Stalnaker 1975 @cite{stalnaker-1975} #
Indicative Conditionals. Philosophia 5(3): 269–286.
Core contributions formalized here #
The pragmatic constraint on selection (§III): if
i ∈ C, thenf(A,i) ∈ Cwhenever someA-world is inC.Indicative ≠ subjunctive at the pragmatic level (§III/IV): both have the same truth-conditional clause; subjunctive mood signals that the pragmatic constraint may be suspended.
Disjunction-appropriateness (§III):
A or Bis appropriately asserted only in contexts where both¬A∧BandA∧¬Bare open.The direct argument is a reasonable inference but not an entailment (§IV): from
A or B, inferif ¬A, B.direct_argument_reasonable: in any context where the disjunction can be appropriately asserted, the post-update context makes the indicative conditional true at every surviving world.direct_argument_not_entailment: a single concrete world model exhibits a selection function for whichA∨Bholds at a world butif ¬A, Bfails — so the inference is not semantic entailment.
Fatalism failure (§V): sketched in
fatalism_remarkas a docstring; the formal point is that constructive dilemma is valid only for entailments, not for reasonable inferences.Polymorphic lift via
Dialogue.Assertable(§ 4 below): the Stalnaker-1975 change-function calculus is shown to be the Stalnaker-instance projection of the framework-genericAssertable.speakerAssert. The direct-argument theorem then lifts to: for ANYAssertableframework, the direct argument fromA∨Btoif ¬A, Bis a reasonable inference. Stalnaker's pragmatic claim is framework-generic, not Stalnaker-representation-specific.
The two universal pragmatic postulates from the Appendix
(respectsCompatibility, changeFn_eq) are stated in
Theories/Pragmatics/Assertion/ReasonableInference.lean.
Integration #
pragmaticConstraint,selectionConditional,moodedConditional,Mood.admissibleSelection,selectionConditional_eq_material_within_context,moodedConditional_indicative_eq_material_within_context— inTheories/Semantics/Conditionals/Basic.lean. The mood distinction lives inMood.admissibleSelection, not in two parallel conditional defs:.indicativerequirespragmaticConstraint,.subjunctiveimposes none.Appropriateness,changeFn,reasonableInference— inTheories/Pragmatics/Assertion/ReasonableInference.lean.- This file: a butler/gardener witness for (4); abstract version of (4) parameterised over any constraint-respecting selection function.
See also #
Phenomena/Modality/Studies/CarianiSantorio2018.lean— extends the Stalnaker selection-function mechanism from conditionals to bare will. C&S'sSemantics.Conditionals.SelectionFunctioninfrastructure is exactly the one used here forselectionConditional; thewould-conditional / Stalnaker-counterfactual identification in C&S §5.3.2 reuses this paper's selection-function semantics under universe parameter.
Stalnaker's direct argument is reasonable (@cite{stalnaker-1975} §IV).
Quantified over any selection function s and context C such that:
sobeys the pragmatic constraint relative toC;- the antecedent
¬Ais open inC(some context-set world is¬A); - in
C, every world satisfiesA ∨ B(i.e., the disjunction is established as common ground after assertion);
the indicative conditional if ¬A, B is true at every world in C.
This is the substance of §IV: no individual semantic entailment is invoked; the pragmatic constraint plus the post-update common ground are enough.
Stalnaker's appropriateness condition for disjunction (§III, end) — that
asserting A or B requires both ¬A∧B and A∧¬B to be open in the prior
context — is what guarantees h_open_notA after the update.
The direct argument is reasonable as a reasonableInference
(@cite{stalnaker-1975} Appendix), in the sense of the change-function
calculus: in every prior context k such that asserting A∨B lands one
in a Stalnakerian indicative-friendly state, the post-update context
entails the indicative conditional.
The Appropriateness relation here bundles the two contextual facts the
disjunction-appropriateness condition guarantees: the pragmatic constraint
holds, and ¬A remains open after the update.
Equations
- Stalnaker1975.instDecidableEqSuspect x✝ y✝ = if h : x✝.ctorIdx = y✝.ctorIdx then isTrue ⋯ else isFalse ⋯
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- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
Instances For
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- Stalnaker1975.instReprSuspect = { reprPrec := Stalnaker1975.instReprSuspect.repr }
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- Stalnaker1975.A3 s = (s = Stalnaker1975.Suspect.butler)
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- Stalnaker1975.AorB3 s = (Stalnaker1975.A3 s ∨ Stalnaker1975.B3 s)
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- Stalnaker1975.instDecidablePredW3AorB3 s = instDecidableOr
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- Stalnaker1975.instDecidablePredW3NotA3 s = instDecidableNot
A "subjunctive" selection function on W3 that, for any nonempty
antecedent set, picks someoneElse first if available — modelling
selection that reaches outside the natural context set.
