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Linglib.Phenomena.Modality.Studies.HollidayMandelkern2024

@cite{holliday-mandelkern-2024}: Possibility-Semantics Case Studies #

@cite{holliday-mandelkern-2024}

Concrete instantiations and paper-specific theorems from H&M 2024 "The Orthologic of Epistemic Modals" (JPL 2024). The general substrate (compatibility frames, ortholattice of regular sets, modal compat frames, T/epistemic frames) lives in Linglib/Theories/Semantics/Modality/Orthologic/{Frames,Modal}.lean (plus Linglib/Core/Order/Ortholattice.lean for the abstract typeclass); this file collects the paper's worked examples and the decide-checked predictions that depend on them.

What's formalized #

Out of scope (deferred) #

Five possibilities arranged in a path: x₁—x₂—x₃—x₄—x₅. The canonical 5-possibility example used by H&M for epistemic-modal applications. Note: Example 4.12 (Figure 9) shows two distinct 4-element frames realizing the smaller non-Boolean ortholattices O₆ and MO₂ from Figure 1 — the path frame is the canonical illustrative example, not the smallest non-Boolean instance. @cite{holliday-mandelkern-2024} Example 4.11, Figure 7.

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      Compatibility on the path frame: a possibility is compatible with itself and with each of its two neighbors.

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        The path compatibility frame: adjacent possibilities are compatible.

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          Distributivity failure. The key result of possibility semantics. C ∧ (A ∨ B) ≠ (C ∧ A) ∨ (C ∧ B), where C = {x₃}, A = {x₁,x₂}, B = {x₄,x₅}. Possibility x₃ is compatible with both A and B worlds, so it makes A ∨ B true; but it doesn't commit to either disjunct, so neither C ∧ A nor C ∧ B is non-empty. @cite{holliday-mandelkern-2024} Example 4.33 (the path-frame instantiation; the algebraic version is Example 3.20, Figure 3). Figure 8 enumerates the ten ◇-regular subsets of pathFrame; the distributivity discussion appears in the prose following Proposition 4.27.

          x₃ is NOT a world — it's a partial possibility, compatible with possibilities on both sides without being a refinement of either.

          Pack the path-frame regular sets as RegularProp pathFrame elements and demonstrate that the abstract OrthocomplementedLattice instance immediately delivers the De Morgan / excluded-middle / non-contradiction laws that are otherwise proved pointwise via decide. The set-membership theorems above remain available as the user-facing API; the …Reg versions below are the same propositions phrased in lattice notation.

          {x₁, x₂} packaged as a regular proposition.

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            {x₄, x₅} packaged as a regular proposition.

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              {x₃} packaged as a regular proposition.

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                Double negation on pLeftReg from the typeclass: (pLeftReg)ᶜᶜ = pLeftReg. Replaces the pointwise doubleNeg_left proof — abstract typeclass result, no decide on Poss5.

                Excluded middle on pLeftReg from the typeclass: pLeftReg ⊔ pLeftRegᶜ = ⊤. Replaces the pointwise excludedMiddle_left proof.

                Non-contradiction on pLeftReg from the typeclass: pLeftReg ⊓ pLeftRegᶜ = ⊥. Replaces the pointwise nonContradiction_left proof.

                The orthocomplement of pLeftReg is pRightReg: (pLeftReg)ᶜ = pRightReg. Lattice-level statement of the pointwise neg_left theorem.

                The Epistemic Scale is constructed from a 2-world model W = {0, 1} with V(p) = {0}. The possibilities are pairs (A, I) where ∅ ≠ A ⊆ I ⊆ W: - x₁ = ({0}, {0}) — settled that p, knows p - x₂ = ({0}, {0,1}) — settled that p, doesn't know - x₃ = ({0,1}, {0,1}) — nothing settled (full uncertainty) - x₄ = ({1}, {0,1}) — settled that ¬p, doesn't know - x₅ = ({1}, {1}) — settled that ¬p, knows ¬p

                Compatibility: (a,i) ◇ (a',i') iff a ∩ a' ≠ ∅ ∧ a ⊆ i' ∧ a' ⊆ i.
                Accessibility: (a,i) R (a',i') iff a ⊆ a' ∧ i' ⊆ i.
                @cite{holliday-mandelkern-2024} Definition 5.1, Example 5.3. 
                

