@cite{tessler-tenenbaum-goodman-2022} — Logic, Probability, and Pragmatics in Syllogistic Reasoning #
Topics in Cognitive Science 14: 574–601.
Core Idea #
Syllogistic reasoning decomposes into two pragmatic subproblems:
- Listener: interprets premises via Bayesian update over Venn diagram states
- Speaker: selects the conclusion that best communicates beliefs to a naive listener
Three speaker models are formalized:
- S₀ (Literal Speaker, eq. 3): scores conclusions by expected literal truth
- State Communication (eq. 4): scores by expected log-likelihood (standard RSA)
- Belief Alignment (eq. 6): scores by −KL divergence (the paper's winning model, r = .82 with 3 parameters: α, φ, β)
State Communication and Belief Alignment produce identical conclusion distributions
after softmax normalization within each syllogism (the additive entropy term
H(L₀(·|premises)) is conclusion-independent and cancels in the per-syllogism softmax;
between syllogisms, this entropy varies, which is why the paper's MCMC fits report
different optimal α values for SC vs BA — same functional form, different scale).
This per-syllogism cancellation is proved as stateCom_eq_beliefAlignment.
Substrate (Semantics.Quantification.Syllogistic) #
This file consumes the syllogistic substrate at Theories/Semantics/Quantification/:
Region,VennState,AristQuant,Syllogism,ConclusiontypeshasA/hasB/hasCregion predicatessyllAll/syllSome/syllSomeNot/syllNone(modern FOL reading)barbara/allAB_allCB/someSomenamed syllogismsstate_A_AC/state_AB_BC/state_ABCwitness states- Validity (
barbara_valid) + invalidity (allAB_allCB_invalid) theorems
Per footnote 2 of @cite{tessler-tenenbaum-goodman-2022}, this paper takes the
Aristotelian stance on the All form: "All As are Bs is false if there are no As."
The substrate is modern (FOL); existential import is added here as a paper-local
wrapper tesslerAll. Other Aristotelian forms (E, I, O) take the modern reading
in this paper, so the asymmetric stance is encoded honestly.
RSA pipeline #
- Noisy semantics via
RSA.Noise.noiseChannel - Belief Alignment utility via the inline discrete sum
∑ p · log(p/q)(the canonical PMF form is(P.klDiv Q).toReal, bridged byPMF.toReal_klDiv_eq_sum_log_div; the (VennState → ℝ) form is natural here) - SC ≡ BA equivalence via
Real.log_div+ sum manipulation (Cover-Thomas identityKL = -H(P) - ∑ P log Q) - "Nothing follows" as vacuous utterance (true in every state)
See also #
Core.Opposition.Probabilistic— the Bayesian listener's posterior probabilitiesP_μ[c]jointly satisfy the probabilistic Aristotelian inequalities (subalternationP[A] ≤ P[I], contradictionP[A]+P[O]=1, etc.). Tessler's speaker models are functionals of these probabilities; this is the natural framework for unifying RSA-syllogistic models with the broader Demey–Smessaert opposition-diagram tradition.
The paper engages the mental-models tradition (Khemlani & Johnson-Laird) and the Probability Heuristics Model @cite{chater-oaksford-1999}, fits parameters on the Ragni et al. 2019 dataset; bib entries for the latter two are deferred pending verified DOI/page metadata.
The paper's Aristotelian "All": existential import on the restrictor. "All Xs are Ys" presupposes that some X exists, per footnote 2: "All As are Bs is false if there are no As."
Equations
- TesslerTenenbaumGoodman2022.tesslerAll s X Y = (Semantics.Quantification.Syllogistic.syllAll s X Y && decide (∃ (r : Semantics.Quantification.Syllogistic.Region), s r = true ∧ X r = true))
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Paper-specific quantifier eval: Aristotelian on All, modern on the others.
