@cite{kratzer-2012} §5.4.3 — Lumping blocks spurious counterfactuals #
Minimal formalization of @cite{kratzer-2012}'s apple-buying counterfactual example (Ch. 5, §5.4.1–§5.4.3, pp. 127–129) demonstrating that the Crucial Set's lumping-closure clause prevents the spurious counterfactual prediction that the naive maximal-consistent-extension semantics gives.
What Kratzer's text actually argues #
Kratzer's examples (10a)/(10b) on p. 128 are MIGHT-counterfactuals:
"If Paula weren't buying a pound of apples, the Atlantic Ocean might
be drying up." The §5.4.2 maximal-consistent-extension semantics
predicts these true (since pa ∨ ad plus ¬pa consistently forces
ad); §5.4.3 introduces lumping to block this prediction.
This file formalizes the would-CF analog (the same structural
argument applied to wouldCF rather than mightCF), which is also
blocked by the same lumping mechanism. The would-CF analog is what
falls out cleanly from the present operator API; a parallel mightCF
formalization is left for future work (the mightCF/wouldCF duality
is not yet proven — see PremiseSemantic.mightCF_iff_not_wouldCF_compl,
currently a sorry-marked TODO).
Scenario #
Three worlds (and one partial situation):
actual— Paula is buying apples; Atlantic is fine; moon is fine. This isw₀in @cite{kratzer-2012} §5.4.1.noApplesQuiet— Paula is not buying apples; Atlantic is fine; moon is fine. (A "boring counterfactual" world; the witness that forceswouldCFto come out false.)atlantic— Paula is not buying apples; Atlantic is drying. (A counterfactual world where the spurious prediction would land.)sA— a partial situation supporting just "Paula buys apples" (sA ≤ actual).
Propositions #
pa(= @cite{kratzer-2012} (9a)): "Paula is buying apples"ad("Atlantic is drying", contradicting (9b))paOrAd(= @cite{kratzer-2012} (9d)):pa ∨ ad(the disjunction)
The lumping fact (§5.4.3, p. 129, verbatim claim) #
"every situation where Paula is buying a pound of apples or the Atlantic Ocean is drying up is a situation where Paula is buying a pound of apples. Hence (9a) is lumped by (9d) in our world."
We prove Lumps paOrAd pa actual: at the actual world, every part
where paOrAd holds also has pa hold (since the ad disjunct has
no truth-makers in any part of actual).
The argument #
Without lumping, a maximal consistent extension of {¬pa} ∪ Fw₀
can include paOrAd while excluding pa. Combined with ¬pa this
forces ad (since paOrAd ∧ ¬pa → ad classically).
With lumping, the Crucial Set's closure clause requires that if
paOrAd ∈ A then pa ∈ A (since Lumps paOrAd pa w₀). But pa
contradicts ¬pa. So paOrAd is excluded from any consistent
lumping-closed subset containing ¬pa.
The headline theorem not_wouldCF_notPa_ad is then derived from the
exact equality crucialSet_notPa_eq_singleton
(CrucialSet Fw₀ actual notPa = {{notPa}}) plus
follows_notPa_ad_fails (which noApplesQuiet witnesses).
Caveat: the Base Set is technically inadmissible #
Fw₀ = {pa, paOrAd} violates @cite{kratzer-2012}'s Non-Redundancy
admissibility clause (p. 132): "A set of propositions is redundant if
it contains propositions p and q such that p ≠ q and p ∩ W ⊆ q ∩ W."
Here pa ⊆ paOrAd everywhere, so Fw₀ is redundant. A more careful
formalization would replace paOrAd with a non-accidental
generalization (cf. §5.5) whose lumping behavior is the same. The
present minimal demo is enough to exhibit the lumping-closure
mechanism but should not be taken as endorsing a Kratzer-admissible
Base Set.
Other admissibility conditions we do not check:
- (ii) Persistence: holds trivially here (each proposition is parthood-upward-closed by construction)
- (iii) Cognitive Viability: per @cite{kratzer-2012} p. 133, "the big unknown" — out of scope for formal semantics
- (v) Completeness:
⋂ Fw₀ = pa = {sA, actual}does not contain "all and only worlds indistinguishable fromactual," so this also fails — fixable but orthogonal to the lumping argument
On the discriminating contrast: Paula vs. switches #
The lumping CF is not the only operator that gets the right answer
on the Paula scenario. Theories/Semantics/Conditionals/Counterfactual.universalCounterfactual
(Lewis/Stalnaker minimal-change) also blocks the spurious prediction
on Paula, because the closest notPa-world to actual under any
sensible similarity ordering is noApplesQuiet (one switch flipped),
not atlantic (two switches flipped). So Paula isn't where the
discriminating power of lumping lives.
