@cite{ciardelli-zhang-champollion-2018} — Two switches in the theory of counterfactuals #
Ciardelli, I., Zhang, L. & Champollion, L. (2018). Two switches in the theory of counterfactuals: A study of truth conditionality and minimal change. Linguistics and Philosophy 41(6): 577–621.
Headline finding #
Two truth-conditionally equivalent clauses (A̅ ∨ B̅ and ¬(A ∧ B),
related by De Morgan) make different semantic contributions when
embedded as counterfactual antecedents. This challenges the textbook
truth-conditional view of meaning AND falsifies any minimal-change
semantics of counterfactuals — including Lewis-Stalnaker similarity
semantics and Kratzer-style premise semantics.
The switches scenario (p. 578, Fig. 1) #
Two switches A, B at opposite ends of a hallway. The light is on iff both switches are in the same position. Currently both are up, light is on. The crowdsourced experiment elicited truth judgments for five counterfactuals; the discriminating contrast (Tables 7–8, p. 607):
A̅ > OFF("If A were down, light would be off"): ~78% trueB̅ > OFF: ~76% trueA̅ ∨ B̅ > OFF: ~79% true¬(A ∧ B) > OFF: ~20% true
A̅ ∨ B̅ and ¬(A ∧ B) are de-Morgan equivalent yet diverge sharply.
What this file proves #
- De Morgan equivalence:
(A̅ ∨ B̅) = ¬(A ∧ B)as sets of worlds. - Concrete predictions across three operators: instantiating a
Hamming-distance similarity ordering at the actual world
uu, all three closest-worlds operators in linglib —universalCounterfactual(Lewis/Stalnaker),selectionalCounterfactual(Stalnaker + supervaluation, returnsTruth3.true), andhomogeneityCounterfactual(von Fintel/Križ, returnsassertion = some truewith satisfied presupposition) — all predict¬(A ∧ B) > OFFtrue. This is the empirically falsified prediction (~20% true, Tables 7–8). - Generic structural argument (CZC §1.2 argument, p. 582):
the operator-agnostic core
(
closestWorlds_predicate_forces_notBothUp) shows that for ANY similarity ordering and ANY consequentB, joint truth of "every closest aDn-world is B" and "every closest bDn-world is B" entails "every closest notBothUp-world is B". Three corollaries instantiate this foruniversalCounterfactual,selectionalCounterfactual, andhomogeneityCounterfactual— closing CZC's claim that all minimal-change theories fail.
Connection to linglib's Kratzer infrastructure #
@cite{ciardelli-zhang-champollion-2018} §6.3 extends the argument to standard premise semantics as formulated in @cite{kratzer-1981} (CZC cite both Kratzer 1981a and 1981b — only the 1981 "Notional Category" paper is in the linglib bib): "regardless of the particular ordering source that we consider, standard premise semantics still predicts that ... `¬(A ∧ B)
OFF` is true as well, contrary to our experimental findings." Per Lewis 1981, standard premise semantics is equivalent to ordering semantics with a weak partial order, which puts it in scope of the §1.2 argument formalized above.
Whether the argument extends to @cite{kratzer-2012}'s lumping-based
revision (§5.4.4) is open and not addressed by CZC. The lumping CF
truth condition (§5.4.4) is a quantifier alternation — "for every set
in F_{w,p} there is a superset that implies q" — not the
maximization-of-consistency pattern that the §1.2 argument falsifies.
Lumping constrains which propositions can accompany an antecedent
into a Crucial Set (the lumping-closure condition); it doesn't relax
the for-all-supersets quantifier. Whether this rescues the analysis on
the switches scenario requires building a properly situation-semantic
switches model and instantiating
Semantics.Conditionals.PremiseSemantic.wouldCF; we leave this as
future work.
For the first concrete wouldCF instantiation on a situation-semantic
scenario, see
Phenomena.Conditionals.Studies.Kratzer2012Lumping — which
formalizes Kratzer's own apple-buying example (§5.4.1–§5.4.3). That
file establishes the template for an eventual situation-semantic
switches model that would settle the question raised here.
