many-valued dilemma #

theorem Kamp1975.kleene_dilemma :
¬∃ (meet : SignType → SignType → SignType), meet 0 0 = 0 ∧ meet 0 (-0) = -1

No truth-functional conjunction is both idempotent at the borderline value and false on borderline contradictions, since with -0 = 0 both demands constrain the same pair of inputs. Kamp states the dilemma (pp. 130–131) for every linearly ordered n-valued logic, of which SignType is the smallest.

The completion comparative #

Definition (12) (paper § 4): u₁ is at least as A as u₂ iff every admissible completion that puts u₂ in the extension also puts u₁ in it. [Kle80] § 5.3 states the strict comparative existentially over comparison classes; the bridge is Klein1980.kleinPreorder_eq_kampPreorder.

@[reducible]
def Kamp1975.kampPreorder {E : Type u_1} {C : Type u_2} (ext : C → E → Prop) (S : Set C) :
Preorder E

Kamp's completion comparative, definition (12) of § 4, is the preorder in which u₁ ≤ u₂ when every completion in S that puts u₂ in the extension also puts u₁ in, so that ≤ reads at least as A as. Kamp credits (12) to [Lew70], who attributes it to Kaplan.

Equations
  • Kamp1975.kampPreorder ext S = { le := fun (u₁ u₂ : E) => ∀ c ∈ S, ext c u₂ → ext c u₁, le_refl := ⋯, le_trans := ⋯, lt_iff_le_not_ge := ⋯ }
Instances For
    theorem Kamp1975.kampPreorder_antitone {E : Type u_1} {C : Type u_2} (ext : C → E → Prop) (u₁ u₂ : E) :
    Antitone fun (S : Set C) => u₁ ≤ u₂

    The completion comparative is antitone in the set of completions, since more completions make ≤ harder to satisfy.

    Completion and measured comparatives #

    Kamp's second candidate, definition (13) (paper § 4), compares the measures of the completion sets rather than the sets themselves. His § 5 argues against (13) for multi-criteria adjectives: it makes any two entities comparable, while (12) leaves Smith and Jones incomparable in cleverness — for Kamp the right verdict. For one-dimensional adjectives (heavy, tall, hot) the two provably coincide.

    def Kamp1975.kampMeasureLe {E : Type u_1} {C : Type u_2} (ext : C → E → Prop) [(c : C) → (e : E) → Decidable (ext c e)] (S : Finset C) (p : C → ℚ) (u₁ u₂ : E) :

    The measured comparative, definition (13) of § 4, holds of u₁ and u₂ when the completions putting u₂ in the extension weigh at most as much as those putting u₁ in.

    Equations
    • Kamp1975.kampMeasureLe ext S p u₁ u₂ = (∑ c ∈ S with ext c u₂, p c ≤ ∑ c ∈ S with ext c u₁, p c)
    Instances For
      theorem Kamp1975.kampMeasureLe_total {E : Type u_1} {C : Type u_2} (ext : C → E → Prop) [(c : C) → (e : E) → Decidable (ext c e)] (S : Finset C) (p : C → ℚ) (u₁ u₂ : E) :
      kampMeasureLe ext S p u₁ u₂ ∨ kampMeasureLe ext S p u₂ u₁

      The measured comparative makes any two objects comparable, Kamp's objection to it in § 5, which the completion comparative escapes (clever_incomparable).

      theorem Kamp1975.kampMeasureLe_of_kampPreorder_le {E : Type u_1} {C : Type u_2} (ext : C → E → Prop) [(c : C) → (e : E) → Decidable (ext c e)] (S : Finset C) (p : C → ℚ) (hp : ∀ c ∈ S, 0 ≤ p c) {u₁ u₂ : E} (h : u₁ ≤ u₂) :
      kampMeasureLe ext S p u₁ u₂

      For nonnegative weights the completion comparative implies the measured one.

