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Linglib.Phenomena.Gradability.Studies.Kamp1975

Kamp (1975): Two Theories about Adjectives @cite{kamp-1975} #

In E. Keenan (ed.), Formal Semantics of Natural Languages, 123–155. Cambridge University Press.

Overview #

Kamp presents two theories of adjective semantics:

Theory 1 (§ 1–2): Adjectives as functions from properties to properties (type ⟨⟨e,t⟩,⟨e,t⟩⟩). The classification hierarchy — intersective, subsective, privative, extensional — is formalized in Theories/Semantics/Lexical/Adjective/Classification.lean.

Theory 2 (§ 3–7): Vague/graded models. Kamp introduces vague models ⟨M, S, F, p⟩ (partial model + completions + σ-field + probability measure) and derives the comparative from quantification over completions. This framework is the common ancestor of both @cite{fine-1975}'s supervaluationism and @cite{klein-1980}'s delineation approach. Theory 2 is not formalized here; § 2 captures only the motivating argument (why truth-functional many-valued logic fails) and § 3 formalizes the comparative definitions that descend from it.

Structure #

Key Insight #

Kamp argues (p. 233 of the Brill reprint) that truth-functional many-valued logic fails for natural language connectives: if ⟦φ⟧ = ½, then ⟦φ ∧ ¬φ⟧ should be 0 (contradictions are false), but any truth-functional F(∧) satisfying F(∧)(½, ½) = 0 also gives F(∧)(½, ½) = 0 for non-contradictory ⟦φ ∧ φ⟧. This motivates the move to supervaluation / probability over completions.

Classification.lean defines the general intensional hierarchy: isIntersective, isSubsective, isPrivative, isExtensional over Property W E = W → E → Bool. The bridge theorems below show that fixing a world reduces the intensional definitions to their single-world extensional counterparts.

theorem Kamp1975.intersective_at_world {W : Type u_1} {E : Type u_2} {adj : Semantics.Gradability.Classification.AdjMeaning W E} (h : Semantics.Gradability.Classification.isIntersective adj) (w : W) :
(Q_w : EBool), ∀ (N : EBool) (x : E), adj (fun (x : W) => N) w x = (Q_w x && N x)

Single-world specialization: given a fixed world, the intensional hierarchy reduces to the extensional one.

If adj is intersective, then at any fixed world w, the function N ↦ adj N w is intersective in the sense of Modification.lean (there exists a fixed predicate Q(w) such that the result is Q(w) ∩ N(w)).

theorem Kamp1975.subsective_at_world {W : Type u_1} {E : Type u_2} {adj : Semantics.Gradability.Classification.AdjMeaning W E} (h : Semantics.Gradability.Classification.isSubsective adj) (w : W) (N : EBool) (x : E) :
adj (fun (x : W) => N) w x = trueN x = true

Single-world specialization of subsective.

intersective_at_world and subsective_at_world show that fixing a world reduces the intensional hierarchy to single-world properties: ∃ Q_w, adj(N)(w)(x) = Q_w(x) ∧ N(x) (intersective) and adj(N)(w)(x) → N(x) (subsective).

@cite{kamp-1975} (p. 233) argues that truth-functional many-valued logic cannot adequately handle vague connectives. The key observation:

If `⟦φ⟧ = ½` (borderline), then `⟦¬φ⟧ = ½` (standard negation).
We want `⟦φ ∧ ¬φ⟧ = 0` (contradictions are false). But any
truth-functional `F(∧)` satisfying `F(∧)(½, ½) = 0` also gives
`F(∧)(½, ½) = 0` for the non-contradictory `φ ∧ φ`, since the
inputs are identical. This is wrong: `φ ∧ φ` should have the same
value as `φ`.

Strong Kleene logic (`Truth3.meet`) makes the symmetric choice:
`meet indet indet = indet`. This preserves `φ ∧ φ ≡ φ` but fails
to make contradictions false. Supervaluationism resolves both. 

Kamp's dilemma: no truth-functional binary operator can simultaneously be idempotent (F(x,x) = x) and make borderline contradictions false (F(½, ¬½) = 0).

Since ¬½ = ½ in any symmetric three-valued logic, the two requirements conflict: idempotence demands F(½,½) = ½, but the contradiction requirement demands F(½,½) = 0. This is what motivates the move to supervaluation.

