Documentation

Linglib.Phenomena.Modality.Studies.PhillipsBrown2025

@cite{phillips-brown-2025} — Some-Things-Considered Desire #

Question-based semantics for desire ascriptions: ⟦S wants p⟧^c is true relative to a contextual question Q_c iff every undominated answer in Q_c-Bel_S entails p. The proposal handles conflicting-desire cases — "S wants p" + "S wants ¬p" — by varying Q_c.

This study file replicates the Nap, Lobster, Lu/Happy/Rain (deck-stacking), and William-III/nuclear-war scenarios of @cite{phillips-brown-2025}, plus a §11 cross-paper bridge to @cite{condoravdi-lauer-2016} (an effective-preferential alternative that refuses simultaneous want(p) and want(¬p)).

The substrate is Theories/Semantics/Attitudes/Desire.lean. All theorems here either compute by decide over an 8-world model (3 binary dimensions: nap × rested × pass = lobster × gustatory × ¬die) or delegate to the substrate's general theorems (wantVF_no_simultaneous_pq_and_negpq, wantQuestionBased_strawson_upward_monotonic, …).

§-by-§ map #

PaperStudy file
§2.1 vF no-go§5 (vf_cannot_predict_both, delegates to general)
§3.3 Q-relative belief§3, §4
§3.4 finest=vF§8
§3.5 best-answer semantics§3, §4
§3.6 Considering§3, §4
§3.7 Diversity, Anti-deckstacking§3, §7
§4.1 doxastic-closure blocking§6
§4.2 Belief-sensitivity§10
§5 cross-framework§11 (CondoravdiLauer bridge)

Parallel discovery: Cariani 2013 isVisible #

PB's isConsidered (§3.6) is the same predicate as @cite{cariani-2013}'s isVisible (§4 p.545–546): both require every cell of the partition/option-set to settle the prejacent. PB doesn't cite Cariani; Cariani doesn't anticipate PB. The identification is exposed in Phenomena/Modality/Studies/Cariani2013.lean, where Cariani's isVisible is defined as abbrev isVisible rc p := isConsidered rc.options p and the bridge theorem isVisible_iff_isConsidered reduces to Iff.rfl. The agreement is independent reinvention across the desire/deontic-modality boundary, surfaced by the substrate sharing a common predicate.

§1. Eight-world model #

3 binary dimensions: d₁ × d₂ × d₃. For Nap: d₁ = nap, d₂ = rested, d₃ = pass. For Lobster (paper §2.2): d₁ = lobster, d₂ = gustatory, d₃ = ¬die. The Lobster scenario reuses the Nap dimensions via abbrev — see lobster := nap, gustatory := rested, die := fail below; the structural isomorphism is documented and not coincidental (lobster_true := nap_true is the same theorem under renaming).

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      §2. Propositions #

      Worldnaprestedpass
      w0TTT
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      w6FFT
      w7FFF
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      The natural propositions of the model (basic dimensions), used to feed isAntiDeckstacking. AD's quantifier is restricted to this test set — see Desire.isAntiDeckstacking docstring.

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        §3. Nap scenario #

        Q' = partition by nap × rested (4 cells).

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          Q'' = partition by nap × pass (4 cells).

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            Beliefs for Nap: nap ↔ rested. Bel = {w0, w1, w6, w7}.

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              Beliefs for Not-nap: pass ↔ ¬nap. Bel = {w1, w3, w4, w6}.

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                Nap is true relative to Q' with beliefs nap↔rested, desires [rested].

                Not-nap is true relative to Q'' with beliefs pass↔¬nap, desires [pass].

                §4. Lobster scenario (paper §2.2) #

                The Lobster scenario reuses the Nap dimensions via abbrev: lobster := nap, gustatory := rested, die := fail. The two paper arguments use different questions over these dimensions — Q_{c''} (qLobGus) ignores death, Q_{c'''} (qLobDie) ignores taste.

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                      Q_{c''} = partition by lobster × gustatory (= qNapRest).

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                        Q_{c'''} = partition by lobster × die.

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                          Beliefs: die ↔ eat lobster. Bel = {w1, w3, w4, w6}.

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                            Die is undefined in the Lobster context c'' (paper §2.2): in qLobGus = qNapRest, no cell settles die, so the Considering presupposition fails.

                            Not-lobster is true in c''' (considering death, ignoring taste).

                            Not-die is also true in c''' (best answer entails both ¬lobster and ¬die).

                            §5. Von Fintel comparison and the no-go theorem #

                            The paper's central argument against belief-based semantics: vF cannot predict both want p and want ¬p simultaneously. Specialised here for the Nap example, then derived from the substrate's general wantVF_no_simultaneous_pq_and_negpq.

