Documentation

Linglib.Phenomena.Questions.Studies.George2011

@cite{george-2011}: Question Embedding and the Semantics of Answers #

@cite{karttunen-1977} @cite{groenendijk-stokhof-1984} @cite{heim-1994} @cite{dayal-1996}

Single-paper formalisation of @cite{george-2011}, Question Embedding and the Semantics of Answers (UCLA Ph.D. dissertation). George's central methodological claim: the weak/intermediate exhaustivity that is widely posited to explain Maggie-knows-was-admitted / Maggie-knows-wasn't-admitted contrasts is dispensable — what appears to be a weak-exhaustivity reading is actually a strong reading under (a) domain uncertainty (the wh-restrictor's extension is not fixed) plus (b) complementation failure (the positive and negative wh-questions don't have the symmetric relationship Groenendijk-Stokhof assumed).

Substrate identifications #

@cite{george-2011}substrate
Strong (eq 125): λw λα λw'(α(w) = α(w'))Exhaustivity.strongAnswer
Weak (eq 130): λw λα λw' ∀β(α(w)(β) → α(w')(β))Exhaustivity.weakAnswer
Strongly-exhaustive answer set (eq 129)Set.range (strongAnswer Q) (Fox 2018 LogicalPartition)
Weakly-exhaustive answer set (eq 131)not directly named; corresponds to the maximal-true-member view of weakAnswer
Mention-some answer (§2.6.1)Resolves σ Q

George's Strong operator (eq 125) takes a world w and an abstract α (an ⟨s, τ⟩ function) and returns the proposition that holds exactly at worlds where the abstract has the same extension as in w. On the substrate's Question W view (which fixes τ = ⟨e, t⟩-ish content), Strong(w)(Q) = strongAnswer Q w.

George's Weak operator (eq 130) takes an abstract α and returns the proposition that holds at worlds where α's extension in the evaluation world is a subset of α's extension here. On the substrate, this is weakAnswer Q w — the conjunction (intersection) of all alternatives true at w.

Section coverage #

What this file does NOT cover #

§2.6.2 Strong operator (eq 125) #

@cite{george-2011} (125): the Strong answer operator, λw λα λw'(α(w) = α(w')). Substrate identification: the set of worlds whose extension on every alternative matches w. Same as the substrate's strongAnswer Q w (see Heim1994 for the bridge to ans₂).

Equations
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    §2.6.3 Weak operator (eq 130) #

    @cite{george-2011} (130): the Weak answer operator, λw λα λw' ∀β(α(w)(β) → α(w')(β)). Substrate identification: the set of worlds where the alternative's extension at w is a subset of its extension here. Same as the substrate's weakAnswer Q w.

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    Instances For

      @cite{george-2011} §2.6.3: any state σ supporting the Strong answer at w also supports the Weak answer at w — i.e., strong exhaustivity entails weak exhaustivity. This is the formal trace of George's claim that "weak exhaustivity is dispensable": everywhere we'd want to use Weak, the stronger Strong already serves.

      §3.1.1 Negation Generalization (eq 5) #

      @cite{george-2011} §3.1.1: under bivalence + domain constancy, the strongly exhaustive answer SET to who walks and to who doesn't walk coincide. Substrate-level: this requires a specific relationship between the question denotation and its complement — specifically, that for every alt p of Q, pᶜ (interpreted as the corresponding negative-question alt) is also in alt Q' for the negative Q'.

      We state George's claim assumption-relatively: under the bivalence-plus-constancy assumption (every world's alt-true-set determines the alt-false-set), the strong answers are equivalent. The substrate doesn't bake in bivalence (worlds can have arbitrary membership in alts) so the equivalence requires explicit hypotheses.

      theorem Phenomena.Questions.Studies.George2011.strongAnswer_eq_when_alts_agree {W : Type u_1} (Q Q' : Core.Question W) (w : W) (hAgree : ∀ (v : W), (∀ pQ.alt, w p v p) pQ'.alt, w p v p) :

      The §3.1.1 formal observation as a substrate-level conditional: if two questions Q and Q' have alts that mutually decide each other (i.e., Q-alts and Q'-alts agree as a partition), then their strongAnswer cells coincide at every w.

      Captures the @cite{groenendijk-stokhof-1984} argument structure that George dissects in (5)-(10).

      §3.1.2 Domain Uncertainty #

      @cite{george-2011} §3.1.2: the apparent inequivalence of Maggie-knows-(12) and Maggie-knows-(13) is consistent with a uniform STRONG-exhaustive reading, provided the wh-restrictor's extension varies across worlds (de dicto interpretation).

      Substrate-level: when alternatives don't fully partition the worlds (e.g., domain restrictions like which applicants vary), strong-exhaustive-Q and strong-exhaustive-(negation Q) can have different extensions even though both encode "Maggie knows the strong-exhaustive answer". The two predications are consistent because they're about different sets of possibilities.

      This is a paper-level observation about the space of cases admitting weak ↔ strong inequivalence; we capture the substrate fact that weakAnswer ⊆ strongAnswer ↔ does NOT hold in general, and the @cite{george-2011} argument turns on which side of this asymmetry is empirically active.

      @cite{george-2011} §3.1.2 substrate fact: the converse inclusion weakAnswer Q w ⊆ strongAnswer Q w does not hold in general — strong exhaustivity is strictly stronger than weak. Concrete intuition: with W = {0, 1, 2} and Q's alts being {0,1} and {1,2} (overlapping non-comparable propositions), at w = 0 the weak answer is {0,1} (only {0,1} is true at 0) but the strong answer is {0} alone (since 1 decides {1,2} differently from 0). Constructing this concrete instance in Lean requires more substrate API for alt of Question.ofList-style constructions; the substrate fact itself is documented in Exhaustivity.strongAnswer_subset_weakAnswer's one-direction status.