Kamp (1975): Two theories about adjectives #
Kamp's first theory treats an adjective as a function from properties to properties, constrained by meaning postulates that make it predicative, privative or affirmative, with alleged satisfying none; extensionality is a separate dimension. His second theory, for vague adjectives, gives them partial extensions and, after van Fraassen, derives the comparative from quantification over the admissible completions: one object is at least as A as another when every completion that puts the second in the extension puts the first in. A rival definition, which compares the measures of the completion sets, makes any two objects comparable, which Kamp rejects for adjectives with several criteria such as clever; for one-dimensional adjectives the two agree. Before this, Kamp argues that no many-valued logic handles borderline cases.
Main statements #
intersective_at_world,subsective_at_world: fixing a world sends the intensional classes to the classes of single-world predicates.kleene_dilemma: no truth-functional conjunction is both idempotent at the borderline value and false on borderline contradictions.kampMeasureLe_total,clever_incomparable: the measured comparative is total, while the completion comparative leaves Smith and Jones incomparable in cleverness.kampPreorder_le_iff_kampMeasureLe: for one-dimensional adjectives the two comparatives agree.gray_intersective,fake_privative,skillful_subsective,skillful_not_extensional,alleged_not_subsective: each class has a member, and extensionality is independent of subsectivity.
Implementation notes #
- The measure of (13) is specialized to atomic
ℚweights over a finite set of completions; only the ordering matters, so the weights need not sum to one. - The Smith and Jones witness is symmetric, one criterion each; the paper's scenario is asymmetric, and the witness shows the incomparability and the forced verdict, not the paper's specific outcome.
References #
Bridge to single-world predicates #
The classification (Modifier.IsIntersective, .IsSubsective, …) is
one order-theoretic definition instantiated at two carriers: the
intensional Property W E = W → E → Prop and the single-world
E → Prop. The bridge theorems below show that fixing a world sends
the first instance to the second.
At a fixed world an intersective modifier of intensional properties is an intersective
modifier of predicates, N ↦ adj (fun _ ↦ N) w.
At a fixed world a subsective modifier of intensional properties is a subsective modifier of predicates.
The many-valued dilemma #
No truth-functional conjunction is both idempotent at the borderline value and false on
borderline contradictions, since with -0 = 0 both demands constrain the same pair of inputs.
Kamp states the dilemma (pp. 130–131) for every linearly ordered n-valued logic, of which
SignType is the smallest.
The completion comparative #
Definition (12) (paper § 4): u₁ is at least as A as u₂ iff every
admissible completion that puts u₂ in the extension also puts u₁ in it.
[Kle80] § 5.3 states the strict comparative existentially over
comparison classes; the bridge is
Klein1980.kleinPreorder_eq_kampPreorder.
Kamp's completion comparative, definition (12) of § 4, is the preorder in which u₁ ≤ u₂
when every completion in S that puts u₂ in the extension also puts u₁ in, so that ≤
reads at least as A as. Kamp credits (12) to [Lew70], who attributes it to Kaplan.
Equations
- Kamp1975.kampPreorder ext S = { le := fun (u₁ u₂ : E) => ∀ c ∈ S, ext c u₂ → ext c u₁, le_refl := ⋯, le_trans := ⋯, lt_iff_le_not_ge := ⋯ }
Instances For
The completion comparative is antitone in the set of completions, since more completions
make ≤ harder to satisfy.
Completion and measured comparatives #
Kamp's second candidate, definition (13) (paper § 4), compares the measures of the completion sets rather than the sets themselves. His § 5 argues against (13) for multi-criteria adjectives: it makes any two entities comparable, while (12) leaves Smith and Jones incomparable in cleverness — for Kamp the right verdict. For one-dimensional adjectives (heavy, tall, hot) the two provably coincide.
The measured comparative, definition (13) of § 4, holds of u₁ and u₂ when the
completions putting u₂ in the extension weigh at most as much as those putting u₁ in.