The actual target of Kratzer's §5.4 complaint is the
naive maximal-consistent-extension premise semantics — the
pre-lumping Kratzer 1981 algebra extended with the disjunctive
proposition paOrAd. That predecessor allows constructing a maximal
consistent extension of {notPa} ∪ Fw₀ that includes paOrAd while
excluding pa, forcing ad. Lumping (the Crucial Set's closure
clause) prevents this construction. To formally exhibit the contrast,
linglib would need to formalize the maximal-consistent-extension
operator separately and prove it predicts ad on this scenario.
That's out of scope here.
The discriminating power of lumping vs. closest-worlds semantics shows up not on Paula but on @cite{ciardelli-zhang-champollion-2018}'s two-switches scenario (where the closest-worlds account is empirically falsified) — see cross-references below.
Cross-references #
Phenomena/Conditionals/Studies/CiardelliZhangChampollion2018.lean: the open question of whether the lumping CF inherits CZC's switches falsification. This file is the first concretewouldCFinstantiation, providing the template for a future situation-semantic switches model.
Scope #
This is the minimal demonstration: 4 indices, 2 propositions in the Base Set, one antecedent, one consequent. A full formalization with all five propositions (9a–9e), the moon variant (10b), and an admissibility-respecting Base Set is left as future work, as is the still-life painting variant from §5.2.
The minimal Paula scenario #
The four indices: three worlds and one partial situation.
- actual : Sit
The actual world
w₀: Paula buys apples; Atlantic fine. - noApplesQuiet : Sit
A counterfactual world: no Paula apples; Atlantic fine.
- atlantic : Sit
A counterfactual world: no Paula apples; Atlantic dries.
- sA : Sit
Partial situation supporting just "Paula buys apples".
Instances For
Equations
- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
Instances For
Equations
- Phenomena.Conditionals.Studies.Kratzer2012Lumping.instDecidableEqSit x✝ y✝ = if h : x✝.ctorIdx = y✝.ctorIdx then isTrue ⋯ else isFalse ⋯
Equations
- One or more equations did not get rendered due to their size.
The frame and propositions #
The minimal SituationFrame: a single dummy entity, the four-index
Sit type with the parthood ordering above. (Kratzer's argument
doesn't depend on entities; we provide a one-element entity domain
for the Frame interface.)
Equations
- Phenomena.Conditionals.Studies.Kratzer2012Lumping.paulaSituationFrame = { Entity := Unit, Index := Phenomena.Conditionals.Studies.Kratzer2012Lumping.Sit, order := inferInstance }
Instances For
Propositions #
These are sets of indices in paulaSituationFrame. The key claim is
that they are persistent (closed upward under parthood) and have
the lumping properties Kratzer's argument requires.
"Paula is buying apples or the Atlantic is drying" — the disjunction (= @cite{kratzer-2012} (9d)).
Equations
Instances For
"Paula is not buying apples" — the antecedent of our
counterfactual. True at noApplesQuiet, atlantic, and trivially
at any other index where pa fails (here, none).
Equations
Instances For
The lumping fact #
The central lumping claim (@cite{kratzer-2012}, p. 129):
paOrAd lumps pa at the actual world. Every part of actual
where the disjunction holds also has pa hold, because the ad
disjunct has no truth-makers in any part of actual.
The reverse direction also holds (pa is reflexively a sublumper
of itself, and paOrAd ⊇ pa extensionally).
Base Set and Crucial Set computation #
The Crucial Set for antecedent notPa at the actual world is
just the singleton {notPa}. Any subset that contains paOrAd
is forced by lumping closure to also contain pa, which then
contradicts notPa — so neither paOrAd nor pa can be
consistently added to a lumping-closed subset of Fw₀ ∪ {notPa}
that contains notPa.
The wouldCF prediction #
The wouldCF truth condition is ∀ A ∈ CrucialSet, ∃ A' ⊇ A in CrucialSet, Follows A' q. We prove CrucialSet Fw₀ actual notPa = {{notPa}}
exactly (not just ∋ {notPa}), which collapses the would-CF prediction
to Follows {notPa} ad — and that fails at noApplesQuiet.
The Crucial Set is exactly {{notPa}}. The lumping-closure
clause forces any consistent member containing paOrAd to also
contain pa, which then contradicts notPa. So the only consistent
lumping-closed subset of Fw₀ ∪ {notPa} containing notPa is
{notPa} itself.
The spurious-prediction-blocking direction: at noApplesQuiet,
the consequent ad fails — so the only candidate Crucial Set
member {notPa} does NOT logically imply ad.
Headline theorem: the @cite{kratzer-2012} §5.4.4 lumping CF
correctly blocks the spurious prediction "if Paula weren't buying
apples, the Atlantic would be drying" (wouldCF returns false).
Proof: by crucialSet_notPa_eq_singleton, the only Crucial Set
member is {notPa}, and the only {notPa}-superset in the (now
singleton) Crucial Set is {notPa} itself. The would-CF prediction
therefore reduces to Follows {notPa} ad, which
follows_notPa_ad_fails shows is false.