                            vF cannot predict both Nap and Not-nap with the same parameter set (specific instance).

                            vF cannot predict both Nap and Not-nap (general no-go, delegates to the substrate). The witness is any belS-world that is Pareto-undominated under the desire ordering.

                            §6. Doxastic closure blocking (paper §4.1) #

                            @cite{villalta-2008} identified the doxastic-closure problem for belief-based semantics: any proposition true at all best belief-worlds is predicted wanted, over-generating for coincidental propositions.

                            The question-based approach makes fail UNDEFINED rather than merely false: fail is not settled by Q' (the nap × rested partition), so the Considering presupposition blocks ⟦want(fail)⟧^{Q'} at definedness. With Q'' (the nap × pass partition), fail is settled — and the contrast is exactly the paper's point.

                            §7. Anti-deckstacking (paper §3.7) #

                            Lu is unsure if it will rain, but is sure he'll feel happy no matter what. Q'''' (deck-stacked) = {r, ¬r∧h, ¬r∧¬h} asymmetrically cross-cuts rain with happiness; the r cell ignores h while the others distinguish it. Cell ¬r∧h predetermines h (entails it), but h is not considered by the question. AD fails on qDeckstacked with test set [r, h].

                            Q''''' (level playing field) = partition by rain × happy (4 cells). AD passes for the same [r, h] test set.

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                            Q'''' (deck-stacked): {r, ¬r∧h, ¬r∧¬h}.

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                              Lu's beliefs: happy unconditionally.

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                                happy is not considered in the deck-stacked Q'''' (the rain cell contains both happy and unhappy worlds).

                                A happy-answer exists in qDeckstacked (the ¬r∧h cell entails happy) — the deck is stacked in favor of ¬rain.

                                Without the constraint, the question-based semantics wrongly predicts Not-rain.

                                Q''''' (level playing field): partition by rain × happy.

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                                  With the fair question, Not-rain is correctly predicted false.

                                  The deck-stacked question fails Anti-deckstacking on test set [r, h] (h is predetermined by the ¬r∧h cell but not considered by Q'''').

                                  The fair (cross-product) question satisfies Anti-deckstacking — every basic proposition is settled by every cell.

                                  Q' (qNapRest) satisfies Anti-deckstacking on the natural-prop test set [nap, rested, pass] — the cross-product over nap and rested settles nap and rested; no cell entails pass, so AD's antecedent is vacuous for pass.

                                  §8. Finest-question simulation (paper §3.4) #

                                  When Q_c is the finest partition (singleton cells = individual worlds), the question-based semantics reduces to vF. The substrate provides finestPartition : List W → List (DecProp W); here we instantiate it on the explicit world list of the model.

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                                    The 8-world list allWorldsW covers W. Hypothesis required by the substrate's general wantQuestionBased_finestPartition_iff_wantVF.

                                    With the finest question, question-based want = standard vF want for nap. Derived from the substrate's general wantQuestionBased_finestPartition_iff_wantVF, not by decide.

                                    With the finest question, question-based want = standard vF want for ¬nap.

                                    With the finest question, question-based want = standard vF want for ¬lobster in the Lobster context.

                                    §9. Definedness via PrProp (paper §3.6) #

                                    §10. Belief-sensitivity: William III / nuclear war (paper §4.2) #

                                    William III wanted to avoid war. Avoiding war entails avoiding nuclear war. But we cannot conclude William III wanted to avoid nuclear war — he lacked the conceptual resources to grasp nuclear war.

                                    Mechanism: William's beliefs are NOT sensitive to Q_nuc that distinguishes nuclear from conventional war. All Q_nuc answers are compatible with his beliefs (total uncertainty), so isBelSensitive returns false and wantDefined blocks the inference. A modern person whose beliefs rule out nuclear war DOES have belief-sensitive context, so the inference goes through.

                                    Strawson upward monotonicity is the closure principle at issue; @cite{phillips-brown-2025} §4.2 argues that question-based semantics must be Strawson-but-not-naively upward monotonic, with definedness gating the inference. The substrate's wantQuestionBased_strawson_upward_monotonic captures the licit direction.

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                                      Natural-prop test set for the nuclear-war scenario. The Nap-vs-war distinction (nap) and the war-of-any-kind distinction (avoidNuclearWar) are the salient dimensions; rested and pass are not part of this scenario's vocabulary.

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                                        William III: total uncertainty (all worlds compatible).

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                                          Modern person: beliefs rule out nuclear war (peace ∨ conventional).

