F&B 2010 as a SAL projection #
@cite{farkas-bruce-2010} @cite{van-der-leer-2026} @cite{bary-2025}
@cite{farkas-bruce-2010}'s discourse model is the 4-tuple
⟨cg, DC_A, DC_B, S⟩ where:
cg— common ground (set of jointly committed propositions)DC_x—x's individual discourse commitments (not yet joint)S— the Table (stack of issues under negotiation)
In SAL, this projects from a CommitmentState W A plus a Table
overlay:
cg(c)— propositionsπsuch that for every agenta,Believes c a π w(mutual belief at every accessible world).DC_x(c)— propositionsπthatxis committed-to towards every other agent:∀ y, Committed c x y π w. F&B don't index commitment by addressee, but in SAL the projection ranges over all addressees.
@cite{bary-2025}'s critique that F&B conflates cg (common belief) with
DC_x (commitments) becomes formally visible here: F&B treats cg ∪ DC_x as a single set, but in SAL they project from different
modal axes (B vs O). The mediated update Bary demanded is
assert_creates_commitment (T25 in Theorems.lean) followed by
committed_implies_belief_under_sincerity_competence (T26) — two
distinct operations, separately projected.
This file does NOT re-implement F&B's model (already in
Theories/Dialogue/FarkasBruce.lean). It establishes the
projection map from SAL to F&B-shaped data, with theorems showing
F&B's ASSERT operator is the cg/DC projection of SAL's
apply (assert a b π).
F&B's DC_x: the propositions agent x is publicly committed to,
projected from a SAL state c by ranging over all addressees y
and accessibility-restricting (a single witness world w).
A proposition π is in DC_x(c)(w) iff Committed c x y π w for
every other agent y. F&B don't track commitments per-addressee;
SAL refines this and the F&B-level commitment is the cross-y
intersection.
Equations
- Dialogue.SAL.Cases.FarkasBruce.discourseCommitment c x w π = ∀ (y : A), Dialogue.SAL.Committed c x y π w
Instances For
F&B's cg (common ground) projected as the set of propositions every
agent believes. Uses Believes from Modal.lean (which itself
delegates to EpistemicLogic.knows), so this projection consumes
the substrate's existing common-belief operator at each agent's
level.
Equations
- Dialogue.SAL.Cases.FarkasBruce.commonGround c w π = ∀ (a : A), Dialogue.SAL.Believes c a π w
Instances For
§ F&B-shaped derivation of SAL T25 / T26 #
After assert_{a,b}(π) in SAL, agent a's F&B-style discourse
commitment includes π (towards b). This is the F&B "ASSERT
adds to DC_speaker" rule, derived from SAL's T25 plus the
F&B projection.
F&B-shaped consequence: under sincerity + competence, after a
speaker a asserts π to addressee b, b believes π —
i.e. π enters the F&B common ground (with respect to b).
This is the formal version of @cite{bary-2025}'s mediated CG update: SAL's T25 plus T26 jointly produce the F&B effect, but only under sincerity+competence — exactly the defeasibility Bary demanded the substrate respect.
§ The conflation Bary 2025 critiques: visible at the type level #
F&B's discourse model conflates cg and DC_x in the sense that the
"total set of commitments for x" is DC_x ∪ cg. In SAL, this is
visibly the wrong move: DC_x projects from Committed (deontic
modality) and cg projects from Believes (doxastic modality),
which are different modal axes. The two are connected only
contingently, by sincerity-and-competence assumptions
(Theorem 26 in SAL); they are not the same thing.
The headline:
DC_x(c) ≠ cg(c) in general,
but DC_x(c) ⊆ cg(c) under sincerity+competence (T26).
This makes the Bary 2025 critique a SAL theorem rather than a prose argument — exactly what the project's "interconnection density" thesis demands.
The headline: under sincerity+competence, DC_x(c) is a subset of
cg(c) — but in general they differ. The first conjunct is the
formal version of Bary 2025's claim that F&B's conflation works
only in the ideal sincere+competent case.