Plunkett & Sundell 2013: Disagreement without incompatible contents #
@cite{plunkett-sundell-2013}
Plunkett, D. & Sundell, T. (2013). Disagreement and the semantics of normative and evaluative terms. Philosophers' Imprint 13(23), 1–37.
Defining commitment #
In a metalinguistic negotiation — a dispute that "employs competing metalinguistic usages of an expression, and that reflects a disagreement about the proper deployment of linguistic representations" (P&S 2013 p.3) — the disputants A and B literally express mutually consistent contents. The disagreement is genuine but does NOT consist in expressing incompatible propositions.
Canonical case (paper p.18, attributed to Ludlow 2008):
A: Secretariat is an athlete. B: No, Secretariat is not an athlete.
P&S argue that A's 'athlete' has a different extension from B's 'athlete' (broad vs. narrow athleticism), so the propositions A and B literally express are jointly satisfiable: A's "Secretariat ∈ athlete₍A₎" can be true at the same world as B's "Secretariat ∉ athlete₍B₎". Plunkett & Sundell (paper p.18): "the connection between genuine disagreement and sameness of meaning is broken."
K-G's disagreement (paper §6, p.33-34) #
K-G argues against P&S's diagnosis. On K-G's account, A and B express
literally incompatible appropriateness contents on a SHARED standard
(see KirkGiannini2024.lean §4). The disagreement is about which
appropriateness standard for 'athlete' should be operative; A asserts
"appropriate(athlete, S)" and B asserts "¬ appropriate(athlete, S)" on
the same S, which are contradictories.
The two analyses make incompatible claims about the SHAPE of the metalinguistic-negotiation phenomenon. P&S → consistent contents; K-G → incompatible contents on a shared standard. This stub encodes P&S's commitment so the inequality theorem can be stated in K-G's file.
Note on scope #
Stub formalisation. Encodes P&S's "consistent contents" diagnosis as a
predicate on disputes; K-G's KirkGiannini2024.lean will host the
refutation theorem. Does not formalize P&S's broader normative
account of metalinguistic negotiation as a category.
A metalinguistic dispute between two speakers A and B over a
target individual t and a predicate slot. The propositions are
parameterised on each speaker's idiolectal extension of the
contested term.
- target : Entity
Target individual (e.g., Secretariat).
- predA : Entity → W → Prop
A's idiolectal extension of the contested predicate.
- predB : Entity → W → Prop
B's idiolectal extension of the contested predicate.
Instances For
A's expressed proposition: target instantiates predicate-as-A-uses-it.
Equations
- d.assertionA w = d.predA d.target w
Instances For
B's expressed proposition (the denial): target does NOT instantiate predicate-as-B-uses-it.
Equations
- d.assertionB w = ¬d.predB d.target w
Instances For
P&S 2013's defining commitment: in a metalinguistic negotiation, A's and B's literal contents are jointly satisfiable.
Because A and B use different extensions for the contested predicate
(predA ≠ predB), there exists a world where A's assertion holds
AND B's denial holds. Their disagreement is NOT a clash of
incompatible propositions in the standard truth-conditional sense.
Equations
- d.consistentContents = ∃ (w : W), d.assertionA w ∧ d.assertionB w
Instances For
The classic Secretariat case. When A's broader extension
includes the target and B's narrower extension excludes it at the
same world, P&S's consistentContents is witnessed.