                Epistemic accessibility for the Epistemic Scale. R(x₁) = {x₁}, R(x₂) = {x₁,x₂,x₃}, R(x₃) = {x₃}, R(x₄) = {x₃,x₄,x₅}, R(x₅) = {x₅}. Note: Figure 12 shows dotted arrows that look symmetric on adjacents, but R as encoded here is the unique relation satisfying R-regularity, Reflexivity, and Knowability on the path compatibility frame — verified operationally by every Figure-13 truth-value matching decide.

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                  The epistemic scale frame. Compatibility is the path graph; accessibility captures epistemic access (refining information). @cite{holliday-mandelkern-2024} Example 4.30, Example 4.33.

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                    Witnessing the epistemic-frame conditions #

                    epistemicScale satisfies all three conditions of HM 2024 Definition 4.26 (Reflexivity is in the structure; R-regularity and Knowability are decide-checked here). Bundled as epistemicCompatFrame, so Phenomena.Modality.Studies.HollidayMandelkern2024.wittgenstein_p and wittgenstein_neg_p collapse to one-line corollaries of the substrate Semantics.Modality.Orthologic.wittgensteinLaw (Proposition 4.27).

                    The Epistemic Scale as an EpistemicCompatFrame — all three Definition 4.26 conditions assembled.

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                      Verification of the truth values listed in Example 4.33 / Figure 13.

                      The motivating examples from §1–2 of the paper: epistemic possibility does not collapse to classical negation, and truth does not collapse to knowledge.

                      ◇¬p does NOT entail ¬p: x₃ makes "it might not be raining" true but does not settle "it's not raining." This is the core motivation for the entire paper — in classical logic, ◇¬p → ¬p, but this fails in possibility semantics. @cite{holliday-mandelkern-2024} §1.

                      p does NOT entail □p: x₂ makes p true without knowing p. "It's raining" does not mean "It must be raining." Failure of necessitation for non-logical truths. @cite{holliday-mandelkern-2024} §2.

                      Wittgenstein's Law: ¬A ∩ ◇A = ∅. "It's raining and it might not be raining" is contradictory. In possibility semantics, if x settles ¬A (all compatible possibilities fail A), then x cannot also make ◇A true (which requires a compatible possibility in □¬A's complement). @cite{holliday-mandelkern-2024} Proposition 4.27.

                      Both theorems below are **structural corollaries** of the substrate
                      `wittgensteinLaw` on epistemic compatibility frames — no per-frame
                      `decide` is needed. The Poss5-specific content was reduced (above) to
                      `epistemicCompatFrame`'s `decide`-checked R-regularity + Knowability;
                      the algebraic identity itself comes from substrate. 
                      

                      ¬p ∧ ◇p = ∅: "p is false and p might be true" is contradictory. One-line corollary of EpistemicCompatFrame.wittgensteinLaw applied to propP.

                      Distributivity fails across epistemic levels: (p ∨ ¬p) ∧ (◇p ∧ ◇¬p) is true at x₃, but (p ∧ ◇p ∧ ◇¬p) ∨ (¬p ∧ ◇p ∧ ◇¬p) is not. The partial possibility x₃ verifies the disjunction without committing to either disjunct — both disjuncts are empty by Wittgenstein's Law (p ∧ ◇¬p = ∅ and ¬p ∧ ◇p = ∅). @cite{holliday-mandelkern-2024} Example 3.20 (algebraic), Example 4.33 (possibility-semantic instantiation).

                      Free choice disjunction: ◇(A ∨ B) entails ◇A ∧ ◇B.

                      HM 2024 do not aim to predict free choice — see footnote 33 (page 890):
                      "We will not try to adjudicate that complicated topic here." The closest
                      paper-anchored result is the **Inheritance principle**
                      (Proposition 5.12.3, page 885): `(U ∨ ◇V) ∧ □V ⊆ ◇(U ∨ V)`.
                      
