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Linglib.Phenomena.Quantification.Studies.TesslerTenenbaumGoodman2022

@cite{tessler-tenenbaum-goodman-2022} — Logic, Probability, and Pragmatics in Syllogistic Reasoning #

Topics in Cognitive Science 14: 574–601.

Core Idea #

Syllogistic reasoning decomposes into two pragmatic subproblems:

  1. Listener: interprets premises via Bayesian update over Venn diagram states
  2. Speaker: selects the conclusion that best communicates beliefs to a naive listener

Three speaker models are formalized:

State Communication and Belief Alignment produce identical conclusion distributions after softmax normalization within each syllogism (the additive entropy term H(L₀(·|premises)) is conclusion-independent and cancels in the per-syllogism softmax; between syllogisms, this entropy varies, which is why the paper's MCMC fits report different optimal α values for SC vs BA — same functional form, different scale). This per-syllogism cancellation is proved as stateCom_eq_beliefAlignment.

Substrate (Semantics.Quantification.Syllogistic) #

This file consumes the syllogistic substrate at Theories/Semantics/Quantification/:

Per footnote 2 of @cite{tessler-tenenbaum-goodman-2022}, this paper takes the Aristotelian stance on the All form: "All As are Bs is false if there are no As." The substrate is modern (FOL); existential import is added here as a paper-local wrapper tesslerAll. Other Aristotelian forms (E, I, O) take the modern reading in this paper, so the asymmetric stance is encoded honestly.

RSA pipeline #

See also #

The paper engages the mental-models tradition (Khemlani & Johnson-Laird) and the Probability Heuristics Model @cite{chater-oaksford-1999}, fits parameters on the Ragni et al. 2019 dataset; bib entries for the latter two are deferred pending verified DOI/page metadata.

The paper's Aristotelian "All": existential import on the restrictor. "All Xs are Ys" presupposes that some X exists, per footnote 2: "All As are Bs is false if there are no As."

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    Truth value of premise 1 in state s (Tessler-Aristotelian).

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      Truth value of premise 2 in state s (Tessler-Aristotelian).

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        Literal meaning of each conclusion in a Venn state, using Tessler-Aristotelian All. NVC ("nothing follows") is the vacuous utterance, true everywhere.

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          Noisy semantics ℒ(u, s): a small probability φ of misjudging truth value. Directly instantiates RSA.Noise.noiseChannel(1−φ, φ, ⟦u⟧).

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            NVC's noisy meaning is 1 − φ everywhere — hearing "nothing follows" does not update the listener's beliefs.

            L₀ joint likelihood of two premises in state s (unnormalized). The uniform prior θ = 0.5 cancels in normalization (eq. 2).

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              S₀ (Literal Speaker, eq. 3): scores conclusions by expected literal truth under the reasoner's posterior.

              S₀(u₃ | u₁,u₂) ∝ exp[α · Σ_s ℒ(u₃,s) · L₀(s|u₁,u₂)]

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                State Communication (S₁, eq. 4): standard RSA informativity.

                S₁(u₃ | u₁,u₂) ∝ exp[α · Σ_s L₀(s|u₁,u₂) · ln L₀(s|u₃)]

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                  Belief Alignment (S₁, eq. 6) — the paper's winning model.

                  S₁(u₃ | u₁,u₂) ∝ exp[α · −KL(L₀(·|u₁,u₂) ‖ L₀(·|u₃))]

                  Inlined discrete KL ∑ p · log(p/q) (mathlib-canonical form; the 0 · log 0 = 0 guard collapses for Real.log). The PMF-canonical form is (P.klDiv Q).toReal via PMF.toReal_klDiv_eq_sum_log_div.

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                    State Communication and Belief Alignment differ by a multiplicative factor exp(α · H(premPost)) that depends only on the reasoner's premise posterior, not on the conclusion. Within a single syllogism's softmax over conclusions, this factor cancels — the two models predict identical conclusion distributions. Between syllogisms, H(premPost) varies, so the same conclusion-distribution data is fit by different α values under SC vs BA — explaining the paper's distinct fit statistics (r = .67 vs .82) without any difference in functional form.

                    Derivation via Real.log_div: KL(P ∥ Q) = Σ P · log(P/Q) = Σ P·log P − Σ P·log Q −KL(P ∥ Q) = Σ P·log Q − Σ P·log P = [SC utility] + H(P)

                    The Belief Alignment score for NVC, when the naive listener for NVC receives the prior, is exp(α · −KL(post ‖ prior)). When premises are uninformative (posterior ≈ prior), KL ≈ 0, so the NVC score approaches exp(0) = 1, the maximum — explaining the model's preference for NVC on uninformative premise combinations.

                    "All A-C" entails "Some A-C" under Tessler-Aristotelian All (existential import is built into tesslerAll so the witness is free). With the substrate's modern syllAll this would require an explicit ∃A hypothesis.

                    Unnormalized L₀ likelihood for a syllogism in state s.

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                      Normalization constant: Σ_s L₀_unnorm(s) over all 128 Venn states. Uses Finset.univ over VennState = Region → Bool via Pi.fintype.

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                        Naive L₀ posterior for a conclusion: L₀(s|c) ∝ ℒ(c,s). The naive listener has heard only the conclusion, not the premises.

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                          Figural bias prior weight, determined by which of A, C appears in subject position of one of the premises (per the paper's figural-effects discussion).

                          • Both premises in A-B/B-C order (Figure 1): only A appears in subject position (of P1) → A-C conclusions get weight β.
                          • Both in B-A/C-B order (Figure 4): only C in subject (of P2) → C-A conclusions get weight β.
                          • Mixed (Figures 2 & 3): both or neither of A, C appear in subject position → no figural bias (weight 1 for all conclusions).

                          NVC always gets weight 1. The paper fits β ≈ 2.01 (MAP).

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                            Belief Alignment score for conclusion c given syllogism syl. Parameters: α (rationality), φ (noise), β (figural bias).

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                              Conclusion probability: P(c|syl) = baScore(c) / Σ_c' baScore(c').

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                                noncomputable def TesslerTenenbaumGoodman2022.α_fit :

                                MAP estimates from the Bayesian data analysis. α ≈ 6.88, φ ≈ 0.06, β ≈ 2.01. Numerical evaluation of conclusionProb at these parameters is not performed in-Lean (would require Float, banned project-wide); the paper's reported predictions can be reproduced via the model code at https://github.com/mhtessler/syllogism-paper.

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                                  For Barbara, every state where both premises are literally true also satisfies "All A-C" — the L₀ posterior concentrates on All-A-C states. Reduces to barbara_premises_imply_allAC from the substrate plus the Tessler-Aristotelian concMeaning wrapping.

                                  "All A-C" properly subalternates "Some A-C" in the Tessler-Aristotelian reading: All entails Some (via existential import in tesslerAll), and state_A_AC witnesses that the converse fails (Some without All).

                                  Probabilistic subalternation on the L₀ posterior. Tessler's Bayesian listener model assigns to every conclusion c an L₀ posterior probability μ({s | concMeaning c s = true}). Aristotelian subalternation lifts to this probabilistic level: under any μ, P_μ[allAC] ≤ P_μ[someAC].

                                  The lift is automatic via Core.Opposition.Subaltern.toProb once allAC_subaltern_someAC is established. The probabilistic Aristotelian diagram (Demey-Smessaert 2018-style, with the convex generalization in Probabilistic.lean) is implicitly the framework Tessler's Bayesian listener computes within.