Equations
- TesslerTenenbaumGoodman2022.tesslerSyllQuantEval Semantics.Quantification.Syllogistic.AristQuant.all s X Y = TesslerTenenbaumGoodman2022.tesslerAll s X Y
- TesslerTenenbaumGoodman2022.tesslerSyllQuantEval Semantics.Quantification.Syllogistic.AristQuant.some s X Y = Semantics.Quantification.Syllogistic.syllSome s X Y
- TesslerTenenbaumGoodman2022.tesslerSyllQuantEval Semantics.Quantification.Syllogistic.AristQuant.someNot s X Y = Semantics.Quantification.Syllogistic.syllSomeNot s X Y
- TesslerTenenbaumGoodman2022.tesslerSyllQuantEval Semantics.Quantification.Syllogistic.AristQuant.no s X Y = Semantics.Quantification.Syllogistic.syllNone s X Y
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Truth value of premise 1 in state s (Tessler-Aristotelian).
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Truth value of premise 2 in state s (Tessler-Aristotelian).
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Literal meaning of each conclusion in a Venn state, using Tessler-Aristotelian All. NVC ("nothing follows") is the vacuous utterance, true everywhere.
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- TesslerTenenbaumGoodman2022.concMeaning Semantics.Quantification.Syllogistic.Conclusion.nvc x✝ = true
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"Nothing follows" is always true.
Noisy semantics ℒ(u, s): a small probability φ of misjudging truth value.
Directly instantiates RSA.Noise.noiseChannel(1−φ, φ, ⟦u⟧).
Equations
- TesslerTenenbaumGoodman2022.noisyConcMeaning φ c s = RSA.Noise.noiseChannel (1 - φ) φ (if TesslerTenenbaumGoodman2022.concMeaning c s = true then 1 else 0)
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Noise zero ⇒ noisy meaning is literal meaning.
NVC's noisy meaning is 1 − φ everywhere — hearing "nothing follows"
does not update the listener's beliefs.
L₀ joint likelihood of two premises in state s (unnormalized). The uniform prior θ = 0.5 cancels in normalization (eq. 2).
Equations
- TesslerTenenbaumGoodman2022.l0PremiseLikelihood φ p1 p2 s = RSA.Noise.noiseChannel (1 - φ) φ (if p1 s = true then 1 else 0) * RSA.Noise.noiseChannel (1 - φ) φ (if p2 s = true then 1 else 0)
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S₀ (Literal Speaker, eq. 3): scores conclusions by expected literal truth under the reasoner's posterior.
S₀(u₃ | u₁,u₂) ∝ exp[α · Σ_s ℒ(u₃,s) · L₀(s|u₁,u₂)]
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State Communication (S₁, eq. 4): standard RSA informativity.
S₁(u₃ | u₁,u₂) ∝ exp[α · Σ_s L₀(s|u₁,u₂) · ln L₀(s|u₃)]
Equations
- TesslerTenenbaumGoodman2022.stateComScore premPost naivePost α c = Real.exp (α * ∑ s : Semantics.Quantification.Syllogistic.VennState, premPost s * Real.log (naivePost c s))
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Belief Alignment (S₁, eq. 6) — the paper's winning model.
S₁(u₃ | u₁,u₂) ∝ exp[α · −KL(L₀(·|u₁,u₂) ‖ L₀(·|u₃))]
Inlined discrete KL ∑ p · log(p/q) (mathlib-canonical form; the
0 · log 0 = 0 guard collapses for Real.log). The PMF-canonical form is
(P.klDiv Q).toReal via PMF.toReal_klDiv_eq_sum_log_div.
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State Communication and Belief Alignment differ by a multiplicative factor
exp(α · H(premPost)) that depends only on the reasoner's premise posterior,
not on the conclusion. Within a single syllogism's softmax over
conclusions, this factor cancels — the two models predict identical
conclusion distributions. Between syllogisms, H(premPost) varies,
so the same conclusion-distribution data is fit by different α values
under SC vs BA — explaining the paper's distinct fit statistics
(r = .67 vs .82) without any difference in functional form.