                      On the Epistemic Scale, full free choice fails because the path frame
                      is non-Boolean. The pattern derivable here is partial: it holds at x₃
                      (full uncertainty, where both p and ¬p remain epistemically possible)
                      but fails at x₁ (knows p, where ◇(p ∨ ¬p) is trivially true but
                      ◇¬p is false).
                      
                      For a deontic-modal account where free choice DOES emerge — via
                      pragmatic enrichment in BSML — see `Phenomena/Modality/Studies/Aloni2022.lean`.
                      The contrast is *modal-flavor-dependent* rather than directly contradictory:
                      Aloni 2022 derives FC for permission-flavored ◇, HM 2024 predicts FC failure
                      for epistemic-flavored ◇. 
                      

                      T axiom: □A entails A (knowledge is factive). @cite{holliday-mandelkern-2024} Proposition 4.25.

                      Disjunctive syllogism ({p ∨ q, ¬q} ⊨ p) fails for epistemic modals: "Either the dog is inside or it must be outside; it's not the case that it must be outside; therefore it is inside." The tautological first premise carries no information. @cite{holliday-mandelkern-2024} §2.3.

                      Disjunctive syllogism fails: p ∨ □¬p and ¬□¬p both hold at x₃ (full uncertainty) but p does not.

                      Orthomodularity (if φ ⊨ ψ then ψ ⊨ φ ∨ (¬φ ∧ ψ)) fails. Since p ⊨ ◇p, orthomodularity would give ◇p ⊨ p ∨ (¬p ∧ ◇p). But ¬p ∧ ◇p = ⊥ by Wittgenstein's Law, so this collapses to ◇p ⊨ p — absurd. @cite{holliday-mandelkern-2024} §2.4.

                      p entails ◇p: truth implies epistemic possibility. Follows from T (T_axiom_general) + duality (per HM 2024 §2.4 p. 839, derivable in their full system).

                      Orthomodularity fails: ◇p holds at x₃ but p ∨ (¬p ∧ ◇p) does not (since ¬p ∧ ◇p = ⊥ by Wittgenstein, this reduces to p).

                      Pseudocomplementation (a ∧ b = 0 → b ≤ ¬a) fails. In a Boolean algebra, ¬a is the greatest element disjoint from a. In an ortholattice this need not hold: p ∧ ◇¬p = ⊥ (Wittgenstein) but ◇¬p ≰ ¬p. This is the algebraic root of why ◇¬p ≠ ¬p. @cite{holliday-mandelkern-2024} Lemma 3.6 (algebraic statement), Example 3.20 (concrete failure).

                      Pseudocomplementation fails: p ∧ ◇¬p = ⊥ but ◇¬p ≰ ¬p. x₃ witnesses ◇¬p (might not be raining) without witnessing ¬p.

                      Level-wise classicality: classical reasoning is safe within an epistemic level but dangerous across levels. The subortholattice B₀ = {⊥, p, ¬p, ⊤} is a four-element Boolean algebra; B₁ (generated by applying □ and ◇ to B₀) is an eight-element Boolean algebra. Distributivity only fails when mixing levels. @cite{holliday-mandelkern-2024} §3.2.4.

                      Cross-level failure: ◇p ∧ (p ∨ ¬p) ≠ (◇p ∧ p) ∨ (◇p ∧ ¬p). ◇p is from B₁ but p, ¬p are from B₀. At x₃ the LHS is true (◇p and excluded middle both hold) but the RHS is false (both disjuncts are empty by Wittgenstein's Law).

                      Lifting construction specialized to the two-world Boolean algebra B = ℘({0, 1}) with valuation V(p) = {0}. The five possibilities are pairs (A, I) with ∅ ≠ A ⊆ I ⊆ W:

                      - x₁ = ({0}, {0})     — knows p
                      - x₂ = ({0}, {0,1})   — settled p, doesn't know
                      - x₃ = ({0,1}, {0,1}) — full uncertainty
                      - x₄ = ({1}, {0,1})   — settled ¬p, doesn't know
                      - x₅ = ({1}, {1})     — knows ¬p
                      
                      Compatibility: (A,I) ◇ (A',I') iff A ∩ A' ≠ ∅ ∧ A ⊆ I' ∧ A' ⊆ I.
                      Accessibility: (A,I) R (A',I') iff A ⊆ A' ∧ I' ⊆ I.
                      
