@cite{lassiter-2017} (apparatus) / @cite{lassiter-2011} (want application) — Expected-value desire #
@cite{lassiter-2017} ch.7 ("Scalar goodness", not a desire chapter) develops an expected-value semantics for evaluative gradable predicates; @cite{lassiter-2011} (NYU dissertation, ch.6) applies the apparatus to want. The book extends the good analysis to want in a single sentence at §8.13 (p.249) — want is gradable like like, matter, care, need.
This study file:
- §1 builds the bare-threshold conflict-witness model (4 worlds,
uniform prior 1/4, V = (10, 4, 4, 0), θ = 3/2,
p = {w₀, w₁}). - §2 replicates the conflict predictions:
want_p ∧ want_negp. - §3 cross-paper bridge to @cite{condoravdi-lauer-2016}: C&L's
wantEP_jointly_belief_consistentforbids the witness; the Lassiter bare apparatus exhibits it. Different mechanisms. - §4 cross-paper bridge to @cite{heim-1992}: same configuration is
wantHeimDefined-OK, butwantHeim_no_simultaneous_pq_and_negpqrules out joint truth. Heim's (40) amendment is the structural analog of Lassiter's Sloman. - §5 Sloman's Principle blocks the witness for Lassiter's full account. The bare-threshold conflict witness is exactly Cariani's Weakening counter-model (Lassiter's Table 8.4 reconstruction of the @cite{cariani-2016} actualist Weakening attack, applied to EV; Cariani's own counter-model uses actualist closeness, not EV) p.239); Lassiter's response is Sloman's Principle, which excludes it. The witness is a falsifier of the bare form, not of Lassiter's actual position.
The chronological-dependency rule applies: this file references
@cite{phillips-brown-2025} only in docstring prose (PB is later);
PhillipsBrown2025.lean already cross-references Lassiter via the
BeliefBasedDesireSemantics typology design.
§1. The 4-world conflict-witness model #
Following @cite{lassiter-2017} §7.6 eq. 7.22 (apparatus) and
@cite{lassiter-2011} ch.6 (want application). Uniform prior over
Fin 4; value function asymmetric on {w₀, w₁} vs {w₂, w₃}.
Value function: V(w₀) = 10, V(w₁) = 4, V(w₂) = 4, V(w₃) = 0.
Equations
- Lassiter2017Desire.value 0 = 10
- Lassiter2017Desire.value 1 = 4
- Lassiter2017Desire.value 2 = 4
- Lassiter2017Desire.value 3 = 0
Instances For
Threshold for "significantly above neutral" — Lassiter 2017 §7.9 treats this as contextually supplied.
Equations
- Lassiter2017Desire.threshold = 3 / 2
Instances For
The agent's belief state: total uncertainty (all worlds compatible).
Matches Lassiter's D = epistemically possible worlds convention
(§7.6 p.187).
Equations
- Lassiter2017Desire.belTotal x✝ = True
Instances For
Equations
- Lassiter2017Desire.instDecidablePredWBelTotal x✝ = isTrue trivial
The target proposition p = {w₀, w₁}.
Equations
- Lassiter2017Desire.targetProp w = (w = 0 ∨ w = 1)
Instances For
Equations
- Lassiter2017Desire.instDecidablePredWTargetProp w = id inferInstance
§2. The conflict predictions #
E_V(p | belS) = (1/4 · 10 + 1/4 · 4) / (1/4 + 1/4) = (14/4) / (1/2) = 7
E_V(¬p | belS) = (1/4 · 4 + 1/4 · 0) / (1/4 + 1/4) = 1 / (1/2) = 2
With θ = 3/2, both are above threshold → both are wanted.
§3. Cross-paper bridge: @cite{condoravdi-lauer-2016} #
C&L's wantEP_jointly_belief_consistent says that for any
EffectivePreferentialBackground EP and any agent a, world w,
wantEP EP a φ w ∧ wantEP EP a ψ w implies (φ ∩ ψ) ∩ B(a, w) ≠ ∅.
Specialized to ψ = φᶜ: the intersection is empty, so simultaneous
truth is impossible.
Lassiter's bare-threshold apparatus exhibits exactly such a configuration. The two frameworks make orthogonal predictions on the 4-world model.
C&L blocks any pair wantEP φ ∧ wantEP ¬φ. Specialized form
showing C&L cannot reproduce Lassiter's witness.
§4. Cross-paper bridge: @cite{heim-1992} #
Heim's (40) amendment + comparative-belief semantics block simultaneous
wantHeim p ∧ wantHeim ¬p (substrate's
wantHeim_no_simultaneous_pq_and_negpq). The 4-world conflict witness
configuration is wantHeimDefined-OK on targetProp (both p-worlds
and ¬p-worlds are in belTotal), so Heim's no-go applies — and Heim's
prediction differs from Lassiter's.
This is the analog: Heim's (40) plays the role for comparative-belief that Sloman plays for Lassiter — both block single-V/single-context conflict.
On the witness configuration, Heim's no-go theorem applies — for
any Heim parameters with strictly asymmetric desirability,
wantHeim cannot make both targetProp and its negation true.
Direct application of the substrate theorem.
§5. Sloman's Principle blocks the witness for Lassiter's full account #
Per @cite{lassiter-2017} §8.11 (p.245): "we should not weaken the semantics to make room for the simultaneous truth of ought(φ) and ought(¬φ). Instead, we should allow that there are various, possibly conflicting sources of value..." Sloman's Principle (eq. 8.16, p.216) is the constraint that excludes single-V conflict.
On the witness model with alts = [targetProp, ¬targetProp]:
- E_V(targetProp) = 7, E_V(¬targetProp) = 2.
- Sloman for
targetProp: requires7 > 2✓. - Sloman for
¬targetProp: requires2 > 7✗.
So wantWithSloman blocks the conflict on this configuration —
matching Lassiter's actual stated position. The bare-threshold witness
is exhibited by conflict_concrete only because it ignores Sloman;
Lassiter himself would say this is the wrong way to formalize his
account.
The two-element alternative set for the witness model.
Equations
- Lassiter2017Desire.witnessAlts = [⟨Lassiter2017Desire.targetProp, inferInstance⟩, ⟨fun (w : Lassiter2017Desire.W) => ¬Lassiter2017Desire.targetProp w, inferInstance⟩]
Instances For
Lassiter's full account blocks the witness via Sloman's
Principle. Direct instance of the substrate theorem
wantWithSloman_blocks_conflict.