Equations
- Kamp1975.kampMeasureLe ext S p u₁ u₂ = (∑ c ∈ S with ext c u₂, p c ≤ ∑ c ∈ S with ext c u₁, p c)
Instances For
The measured comparative makes any two objects comparable, Kamp's objection to it in § 5,
which the completion comparative escapes (clever_incomparable).
For nonnegative weights the completion comparative implies the measured one.
Smith and Jones #
Two criteria for clever — problem-solving and quick-wittedness — as
two completions; Smith passes one, Jones the other. Under (12) the two
are incomparable, which Kamp argues is correct; (13) must issue a
verdict (kampMeasureLe_total). Kamp's own scenario is asymmetric
(Smith much better at problems, only slightly worse in wit, so (13)
wrongly makes Smith cleverer); this symmetric toy witnesses the
incomparability and the forced verdict, not that specific outcome.
The two criteria of cleverness, problem solving and quick wit.
Instances For
Equations
- Kamp1975.instDecidableEqCrit x✝ y✝ = if h : x✝.ctorIdx = y✝.ctorIdx then isTrue ⋯ else isFalse ⋯
Equations
- Kamp1975.instDecidableEqP2 x✝ y✝ = if h : x✝.ctorIdx = y✝.ctorIdx then isTrue ⋯ else isFalse ⋯
Smith is clever by the first criterion and Jones by the second.
Equations
Instances For
One-dimensionality #
An adjective is one-dimensional, as heavy, tall and hot are in § 5, when the completion sets of any two entities are comparable by inclusion. The condition is Kamp's (18), stated in § 6.
Equations
- Kamp1975.OneDimensional ext S = ∀ (u₁ u₂ : E), (∀ c ∈ S, ext c u₁ → ext c u₂) ∨ ∀ c ∈ S, ext c u₂ → ext c u₁
Instances For
For a one-dimensional adjective and strictly positive weights the two comparatives agree, Kamp's observation in § 5 that "for this special case the two definitions are equivalent", strict positivity rendering his proviso that the measure be correctly specified.
A member of each class #
Each class in the hierarchy is non-empty: explicit denotations that
provably satisfy each definition from Classification.lean, modeling
the classic examples from the literature — "gray" (intersective), "fake"
(privative), "skillful" (subsective but not extensional), "alleged"
(non-subsective/modal).
[Par10] argues that the privative class should be eliminated
in favor of subsective + noun coercion. The witness fakeAdj below
models the traditional analysis; see Partee2010.lean for the
coercion reanalysis.
Two worlds suffice to distinguish extensional from non-extensional.
Instances For
gray is predicative, Kamp's definition (4), since it conjoins a fixed property with the noun, so gray cat entails both gray and cat.
Equations
- Kamp1975.grayAdj N w Kamp1975.E3.a = (True ∧ N w Kamp1975.E3.a)
- Kamp1975.grayAdj N w x = (False ∧ N w x)
Instances For
fake is privative, Kamp's definition (5), so fake gun entails not a gun. Kamp doubts that any English adjective is privative "in all of its possible uses".
Equations
- Kamp1975.fakeAdj N w Kamp1975.E3.b = (True ∧ ¬N w Kamp1975.E3.b)
- Kamp1975.fakeAdj N w x = (False ∧ ¬N w x)
Instances For
skillful is affirmative, Kamp's definition (6), but not extensional. A skillful surgeon is a surgeon, yet skill depends on the noun's intension and not just its current extension, as in the case of cobblers and darts players that Kamp credits to Lewis.
Equations
- Kamp1975.skillfulAdj N w Kamp1975.E3.a = (N w Kamp1975.E3.a ∧ N Kamp1975.W2.w₁ Kamp1975.E3.a)
- Kamp1975.skillfulAdj N w x = (N w x ∧ False)
Instances For
alleged satisfies no meaning postulate, Kamp's opening example (1) being that every alleged thief is a thief is no logical truth.
Equations
- Kamp1975.allegedAdj _N x✝ Kamp1975.E3.a = True
- Kamp1975.allegedAdj _N x✝ x = False
Instances For
alleged ignores the noun, so it is extensional; with skillful_not_extensional this
shows that extensionality is independent of subsectivity.
alleged N does not entail not N.