                      The general lifting from an arbitrary Boolean algebra `B` (Def 5.1)
                      is unformalized; this section verifies the agreement of the derived
                      `liftedCompat`/`liftedAccess` with the stipulated `pathFrame`/
                      `epistemicScale` for the W={0,1} case. 
                      

                      Compatibility derived from lifting: (A,I) ◇ (A',I') iff A ∩ A' ≠ ∅ ∧ A ⊆ I' ∧ A' ⊆ I. @cite{holliday-mandelkern-2024} Definition 5.1.2.

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                        Accessibility derived from lifting: (A,I) R (A',I') iff A ⊆ A' ∧ I' ⊆ I (refining = expanding actuality, shrinking information). @cite{holliday-mandelkern-2024} Definition 5.1.3.

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                          The epistemic scale's compatibility matches the lifting construction.

                          The epistemic scale's accessibility matches the lifting construction.

                          @cite{holliday-mandelkern-2024} Lemma 5.4: truth at a possibility reduces to truth at worlds via the A and I sets.

                          - propP x = true  iff  world 1 ∉ A(x)  (all actual worlds satisfy p)
                          - □p x = true     iff  world 1 ∉ I(x)  (all information-accessible worlds satisfy p)
                          - ◇p x = true     iff  world 0 ∈ A(x)  (some actual world satisfies p)
                          
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                          Truth from worlds: p holds at x iff the ¬p-world is not actual.

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                          Box truth from worlds: □p holds at x iff the ¬p-world is not information-accessible.

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                          Diamond truth from worlds: ◇p holds at x iff the p-world is actual.

                          HM 2024's formal predictions agree with the empirical patterns recorded in the prior literature. These bridges close the loop between Yalcin's embedding diagnostic, Mandelkern's distributivity-failure intuition, Klinedinst & Rothschild's disjunctive-syllogism failure, and HM's formal theorems on the Epistemic Scale.

                          Each agreement bundles **two** components: (i) the proof-bearing
                          structural witness from this file, exhibiting the prediction as a
                          Lean theorem, and (ii) the literal `:= rfl` over the sibling's Bool
                          table, serving as a drift sentry — if either side later changes, the
                          `rfl` will fail loudly. 
                          

                          HM 2024 predicts that classical contradictions are infelicitous — matching Yalcin (2007). Witness: p ∧ ¬p = ∅ on the Epistemic Scale, structurally guaranteed by the inf_compl_eq_bot ortholattice axiom on RegularProp pathFrame.

                          HM 2024 predicts Klinedinst & Rothschild (2012)'s disjunctive-syllogism failure: from p ∨ □¬p and ¬□¬p, the conclusion p does not follow. Witness: disjSyllogism_fails (§11) exhibits x₃ as the joint witness where both premises hold but the conclusion fails.

                          HM 2024's wittgenstein_p and wittgenstein_neg_p (§7) jointly say that BOTH ¬p ∧ ◇p and p ∧ ◇¬p are infelicitous on every state of the Epistemic Scale — Wittgenstein's Law is symmetric in possibility semantics.

                          Veltman 1996's update semantics predicts the opposite: order MATTERS.
                          `Theories.Semantics.Dynamic.UpdateSemantics.Basic.might_order_matters`
                          proves that `p ∧ might ¬p` collapses to ∅ but `might ¬p ∧ p` does not,
                          on any state with `Nontrivial W`.
                          
                          Both files acknowledge this divergence in prose; the theorem below
                          makes the structural contradiction Lean-checkable — the *first*
                          cross-framework Lean-checkable contradiction in `Phenomena/Modality/`.
                          Per linglib's mission: theoretical incompatibilities should be visible
                          at theorem level, not docstring level. 
                          

                          Cross-framework contradiction (HM 2024 vs Veltman 1996): HM predicts that both Wittgenstein orderings collapse to ∅ on every Poss5 state (hm_wittgenstein_symmetric), while Veltman predicts that on any Nontrivial W there is a state where p ∧ might ¬p collapses but might ¬p ∧ p survives (might_order_matters). The two frameworks disagree at the theorem level on whether Wittgenstein's Law is symmetric — instantiated at W := Bool.