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                                            §11. Cross-paper bridge: @cite{condoravdi-lauer-2016} #

                                            @cite{condoravdi-lauer-2016}'s effective-preferential wantEP carries a joint-belief-consistency theorem (wantEP_jointly_belief_consistent): if both wantEP EP a φ w and wantEP EP a ψ w hold, then (φ ∩ ψ) ∩ B(a, w) ≠ ∅. Specialized to ψ = φᶜ, the conclusion becomes ∅ ∩ B(a, w) ≠ ∅, which is contradictory. So C&L forbids simultaneous want(p) and want(¬p) against a single belief state and preference structure.

                                            @cite{phillips-brown-2025} resolves the conflict by varying the contextual question Q_c (and the contextually-relevant belS) per ascription. C&L resolves it by varying the preference structure (per reading: wantPExact / wantPSuccess / wantPQH). The two resolutions are orthogonal — both can coexist in a unified theory of desire, but they make non-overlapping claims.

                                            theorem PhillipsBrown2025.condoravdiLauer_blocks_simultaneous_pq_and_negpq {Agent W : Type} {B : AgentWSet W} (EP : Semantics.Attitudes.CondoravdiLauer.EffectivePreferentialBackground Agent W B) (a : Agent) (φ : Set W) (w : W) ( : Semantics.Attitudes.CondoravdiLauer.wantEP EP a φ w) (hnegφ : Semantics.Attitudes.CondoravdiLauer.wantEP EP a (fun (w : W) => ¬φ w) w) :
                                            False

                                            C&L's joint-belief-consistency, specialized to ψ = φᶜ: no single EP-want can hold of both φ and ¬φ simultaneously, since their intersection is empty.

                                            This is a paper-level contrast with PB §3: PB makes both nap_true and not_nap_true work by varying Q_c and belS; the C&L analysis would need different EP per ascription to reproduce the contrast.

                                            §12. Heim foil and parametric no-go #

                                            @cite{heim-1992}'s comparative-belief semantics (wantHeim) is the other canonical belief-based account — formalized at Theories/Semantics/Attitudes/Desire.lean and exercised in Phenomena/Modality/Studies/Heim1992.lean. The substrate's BeliefBasedDesireSemantics typology packages vF, Heim, and (in principle) Levinson 2003 / sufficient-desirability accounts under a single structural property isConflictBlocking.

                                            PB's argument against belief-based semantics generalizes from vf_no_conflict_nap (vF only) to:

                                            PB's wantQuestionBased evades the no-go by selecting from Q-Bel_S rather than directly from Bel_S — it is not an instance of BeliefBasedDesireSemantics (the question parameter answers plays a non-trivial role outside the typeclass shape).

                                            theorem PhillipsBrown2025.heim_no_go_covers_belief_based_family {W : Type} [Fintype W] [DecidableEq W] (params : Semantics.Attitudes.Desire.HeimDesireParams W) (w_eval : W) (hAsym : ∀ (x y : W), params.pref w_eval x yparams.pref w_eval y xx = y) (belS : Set W) [DecidablePred belS] (p : Set W) [DecidablePred p] (h : Semantics.Attitudes.Desire.wantHeimDefined belS p) :
                                            ¬(Semantics.Attitudes.Desire.wantHeim belS params w_eval p Semantics.Attitudes.Desire.wantHeim belS params w_eval fun (w : W) => ¬p w)
                                            theorem PhillipsBrown2025.lassiter_evades_no_go_via_grading :
                                            ∃ (W : Type) (x : Fintype W) (x_1 : DecidableEq W) (belS : Set W) (x_2 : DecidablePred belS) (pr : W) (V : W) (θ : ) (p : Set W) (x_3 : DecidablePred p), Semantics.Attitudes.Desire.Lassiter.want belS pr V θ p Semantics.Attitudes.Desire.Lassiter.want belS pr V θ fun (w : W) => ¬p w

                                            @cite{lassiter-2017} also evades the no-go but via numerical threshold + graded value rather than question-sensitivity. The Lassiter substrate's threshold_admits_conflict_witness exhibits a concrete configuration where both want(p) and want(¬p) fire on a single (belS, pr, V, θ) — falsifying isConflictBlocking.

                                            Lassiter and PB are now formalized as two distinct non-instances of BeliefBasedDesireSemantics. PB's escape route: question parameter outside the BBS shape. Lassiter's: numerical threshold on graded expected value. The cross-paper picture: the typology correctly excludes both, and they evade via genuinely different mechanisms.

                                            Summary #

                                            The 8-world model verifies all of the paper's quantitative predictions that fit the 3-binary-dimension encoding (Nap, Lobster-via-isomorphism, Lu/deck-stacking, William-III). The substrate carries the general arguments (no-go for vF, no-go for Heim, Strawson upward monotonicity, finest=vF direction, parametric BeliefBasedDesireSemantics typology). The §11 bridge makes the disagreement with C&L explicit; the §12 foil shows the no-go covers the whole belief-based family.

                                            What's deferred: