Preference Structures #
@cite{condoravdi-lauer-2012} @cite{lauer-2013} @cite{condoravdi-lauer-2016} @cite{condoravdi-lauer-2011}
A preference structure (@cite{condoravdi-lauer-2012} (65)) is a pair
⟨P, ≺⟩ where P ⊆ ℘(W) is a set of propositions and ≺ is a strict
partial order on P.
Layout #
PreferenceStructure W— the bare carrier; a strict order onprefs.Elempackaged as anIsStrictOrderinstance for compatibility with mathlib's order API.maxElts(eq. 70) — maximal elements, returned asSet (Set W)so consumers don't have to package membership proofs.consistent (B : Set W)(eq. 66) — strong, subset-quantified version (distinct from the pairwiseconsistentof @cite{condoravdi-lauer-2011}; fn. 29 of the anankastics paper). Quantifies over arbitraryX ⊆ prefs.realistic (B : Set W)(eq. 67) — preferences are belief-compatible.consistent_implies_realistic— eq. 67 derived from eq. 66 via the singleton-Xcase.
A preference structure: a set of propositions equipped with a strict partial order on the subtype.
prec : prefs → prefs → Prop is typed on the subtype, so the
IsStrictOrder instance is meaningful (no vacuous-off-prefs trap).
For ergonomic raw access, use prec p q with elements of
prefs.Elem (i.e., ⟨_, _⟩ packaged with their membership proof).
- prefs : Set (Set W)
The propositions the agent has preferences over.
The strict ranking on the subtype of preferences.
prec p qreads "q is strictly preferred to p".The strict-partial-order axioms, packaged as a mathlib typeclass.
Instances For
The maximal elements of the preference structure
(@cite{condoravdi-lauer-2016} (70)), returned as
propositions in Set (Set W).
Instances For
Consistency w.r.t. an information state B
(@cite{condoravdi-lauer-2016} (66)): for any subfamily of
preferences whose joint realization is incompatible with B, some
pair is strictly ranked. The quantification over arbitrary X ⊆ prefs
(not just pairs) is the strong form, distinct from
@cite{condoravdi-lauer-2011}'s pairwise variant (fn. 29).
Equations
- P.consistent B = ∀ X ⊆ P.prefs, B ∩ ⋂ p ∈ X, p = ∅ → ∃ p ∈ X, ∃ q ∈ X, ∃ (hp : p ∈ P.prefs) (hq : q ∈ P.prefs), P.prec ⟨p, hp⟩ ⟨q, hq⟩
Instances For
Realism w.r.t. an information state (@cite{condoravdi-lauer-2016} (67)): every preference is belief-compatible.
Instances For
@cite{condoravdi-lauer-2016} fn. 30: realism follows from
consistency via the singleton-X case combined with irreflexivity.
Pair belief-consistency of maximal preferences — abstract version
of @cite{condoravdi-lauer-2016} p. 30 (end of § 5.4): given
consistent B, two maximal preferences cannot have an empty
intersection w.r.t. B. The four cases of the consistency conclusion
∃ p, q ∈ {φ, ψ}, prec p q are blocked by IsStrictOrder
irreflexivity (diagonal pairs) and maximality (off-diagonal pairs).