@cite{kamp-1975}'s definition (12) for the comparative:

u₁ is at least as A as u₂ iff for every completion M' ∈ S where
u₂ is in the extension of A, u₁ is also in the extension.

@cite{klein-1980} rephrases this with comparison classes: u₁ is
more A than u₂ iff there exists a comparison class C where u₁ is
A-in-C but u₂ is not.

These are contrapositives: Kamp's "∀ completions, u₂ ∈ ext → u₁ ∈ ext"
is equivalent to Klein's "¬∃ completion where u₂ ∈ ext ∧ u₁ ∉ ext",
and Klein's strict comparative adds the asymmetric witness. 
@[reducible]
def Kamp1975.kampPreorder {E : Type u_1} {C : Type u_2} (ext : CEBool) (S : Set C) :
Preorder E

Kamp's definition (12) induces a Preorder on entities: u₁ ≤ u₂ iff every completion in S that puts u₂ in the extension also puts u₁ in the extension.

This is the S-restricted analogue of kleinPreorder from Delineation.lean. When S = Set.univ and ext is Bool-valued, the two coincide (see Klein1980.kleinPreorder_eq_kampAtLeastAs).

Equations
  • Kamp1975.kampPreorder ext S = { le := fun (u₁ u₂ : E) => ∀ (c : C), c Sext c u₂ = trueext c u₁ = true, le_refl := , le_trans := , lt_iff_le_not_ge := }
Instances For
    theorem Kamp1975.kampPreorder_antitone {E : Type u_1} {C : Type u_2} (ext : CEBool) (u₁ u₂ : E) :
    Antitone fun (S : Set C) => u₁ u₂

    The Kamp preorder is Antitone in S: enlarging S (more completions to quantify over) makes harder to satisfy.

    Each class in the hierarchy is non-empty. We construct explicit adjective denotations that provably satisfy each definition from Classification.lean, modeling the classic examples: "gray" (intersective), "fake" (privative), "skillful" (subsective but not extensional), and "alleged" (non-subsective/modal).

    These are the formal counterparts of the informal entailment judgments
    from the literature (e.g., "gray cat entails cat" ↔ `isSubsective`,
    "skillful surgeon + violinist ⊬ skillful violinist" ↔ `¬isExtensional`).
    
    @cite{partee-2010} argues that the privative class should be eliminated
    in favor of subsective + noun coercion. The witness `fakeAdj` below
    models the traditional analysis; see `Partee2010.lean` for the
    coercion reanalysis. 
    
    inductive Kamp1975.W2 :

    Two worlds suffice to distinguish extensional from non-extensional.

    Instances For
      inductive Kamp1975.E3 :

      Three entities suffice for all witness constructions.

      Instances For

        "gray": an intersective adjective. The extension of "gray N" is {x | gray(x)} ∩ {x | N(w)(x)} — a fixed property independent of the noun.

        Models @cite{kamp-1975} definition (4). Entailment pattern: "gray cat" entails both "gray" and "cat"; "gray" + "cat" entails "gray cat".

        Equations
        Instances For

          "fake": a privative adjective (traditional analysis). "Fake N" entities are never N.

          Models @cite{kamp-1975} definition (5). Entailment pattern: "fake gun" entails "not a gun".

          @cite{partee-2010} argues this class should be reanalyzed as subsective with noun coercion — see Partee2010.lean.

          Equations
          Instances For

            "skillful": a subsective adjective that is NOT extensional. Being a "skillful N" depends on N's intension — what counts as an N across worlds — not just who the N's are in this world.

            Models @cite{kamp-1975} definition (6) without definition (7). Entailment pattern: "skillful surgeon" entails "surgeon" (subsective), but "skillful surgeon" + "violinist" does not entail "skillful violinist" (not intersective, because not extensional).

            Equations
            Instances For

              "alleged": a non-subsective (modal) adjective. An "alleged N" may or may not be an N — the adjective creates an intensional context without entailing or anti-entailing the noun.

              This is the complement class in the hierarchy: adjectives like "alleged", "potential", "putative" that carry no meaning postulate constraining the relationship between the modified and unmodified extension.

              Equations
              Instances For

                "alleged N" does not entail "not N" (not privative).