Derivation via Real.log_div:
KL(P ∥ Q) = Σ P · log(P/Q) = Σ P·log P − Σ P·log Q
−KL(P ∥ Q) = Σ P·log Q − Σ P·log P = [SC utility] + H(P)
The Belief Alignment score for NVC, when the naive listener for NVC
receives the prior, is exp(α · −KL(post ‖ prior)). When premises are
uninformative (posterior ≈ prior), KL ≈ 0, so the NVC score approaches
exp(0) = 1, the maximum — explaining the model's preference for NVC
on uninformative premise combinations.
"All A-C" entails "Some A-C" under Tessler-Aristotelian All (existential
import is built into tesslerAll so the witness is free). With the
substrate's modern syllAll this would require an explicit ∃A hypothesis.
Strict informativity: "All A-C" is compatible with strictly fewer states
than "Some A-C". Witness: state_A_AC.
Unnormalized L₀ likelihood for a syllogism in state s.
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Normalization constant: Σ_s L₀_unnorm(s) over all 128 Venn states.
Uses Finset.univ over VennState = Region → Bool via Pi.fintype.
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Normalized L₀ posterior: L₀(s|premises) = L₀_unnorm(s) / Z.
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- TesslerTenenbaumGoodman2022.l0Post φ syl s = TesslerTenenbaumGoodman2022.l0Unnorm φ syl s / TesslerTenenbaumGoodman2022.l0Z φ syl
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Normalization constant for naive L₀ on a single conclusion.
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Naive L₀ posterior for a conclusion: L₀(s|c) ∝ ℒ(c,s). The naive listener has heard only the conclusion, not the premises.
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Figural bias prior weight, determined by which of A, C appears in subject position of one of the premises (per the paper's figural-effects discussion).
- Both premises in A-B/B-C order (Figure 1): only A appears in subject position (of P1) → A-C conclusions get weight β.
- Both in B-A/C-B order (Figure 4): only C in subject (of P2) → C-A conclusions get weight β.
- Mixed (Figures 2 & 3): both or neither of A, C appear in subject position → no figural bias (weight 1 for all conclusions).
NVC always gets weight 1. The paper fits β ≈ 2.01 (MAP).
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Belief Alignment score for conclusion c given syllogism syl. Parameters: α (rationality), φ (noise), β (figural bias).
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Conclusion probability: P(c|syl) = baScore(c) / Σ_c' baScore(c').
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MAP estimates from the Bayesian data analysis. α ≈ 6.88, φ ≈ 0.06,
β ≈ 2.01. Numerical evaluation of conclusionProb at these parameters
is not performed in-Lean (would require Float, banned project-wide);
the paper's reported predictions can be reproduced via the model code
at https://github.com/mhtessler/syllogism-paper.
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- TesslerTenenbaumGoodman2022.α_fit = 688 / 100
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- TesslerTenenbaumGoodman2022.φ_fit = 6 / 100
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- TesslerTenenbaumGoodman2022.β_fit = 201 / 100
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For Barbara, every state where both premises are literally true also
satisfies "All A-C" — the L₀ posterior concentrates on All-A-C states.
Reduces to barbara_premises_imply_allAC from the substrate plus the
Tessler-Aristotelian concMeaning wrapping.
For the invalid syllogism (All A-B, All C-B), the L₀ posterior does NOT concentrate on any single conclusion — some consistent states satisfy "All A-C" while others falsify it.
"All A-C" properly subalternates "Some A-C" in the Tessler-Aristotelian
reading: All entails Some (via existential import in tesslerAll), and
state_A_AC witnesses that the converse fails (Some without All).
Probabilistic subalternation on the L₀ posterior. Tessler's Bayesian
listener model assigns to every conclusion c an L₀ posterior probability
μ({s | concMeaning c s = true}). Aristotelian subalternation lifts to
this probabilistic level: under any μ, P_μ[allAC] ≤ P_μ[someAC].
The lift is automatic via Core.Opposition.Subaltern.toProb once
allAC_subaltern_someAC is established. The probabilistic Aristotelian
diagram (Demey-Smessaert 2018-style, with the convex generalization in
Probabilistic.lean) is implicitly the framework Tessler's Bayesian
listener computes within.