      Smith and Jones #

      Two criteria for clever — problem-solving and quick-wittedness — as two completions; Smith passes one, Jones the other. Under (12) the two are incomparable, which Kamp argues is correct; (13) must issue a verdict (kampMeasureLe_total). Kamp's own scenario is asymmetric (Smith much better at problems, only slightly worse in wit, so (13) wrongly makes Smith cleverer); this symmetric toy witnesses the incomparability and the forced verdict, not that specific outcome.

      inductive Kamp1975.Crit :

      The two criteria of cleverness, problem solving and quick wit.

      Instances For
        @[instance_reducible]
        instance Kamp1975.instDecidableEqCrit :
        DecidableEq Crit
        Equations
        inductive Kamp1975.P2 :

        Smith and Jones.

        • smith : P2
        • jones : P2
        Instances For
          @[instance_reducible]
          instance Kamp1975.instDecidableEqP2 :
          DecidableEq P2
          Equations

          Smith is clever by the first criterion and Jones by the second.

          Equations
          Instances For

            By the completion comparative Smith and Jones are incomparable in cleverness, which Kamp takes to capture the comparative correctly for adjectives with several criteria.

            One-dimensionality #

            def Kamp1975.OneDimensional {E : Type u_1} {C : Type u_2} (ext : C → E → Prop) (S : Finset C) :

            An adjective is one-dimensional, as heavy, tall and hot are in § 5, when the completion sets of any two entities are comparable by inclusion. The condition is Kamp's (18), stated in § 6.

            Equations
            • Kamp1975.OneDimensional ext S = ∀ (u₁ u₂ : E), (∀ c ∈ S, ext c u₁ → ext c u₂) ∨ ∀ c ∈ S, ext c u₂ → ext c u₁
            Instances For
              theorem Kamp1975.kampPreorder_le_iff_kampMeasureLe {E : Type u_1} {C : Type u_2} (ext : C → E → Prop) [(c : C) → (e : E) → Decidable (ext c e)] (S : Finset C) (p : C → ℚ) (hp : ∀ c ∈ S, 0 < p c) (h18 : OneDimensional ext S) (u₁ u₂ : E) :
              u₁ ≤ u₂ ↔ kampMeasureLe ext S p u₁ u₂

              For a one-dimensional adjective and strictly positive weights the two comparatives agree, Kamp's observation in § 5 that "for this special case the two definitions are equivalent", strict positivity rendering his proviso that the measure be correctly specified.

              A member of each class #

              Each class in the hierarchy is non-empty: explicit denotations that provably satisfy each definition from Classification.lean, modeling the classic examples from the literature — "gray" (intersective), "fake" (privative), "skillful" (subsective but not extensional), "alleged" (non-subsective/modal).

              [Par10] argues that the privative class should be eliminated in favor of subsective + noun coercion. The witness fakeAdj below models the traditional analysis; see Partee2010.lean for the coercion reanalysis.

              inductive Kamp1975.W2 :

              Two worlds suffice to distinguish extensional from non-extensional.

              Instances For
                inductive Kamp1975.E3 :

                Three entities suffice for all witness constructions.

                Instances For

                  gray is predicative, Kamp's definition (4), since it conjoins a fixed property with the noun, so gray cat entails both gray and cat.

                  Equations
                  Instances For

                    fake is privative, Kamp's definition (5), so fake gun entails not a gun. Kamp doubts that any English adjective is privative "in all of its possible uses".

                    Equations
                    Instances For

                      skillful is affirmative, Kamp's definition (6), but not extensional. A skillful surgeon is a surgeon, yet skill depends on the noun's intension and not just its current extension, as in the case of cobblers and darts players that Kamp credits to Lewis.

                      Equations
                      Instances For

                        alleged satisfies no meaning postulate, Kamp's opening example (1) being that every alleged thief is a thief is no logical truth.

                        Equations
                        Instances For

                          alleged ignores the noun, so it is extensional; with skillful_not_extensional this shows that extensionality is independent of subsectivity.

                          alleged N does not entail N.

                          alleged N does not entail not N.