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- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
Instances For
Counterexample to the direct argument as a semantic entailment.
At w = butler, A∨B = true, but s_subj3.sel butler {¬A worlds} = someoneElse, where B fails. So if ¬A, B is false at butler under
this selection function.
Sanity check: with any indicative selection function (one that
obeys the pragmatic constraint relative to C), the conditional does
hold at every C-world satisfying the disjunction. The contrast with
direct_argument_not_entailment is the pragmatic-vs-semantic gap
@cite{stalnaker-1975} emphasises.
Stalnaker 1975's change-function calculus uses changeFn p k
(set intersection) as the post-assertion update operator. The
Theories/Dialogue/Assertable.lean typeclass abstracts over
any dialogue-state representation that admits Stalnakerian
narrowing. This section shows that:
- The
changeFnoperator IS the Stalnaker-instance projection ofAssertable.speakerAssert(a 1-line bridge bySet.inter_comm). - The direct-argument theorem lifts to be polymorphic over
[Assertable S W]— Stalnaker's "reasonable inference" claim doesn't depend on Stalnaker's particular state representation. - The lifted theorem applies cleanly to both the Stalnaker instance (the original framework) and the Krifka instance (a commitment-space representation with a radically different internal structure but the same projected context-set behavior).
This is the consumer that earns the Dialogue.Assertable
typeclass's existence: a substantive philosophical claim
(reasonable inference is framework-generic) given a
substrate-level proof (the typeclass's narrowing law is
sufficient).
Bridge theorem: Stalnaker's changeFn operator equals the
HasContextSet-projection of Assertable.speakerAssert at the
Stalnaker instance.
changeFn p k = k ∩ p (Stalnaker 1975 Appendix postulate 2);
HasContextSet.toContextSet (Stalnaker.assert s p) = p ∩ s.contextSet.
They're equal up to Set.inter_comm.
Polymorphic direct argument: for ANY Assertable framework,
asserting A∨B yields a context set in which the indicative
conditional if ¬A, B holds at every world.
The proof is shorter than its single-framework predecessor
(direct_argument_reasonable) because the Assertable typeclass
provides one of the hypotheses for free: every world surviving
the assertion satisfies AorB (the typeclass law
speakerAssert_narrows). Compare with the Stalnaker-specific
version, which had to take this as a hypothesis (h_C_AorB).
Stalnaker instance application: the polymorphic lift fires on
the Stalnaker framework. Recovers the framework-specific
direct_argument_reasonable for the post-assertion context.
Krifka instance application: the polymorphic lift fires on
the commitment-space framework too. Krifka's KrifkaState
represents the same dialogue state as a tree of indexed
commitments rather than a flat list of propositions, but the
direct-argument inference is equally valid — the Assertable
typeclass abstracts over the representational difference.
Contraposition / hypothetical syllogism #
@cite{stalnaker-1975} observes that contraposition and hypothetical
syllogism fail in general for selection-based conditionals; the
counterexamples all involve subjunctives whose antecedents are
presupposed false. For indicatives — which obey pragmaticConstraint —
both inference forms come out reasonable in the Appendix's sense.
The semantic-failure side already exists as
Semantics.Conditionals.perfection_not_entailed_variablyStrict and can be
adapted directly to selection-based conditionals. The pragmatic-success
side is a clean extension of direct_argument_reasonable and is left for
follow-up.
Fatalism (§V) fatalism_remark #
Dummett's wartime-Britain fatalism argument has the form:
K ∨ ¬K(premise: I will be killed or not).- From
K, deriveIf P, K(precautions ineffective). - From
¬K, deriveIf ¬P, ¬K(precautions unnecessary). - ∴
Q ∨ R.
Steps 2 and 3 are reasonable inferences (they exploit the post-update
context where K or ¬K is taken as established). Step 4 applies
constructive dilemma — valid for entailments, but not for
reasonable inferences. The argument equivocates the two notions.
Formalising this requires the n-ary appropriateSeq machinery already
present, plus a counterexample showing constructive dilemma fails for
reasonable inference. Left for follow-up.