@cite{belnap-1982}: Approaches to the semantics of questions in natural language #
Single-paper formalisation of the answerhood theorems from
@cite{belnap-1982} ("Approaches to the semantics of questions in
natural language", in Issues in the Logic of Questions), formulated
over the GSQuestion W substrate.
Theorems #
- Unique Answer Fallacy (§2.3): each question does not have a
unique complete true answer —
ANS(Q, w)varies with the indexw. Direct restatement of @cite{groenendijk-stokhof-1984}'sans_situation_dependentunder Belnap's diagnostic name. - Distributivity Principle (§2.4): knowing the answer to a wh-question is equivalent to knowing each atomic fact (for each individual, whether the predicate holds). Bridges question-embedding and propositional attitudes.
- Distributivity Test (§2.4, p. 177): a negative criterion for
ruling out candidate answers — Sally knows that P, but Sally
doesn't know IQ must be inconsistent for
Pto answerIQ.
Unique Answer Fallacy (§2.3) #
@cite{belnap-1982}'s Unique Answer Fallacy: it is a fallacy to
assume that each question has a unique complete true answer. In
the G&S framework, ans q w varies with the index w — the same
question Q yields different complete true answers at different
worlds. Direct restatement of ans_situation_dependent.
Distributivity Principle (§2.4) #
@cite{belnap-1982}'s Distributivity Principle: knowing the answer to a wh-question is equivalent to knowing, for each individual, whether the predicate holds.
An agent whose epistemic state (the set of worlds they consider
possible) is epState knows the answer to Q at w iff their
state is a subset of ans(Q, w) — i.e., every world they consider
possible agrees with w on the full extension of the predicate.
The Distributivity Principle says this is equivalent to knowing
each atomic fact: for every entity e in the domain, the agent
knows whether pred e holds. This bridges question-embedding
("knows who walks") and propositional attitudes ("knows that John
walks ∧ knows that Mary walks ∧ ...").
Distributivity Test (§2.4, p. 177) #
Partial answer: eliminates some cells but not all.
Equations
- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
Instances For
@cite{belnap-1982}'s Distributivity Test (§2.4, p. 177): a
negative criterion for ruling out candidate answers. For any
proposition P and indirect question IQ, if the following is
consistent:
Sally knows that P, but Sally doesn't know IQ.
then P is not an answer to IQ. The test "distributes" the
know inside the question and onto its answers: if knowing P
doesn't suffice to know IQ, then P doesn't answer IQ.
Formalisation: P fails the test for Q at w if there exists
an epistemic state (set of worlds the agent considers possible)
that is a subset of P (the agent knows P) but not a subset
of ans(Q, w) (the agent doesn't know Q).
Equations
- Phenomena.Questions.Studies.Belnap1982.failsDistributivityTest p q w worlds = worlds.any fun (v : W) => p v && !QUD.ans q w v
Instances For
If P passes the Distributivity Test (no witnessing world
exists), then knowing P implies knowing Q — i.e., P is at
least as informative as Q w.r.t. the partition. Contrapositive
of the test.
Concrete demonstration of the Distributivity Test.
@cite{belnap-1982} §2.4, p. 177: "Peter knows that the person who kicked Sam is John, but Peter doesn't know who kicked Sam." This is inconsistent — so the person who kicked Sam is John IS an answer to who kicked Sam.
Vs: "Peter knows that China is populous, but Peter doesn't know which person kicked Sam." This IS consistent — so China is populous is NOT an answer.
We verify on Fin 3 with identity partition (who kicked Sam → full
extension):
- "the answer is 0" passes the test (knowing it entails knowing who kicked Sam);
- "w.val < 2" (an irrelevant fact) fails the test.