The CZC positive proposal — a foreground/background distinction combined with inquisitive lifting (§4) — and §6.4's SNCA derivation (Proposition 2 + Lemma 1) are also left as future formalization.
The switches scenario #
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- Phenomena.Conditionals.Studies.CiardelliZhangChampollion2018.instDecidableEqWorld x✝ y✝ = if h : x✝.ctorIdx = y✝.ctorIdx then isTrue ⋯ else isFalse ⋯
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Atomic propositions: switch positions and the light.
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- Phenomena.Conditionals.Studies.CiardelliZhangChampollion2018.aUp Phenomena.Conditionals.Studies.CiardelliZhangChampollion2018.World.uu = True
- Phenomena.Conditionals.Studies.CiardelliZhangChampollion2018.aUp Phenomena.Conditionals.Studies.CiardelliZhangChampollion2018.World.ud = True
- Phenomena.Conditionals.Studies.CiardelliZhangChampollion2018.aUp Phenomena.Conditionals.Studies.CiardelliZhangChampollion2018.World.du = False
- Phenomena.Conditionals.Studies.CiardelliZhangChampollion2018.aUp Phenomena.Conditionals.Studies.CiardelliZhangChampollion2018.World.dd = False
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- Phenomena.Conditionals.Studies.CiardelliZhangChampollion2018.bUp Phenomena.Conditionals.Studies.CiardelliZhangChampollion2018.World.uu = True
- Phenomena.Conditionals.Studies.CiardelliZhangChampollion2018.bUp Phenomena.Conditionals.Studies.CiardelliZhangChampollion2018.World.du = True
- Phenomena.Conditionals.Studies.CiardelliZhangChampollion2018.bUp Phenomena.Conditionals.Studies.CiardelliZhangChampollion2018.World.ud = False
- Phenomena.Conditionals.Studies.CiardelliZhangChampollion2018.bUp Phenomena.Conditionals.Studies.CiardelliZhangChampollion2018.World.dd = False
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The wiring law (@cite{ciardelli-zhang-champollion-2018}, p. 578): light is on iff both switches are in the same position.
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- Phenomena.Conditionals.Studies.CiardelliZhangChampollion2018.lightOn Phenomena.Conditionals.Studies.CiardelliZhangChampollion2018.World.uu = True
- Phenomena.Conditionals.Studies.CiardelliZhangChampollion2018.lightOn Phenomena.Conditionals.Studies.CiardelliZhangChampollion2018.World.dd = True
- Phenomena.Conditionals.Studies.CiardelliZhangChampollion2018.lightOn Phenomena.Conditionals.Studies.CiardelliZhangChampollion2018.World.ud = False
- Phenomena.Conditionals.Studies.CiardelliZhangChampollion2018.lightOn Phenomena.Conditionals.Studies.CiardelliZhangChampollion2018.World.du = False
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Antecedents and consequents #
We follow the paper's notation: A̅ (aDn) means "switch A is down"
and so on. The two key antecedents — A̅ ∨ B̅ (aOrBdn) and
¬(A ∧ B) (notBothUp) — are de-Morgan equivalent.
"Switch A is down."
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"Switch B is down."
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"Switch A is down or switch B is down."
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"Switches A and B are not both up" (= ¬(A ∧ B)).
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"The light is off."
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De Morgan equivalence #
A̅ ∨ B̅ and ¬(A ∧ B) are pointwise-equivalent: the two antecedents
have identical truth conditions across the four worlds.
The same equivalence as set equality (the truth-conditional content of the two antecedents coincides).
Concrete similarity ordering: Hamming distance #
Hamming distance between two worlds: the number of switch positions on which they disagree.
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Standard "edit distance" similarity ordering: w₁ is at least as
close to w₀ as w₂ is iff hamming w₀ w₁ ≤ hamming w₀ w₂. This
is one natural ordering on this scenario; the abstract theorem
below shows the falsification doesn't depend on this choice.
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Predictions of the universal/Lewis-Stalnaker counterfactual #
Prediction 1: A̅ > OFF is true at uu. (The closest A̅-world
to uu is du — Hamming distance 1 — and the light is off there.)
Empirically: ~78% true.
