Documentation

Linglib.Theories.Discourse.EvidentialIllocution

Evidential Illocutionary Operators #

@cite{faller-2002} @cite{faller-2019a} @cite{murray-2014} @cite{murray-2017} @cite{krifka-2014} @cite{anderbois-brasoveanu-henderson-2015} @cite{martinez-vera-2024} @cite{martinez-vera-2026}

Two illocutionary operators consistently distinguish direct from indirect evidentials in the Faller / Murray tradition:

Both operators are illocutionary in the sense of @cite{martinez-vera-2026} Composition Rule III: they consume the full ⟨at-issue, not-at-issue⟩ pair from Theories/Semantics/Composition/Layered and produce a discourse update.

What this module exposes #

Existing substrate:

The result of applying an illocutionary operator to a layered argument.

Records: speaker, addressee, the scope proposition (regardless of commitment), the not-at-issue evidential proposition, and the binary flag distinguishing assert-flavour (commits to scope) from present-flavour (does not). All four discourse-update tracker families (Krifka commitment-space, Farkas-Bruce table, Murray-style cards, Anderbois-Brasoveanu-Henderson AI-stack) can ingest this record by reading the relevant fields.

Named EvidentialAct to disambiguate from the existing Dialogue.Krifka.SpeechAct (CommitmentSpace.lean) and Semantics.Modality.Assert.SpeechActEvent — three different formalisations of overlapping concepts that should eventually be bridged.

  • Speaker of the act.

  • Addressee.

  • scope : Set W

    The proposition under consideration (regardless of speaker commitment).

  • evidentialContent : Set W

    The not-at-issue (evidential) proposition the speaker commits to.

  • commitsToScope : Bool

    Whether the speaker publicly commits to scope (assert-flavour) or merely brings it to attention (present-flavour).

Instances For

    @cite{faller-2002}/@cite{faller-2019a}: assert(⟨A, N⟩) commits the speaker both to A (the scope proposition) and to N (the evidential proposition). Used with direct evidentials.

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      @cite{murray-2014}/@cite{faller-2019a}: present(⟨A, N⟩) brings A to the addressee's attention but does NOT commit the speaker to A; it commits only to N (the evidential proposition). Used with reportative/inferential evidentials.

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        The defining contrast between assert and present: they agree on speaker, addressee, scope, and evidential content, but disagree on whether the speaker commits to scope.

        § Raised propositions: the substrate-level highlighting projection #

        raisedPropositions is the propositions an act puts forward for the addressee to consider. The commitsToScope flag determines what's raised:

        This is the substrate-level claim about Faller/Murray's analysis. Verum studies (e.g. Phenomena/Verum/Studies/MartinezVera2026.lean) build their discourse-update maps by adding raisedPropositions to whatever salience tracker they use, rather than re-stipulating the match-on-commitsToScope.

        The propositions an act puts forward to the addressee.

        assert raises just the scope (the speaker has committed; ¬scope is not on the table). present raises both scope and ¬scope (the speaker is non-committal, so both polar options are open).

        This is the substrate-level projection that downstream highlighting consumers cite. The if is local here so future studies don't re-derive it.

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          @[simp]

          present raises both the scope and its complement (the polar issue).

          present raises the negation of its scope as a salient alternative. This is the substrate fact verum studies cite to license a verum-marker follow-up after a reportative evidential.

          assert does NOT raise the negation of its scope, provided the scope is satisfiable (some world satisfies it). This rules out the degenerate empty-W case where every set equals its complement. The substrate fact verum studies cite to predict that a verum-marker follow-up is INFELICITOUS after a direct evidential.

          § Typological mapping from evidence source to illocutionary flavour #

          Typological mapping from evidential source to illocutionary operator flavour. Direct evidence licenses assert; hearsay and inference license present (@cite{faller-2002}, @cite{faller-2019a}, @cite{murray-2014}, @cite{murray-2017}).

          This is a typological generalisation, not a definitional truth. Footnote 7 of @cite{martinez-vera-2026} documents an Andean exception (a speaker authoritative about Inca history uses the direct -rka in the absence of direct perceptual evidence); per-construction analyses can override the default.

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            @[implicit_reducible]
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              Apply the typologically-default operator for a given evidential source.

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                Direct evidentials commit the speaker to the scope proposition; indirect (hearsay/inference) evidentials do not. The headline typological generalisation.