@cite{george-2011}: Question Embedding and the Semantics of Answers #
@cite{karttunen-1977} @cite{groenendijk-stokhof-1984} @cite{heim-1994} @cite{dayal-1996}
Single-paper formalisation of @cite{george-2011}, Question Embedding and the Semantics of Answers (UCLA Ph.D. dissertation). George's central methodological claim: the weak/intermediate exhaustivity that is widely posited to explain Maggie-knows-was-admitted / Maggie-knows-wasn't-admitted contrasts is dispensable — what appears to be a weak-exhaustivity reading is actually a strong reading under (a) domain uncertainty (the wh-restrictor's extension is not fixed) plus (b) complementation failure (the positive and negative wh-questions don't have the symmetric relationship Groenendijk-Stokhof assumed).
Substrate identifications #
| @cite{george-2011} | substrate |
|---|---|
Strong (eq 125): λw λα λw'(α(w) = α(w')) | Exhaustivity.strongAnswer |
Weak (eq 130): λw λα λw' ∀β(α(w)(β) → α(w')(β)) | Exhaustivity.weakAnswer |
| Strongly-exhaustive answer set (eq 129) | Set.range (strongAnswer Q) (Fox 2018 LogicalPartition) |
| Weakly-exhaustive answer set (eq 131) | not directly named; corresponds to the maximal-true-member view of weakAnswer |
| Mention-some answer (§2.6.1) | Resolves σ Q |
George's Strong operator (eq 125) takes a world w and an abstract
α (an ⟨s, τ⟩ function) and returns the proposition that holds
exactly at worlds where the abstract has the same extension as in
w. On the substrate's Question W view (which fixes τ = ⟨e, t⟩-ish
content), Strong(w)(Q) = strongAnswer Q w.
George's Weak operator (eq 130) takes an abstract α and returns
the proposition that holds at worlds where α's extension in the
evaluation world is a subset of α's extension here. On the
substrate, this is weakAnswer Q w — the conjunction (intersection)
of all alternatives true at w.
Section coverage #
- §2.6.2 Strong operator (eq 125) — substrate identification.
- §2.6.3 Weak operator (eq 130) — substrate identification, plus
observation (paragraph after eq 132) that "the weakly exhaustive
answer is the maximal true member of the weakly-exhaustive answer
set" — captured by
weakAnswersemantics. - §3.1.1 Negation Generalization (eq 5–10) — formal argument that
who walksandwho doesn't walkproduce the same strongly exhaustive answer SET (under classical bivalence + domain constancy). Substrate-level: the formal equivalence holds under closed-world assumption; in the substrate,strongAnswer Q wandstrongAnswer (negation Q) ware equivalent only if every world's question denotation has the right complementarity. This file states the assumption-relative equivalence. - §3.1.2 Domain Uncertainty (eq 11–15) — George's first dispensability argument: when the wh-restrictor's extension varies across worlds (de dicto reading), the equivalence fails. The Maggie-knows-(13)-but-not-(15) judgment is consistent with a uniform STRONG reading, not evidence for weak.
- §3.1.3 Complementation Failure — second dispensability
argument; deferred (substrate captures the underlying machinery
via
info Qandcompl). - Chapter 4 (Non-)Reducibility — George's argument that responsive predicates' question-embedding semantics is not always reducible to their that-clause-embedding semantics. Requires a doxastic / attitudinal layer; deferred.
What this file does NOT cover #
- George's compositional system (Chapter 2): topical-property /
abstract machinery is richer than
Question W = LowerSet (Set W). - Chapters 5–6 alternative-question and mention-some scope account.
- Chapter 7 strong-ish exhaustivity speculation.
§2.6.2 Strong operator (eq 125) #
@cite{george-2011} (125): the Strong answer operator,
λw λα λw'(α(w) = α(w')). Substrate identification: the set of
worlds whose extension on every alternative matches w. Same as
the substrate's strongAnswer Q w (see Heim1994 for the
bridge to ans₂).
Equations
Instances For
§2.6.3 Weak operator (eq 130) #
@cite{george-2011} (130): the Weak answer operator,
λw λα λw' ∀β(α(w)(β) → α(w')(β)). Substrate identification:
the set of worlds where the alternative's extension at w is a
subset of its extension here. Same as the substrate's
weakAnswer Q w.
Equations
Instances For
@cite{george-2011} §2.6.3: any state σ supporting the Strong
answer at w also supports the Weak answer at w — i.e., strong
exhaustivity entails weak exhaustivity. This is the formal trace
of George's claim that "weak exhaustivity is dispensable":
everywhere we'd want to use Weak, the stronger Strong already
serves.
§3.1.1 Negation Generalization (eq 5) #
@cite{george-2011} §3.1.1: under bivalence + domain constancy,
the strongly exhaustive answer SET to who walks and to who
doesn't walk coincide. Substrate-level: this requires a specific
relationship between the question denotation and its complement —
specifically, that for every alt p of Q, pᶜ (interpreted as
the corresponding negative-question alt) is also in alt Q' for
the negative Q'.
We state George's claim assumption-relatively: under the bivalence-plus-constancy assumption (every world's alt-true-set determines the alt-false-set), the strong answers are equivalent. The substrate doesn't bake in bivalence (worlds can have arbitrary membership in alts) so the equivalence requires explicit hypotheses.
The §3.1.1 formal observation as a substrate-level conditional:
if two questions Q and Q' have alts that mutually decide
each other (i.e., Q-alts and Q'-alts agree as a partition),
then their strongAnswer cells coincide at every w.
Captures the @cite{groenendijk-stokhof-1984} argument structure that George dissects in (5)-(10).
§3.1.2 Domain Uncertainty #
@cite{george-2011} §3.1.2: the apparent inequivalence of Maggie-knows-(12) and Maggie-knows-(13) is consistent with a uniform STRONG-exhaustive reading, provided the wh-restrictor's extension varies across worlds (de dicto interpretation).
Substrate-level: when alternatives don't fully partition the worlds (e.g., domain restrictions like which applicants vary), strong-exhaustive-Q and strong-exhaustive-(negation Q) can have different extensions even though both encode "Maggie knows the strong-exhaustive answer". The two predications are consistent because they're about different sets of possibilities.
This is a paper-level observation about the space of cases
admitting weak ↔ strong inequivalence; we capture the substrate
fact that weakAnswer ⊆ strongAnswer ↔ does NOT hold in general,
and the @cite{george-2011} argument turns on which side of this
asymmetry is empirically active.
@cite{george-2011} §3.1.2 substrate fact: the converse
inclusion weakAnswer Q w ⊆ strongAnswer Q w does not hold
in general — strong exhaustivity is strictly stronger than weak.
Concrete intuition: with W = {0, 1, 2} and Q's alts being
{0,1} and {1,2} (overlapping non-comparable propositions),
at w = 0 the weak answer is {0,1} (only {0,1} is true at
0) but the strong answer is {0} alone (since 1 decides
{1,2} differently from 0). Constructing this concrete
instance in Lean requires more substrate API for alt of
Question.ofList-style constructions; the substrate fact itself
is documented in Exhaustivity.strongAnswer_subset_weakAnswer's
one-direction status.