Prediction 2: B̅ > OFF is true at uu. By the symmetric
argument. Empirically: ~76% true.
Prediction 3: A̅ ∨ B̅ > OFF is true at uu. The closest
A̅ ∨ B̅-worlds are {ud, du} (both at Hamming distance 1), and the
light is off in both. Empirically: ~79% true.
Prediction 4 (the falsified one): ¬(A ∧ B) > OFF is also
predicted true at uu, since ¬(A ∧ B) and A̅ ∨ B̅ are
de-Morgan equivalent. Empirically: only ~20% true.
This is the central empirical contrast of @cite{ciardelli-zhang-champollion-2018}: a truth-conditional semantics combined with minimal change cannot reproduce the sharp divergence between the two predictions, since the two antecedents are forced to behave identically.
Same falsified prediction under selectional and homogeneity #
@cite{ciardelli-zhang-champollion-2018}'s argument targets any
minimal-change semantics. Both selectionalCounterfactual (Stalnaker
- supervaluation) and
homogeneityCounterfactual(von Fintel/Križ) share the same closest-worlds substrate asuniversalCounterfactual, and so make the same falsified prediction on the switches scenario.
Selectional CF also predicts ¬(A ∧ B) > OFF true at uu.
Homogeneity CF also predicts ¬(A ∧ B) > OFF true at uu,
with satisfied presupposition (the closest worlds are not mixed
on lightOff).
Abstract minimal-change forcing (@cite{ciardelli-zhang-champollion-2018} §1.2, p. 582) #
The concrete predictions above used a specific similarity ordering. The
following theorem strengthens the argument: for any similarity
ordering whatsoever, if both A̅ > OFF and B̅ > OFF are true at a
world, then ¬(A ∧ B) > OFF is forced true at that world. So there is
no choice of similarity that vindicates the empirical pattern — the
fault lies with the minimal-change architecture itself.
The generic structural argument #
CZC's §1.2 proof actually targets any operator definable as "every closest A-world satisfies B". We expose the generic version first; the universal/selectional/homogeneity instantiations below all collapse to it.
Generic minimal-change forcing: for any similarity ordering and
any consequent predicate B, joint truth of "every closest aDn-world
is B" and "every closest bDn-world is B" entails "every closest
notBothUp-world is B".
This is the operator-agnostic core of CZC §1.2 p. 582. The structural
fact is SimilarityOrdering.mem_closestWorlds_of_subset: a closest
notBothUp-world that happens to be aDn is also a closest
aDn-world (since aDn ⊆ notBothUp as Finsets), so h_a applies;
symmetric for bDn.
Operator-specific corollaries #
All three of universalCounterfactual, selectionalCounterfactual,
and homogeneityCounterfactual reduce their "true" verdict to the
same ∀ w' ∈ closestWorlds, B w' condition (the first if branch in
each definition). The structural lemma above therefore applies
verbatim, only differing in how each operator packages its truth value.
Universal CF version (Lewis/Stalnaker). Direct corollary of the
generic lemma since universalCounterfactual is the universal
quantifier over closest worlds.
Selectional CF version (Stalnaker + supervaluation). When both
simple counterfactuals return .true (every closest world is OFF),
so does the disjunctive-antecedent counterfactual.
Homogeneity CF version (von Fintel/Križ). When both simple
counterfactuals satisfy their presupposition with assertion = some true (every closest world is OFF), so does the disjunctive-
antecedent version.
Empirical data (Tables 7 and 8, p. 607) #
The "True" percentages from the main experiment, separated by presentation order. Reported as rationals for exact comparison.
Table 7: target precedes filler.
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Table 8: filler precedes target.
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The discriminating empirical contrast (Table 7, p. 607): the two
de-Morgan-equivalent antecedents A̅ ∨ B̅ and ¬(A ∧ B) produce
sharply divergent truth-judgment rates when embedded as counterfactual
antecedents.
The simple antecedents A̅ > OFF and B̅ > OFF are robustly judged
true while ¬(A ∧ B) > OFF is robustly judged not-true (Table 7).
This is the contrast that the abstract minimal-change forcing
theorem rules out for any similarity ordering.